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Essays in Macroeconomics and Finance
Pablo Ottonello
This dissertation contains three essays on Macroeconomics and Finance. The first
chapter has been motivated by the fact that recoveries from financial crises are charac-
terized by low investment rates and declines in capital stocks. The paper constructs an
equilibrium framework in which financial shocks have a persistent effect on aggregate
investment. The key assumption is that physical capital is traded in a decentralized
market with search frictions, generating “capital unemployment.” After a negative
financial shock, the share of unemployed capital is high, and the economy dedicates
more resources to absorbing existing unemployed capital into production, and less to
accumulating new capital. An estimation of the model for the U.S. economy using
Bayesian techniques shows that the model can generate the investment persistence
and half of the output persistence observed in the Great Recession. Investment search
frictions also lead to a different interpretation of the sources of business-cycle fluctu-
ations, with a larger role for financial shocks, which account for 33 percent of output
fluctuations. Extending the model to allow for heterogeneity in match productiv-
ity, the framework also provides a mechanism for procyclical capital reallocation, as
observed in the data.
The second and third chapters focus on labor unemployment during financial
crises. The second chapter uses a sample of 116 recession episodes in developed and
emerging market economies to compare the labor-market recovery during financial
crises with that of other recession episodes. It documents two new stylized facts.
First, labor-market recovery from financial crises is characterized by either higher
unemployment (“jobless recovery”) or a lower real wage (“wageless recovery”). Sec-
ond, inflation determines the type of recovery: low inflation (below 30 percent annual
rate) is associated with jobless recovery, while high inflation is associated with wage-
less recovery. The paper shows that this pattern of labor recovery from financial
crises is consistent with a simple model in which collateral requirements are higher
(lower) when a larger share of labor costs (physical capital expenditure) is involved
in a loan contract.
The third chapter paper conducts a quantitative study of the optimal exchange-
rate policy in a small open economy that faces the “credit access–unemployment”
trade-off: In the presence of nominal wage rigidity, exchange-rate depreciation re-
duces unemployment; in the presence of collateral constraints linking external debt
to the value of income, exchange-rate depreciation tightens the collateral constraint
and leads to higher consumption adjustment. It is shown that the optimal policy
during financial crises generally features large currency depreciation, since welfare
costs related to higher unemployment and lower consumption typically outweigh wel-
fare costs associated with intertemporal misallocation of consumption. The optimal
policy also implies a lower currency depreciation than that necessary to achieve full
employment, which is consistent with a managed-floating exchange-rate policy, fre-
quently observed during financial crises in emerging market economies. Sudden stops
(or large current-account adjustments) are part of the endogenous response to large
negative shocks under the optimal exchange-rate policy.
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The U.S. Great Recession was followed by a persistent investment slump: Five years
after the trough, investment rates remain below their historical average, and the stock
of capital continues to fall with respect to its trend, constituting the most important
contributor to persistently low economic activity (see Hall, 2014, and Figure 1.1).
The low levels of aggregate investment observed during the recovery from the U.S.
Great Recession are challenging from the points of view of real and monetary models
(see Kydland and Zarazaga, 2012; Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2012). Ac-
cording to these large classes of models, the recovery should be characterized by high
investment rates and rising stocks of physical capital.
The low-investment pattern exhibited by the recovery from the U.S. Great Re-
cession is a salient characteristic of financial-crisis episodes across time and space.
Figure 1.1 shows evidence from a sample of 100 post-war recession episodes in ad-
vanced economies. Recoveries from financial crises are characterized by investment
rates below the historical average and by a fall in capital stock with respect to its
trend – as observed in the U.S. Great Recession.1 This pattern is not, in fact, charac-
1A “financial crisis” is defined as a recession episode in which a banking crisis event (as defined in
1
teristic of the average “regular” recession episode, in which investment rates recover
with output and capital stock stabilizes close to its trend.
Motivated by this evidence, this paper constructs a general equilibrium framework
in which financial shocks lead to investment slumps. The key idea in the model is
that the production of new capital is affected by existing “capital unemployment”
(i.e., owners of idle units of capital unable to find a firm willing to buy or rent these
units to produce). After a negative financial shock (i.e., shocks to the net worth of
the business sector or the risk of business projects), the share of unemployed cap-
ital is high; the economy, then, can achieve a better allocation by directing more
resources to absorb existing unemployed capital into the production process and di-
recting fewer resources to the accumulation of new capital, leading to low investment
rates even after the shock has dissipated. The model’s main assumption, which leads
to equilibrium capital unemployment, is that trade in physical capital occurs in a de-
centralized market characterized by search frictions, capturing costs that firms face
when matching capital to business projects.
To assess the quantitative importance of the proposed mechanism, the paper con-
structs a stochastic business-cycle model with investment search frictions and capital
unemployment. The model is estimated for the U.S. economy using Bayesian tech-
niques and data prior to the U.S. Great Recession. It is shown that following a
sequence of shocks such as those experienced by the U.S. economy in 2008 – and with
no further shocks – the model predicts the persistence of aggregate investment and at
least half of the output persistence observed in the aftermath of the U.S. Great Reces-
sion. Conducting the same exercise in a benchmark model without investment search
frictions, the model predicts that both investment and output should be significantly
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a) takes place between the output peak and recovery point. Appendix A.1
describes the sample construction and data used. The finding of investment lagging behind output
recovery has been documented by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) in a sample of emerging-market
sudden-stop crisis episodes. For other empirical studies characterizing financial-crisis episodes, see
Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b, 2014).
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Figure 1.1: Financial Crises and Investment Slumps.
Note: Output refers to real, per capita, gross domestic product; investment rate refers to the ratio
of gross fixed capital formation to gross domestic product; capital stock refers to the net stock of
fixed assets. The sample of recession episodes includes 20 “financial crisis” episodes and 80 “regular”
recession episodes for 22 advanced economies in the period 1950-2006. For each country included in
the sample, investment rates are expressed in percent deviation from the mean over 1950–2013; the
capital stock is expressed in percent deviation from a log-quadratic trend. In each recession episode,
t = 0 denotes the output trough. The time unit for average episodes is a year. See Appendix A.1
for a description of the sample and data.
higher than the levels observed in the data, as noted in the previous literature.
The estimated model is also used to interpret the sources of U.S. business-cycle
fluctuations. Results indicate that investment search frictions and capital unemploy-
ment are a relevant propagation mechanism for financial shocks: While these shocks
account 33% of output fluctuations in the model with investment search frictions,
they only account for 1% of output fluctuations in the benchmark real model with-
out investment search frictions. Real models with financial frictions that distort firm
purchases of capital can only assign a small role to financial shocks primarily because
3
observed fluctuations in aggregate investment do not imply large fluctuations in the
stock of capital, which is the input to the production function (as discussed, for ex-
ample in Schwartzman, 2012; Bigio, 2014). In the framework developed in the present
paper, the input to the production function is employed capital, which does fluctuate
significantly in response to firm purchases of capital following financial shocks. The
estimated model disciplines the fluctuations in capital unemployment with data on
commercial real estate vacancy rates (office, retail, and industrial space). As shown
in Figure 1.2, the level and fluctuations in this measure of capital unemployment are
comparable to those of U.S. labor unemployment.2 The estimation attributes most
of the fluctuations in capital unemployment to financial shocks, which have a large
effect on firms’ capital demand.
In the model search is directed, in the sense that sellers and buyers can search
offers at a particular price, and the probability of finding a match depends on this
price (see, for example, Shimer, 1996; Moen, 1997). Search frictions in the physical
capital market were first studied in a random search environment by Kurmann and
Petrosky-Nadeau (2007). In a calibrated version of their model they show that these
frictions are not a quantitatively relevant propagation mechanism of TFP shocks.
The most important difference from their quantitative framework is the inclusion of
financial shocks, that in the present paper account for most of the fluctuations in
market tightness. In fact, if the present paper included only TFP shocks, it would
also have concluded that search frictions in investment are not a relevant quantitative
propagation mechanism once output fluctuation is matched, a result reminiscent to
that found in Shimer (2005) for the labor market.
The directed-search framework for the physical-capital market developed in the
present paper builds on those developed for the labor market in Shi (2009), Menzio
2Figure A.1 of Appendix A.2 shows that measures of capital unemployment available to Euro
economies experiencing deep financial crises (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) also show a large
increase in capital unemployment, comparable to that of labor unemployment.
4
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Figure 1.2: U.S. Unemployment of Physical Capital and Labor, 1980–2013.
Note: Capital unemployment (structures) constructed based on vacancy rates of office, retail and
industrial units. Data source: CBRE and REIS. See Appendix A.1 for details. Labor unemployment
refers to the civilian unemployment rate. Data source: Federal Reserve of Saint Louis. Data is
expressed in percent. Shadow areas denote NBER (peak to trough) recession dates.
and Shi (2010, 2011), Schaal (2012) and Kaas and Kircher (2013). Studying these
frictions for the physical capital market provides two novel mechanisms: First, it pro-
vides a new interaction between the production of capital and capital unemployment.
The existence of high capital unemployment leads to a lower accumulation of new
capital goods, while existing units are absorbed into production. This mechanism
is not present in labor-market models in which population is generally assumed to
be constant or exogenous. Second, because physical capital is not only a factor of
production, but can also be used by firms as collateral for loans (see, for example,
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Geanakoplos, 2010), fluctuations in capital unemployment
interact with financial shocks in a way not seen in the labor market.
The framework developed in this paper can also be used to study capital real-
location. This is done by extending the model to allow for heterogeneity in capital
5
match-specific productivity. This extension allows a characterization not only of
the transition of capital from unemployment to employment, but of the transition
of capital from employment to employment, since it adds a motive for trading un-
matched capital while it remains employed (similar to “on the job search” in the
labor-market literature). As shown in Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2011) for
the labor market, the directed-search structure of the model is especially suitable to
studying employment–employment transitions resulting from heterogeneity in match-
specific productivity. The paper shows that capital reallocation is procyclical in this
framework, as in the data (see Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Eisfeldt and Rampini,
2006). This is because negative shocks are associated with fewer capital purchases,
making it harder for sellers of employed capital to find buyers.
Layout. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses
the relationship with the literature. Section 1.3 introduces investment search frictions
and capital unemployment into a simple neoclassical growth model, and presents the
main mechanism relating capital unemployment to capital accumulation. Section 1.4
builds a quantitative business-cycle model including search frictions in investment.
Section 1.5 presents the model estimation and the quantitative results. Section 1.6
studies capital reallocation in the framework of the model. Section 1.7 concludes and
discusses possible extensions.
1.2 Relationship with the Literature
This section discusses the contribution of the present paper from the perspective of
four strands of the literature.
Financial Shocks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. This paper builds on
the growing body of literature that studies the effect of financial shocks on macroe-
6
conomic fluctuations. The study of the implications of financial frictions has a long
tradition in macroeconomics (for a recent survey, see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and
Sannikov, 2012). Following the Great Recession, a number of studies have shown
that shocks that affect the severity of financial frictions can have a large impact on
aggregate fluctuations (see, for example, Mendoza, 2010; Arellano, Bai and Kehoe,
2012; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2013; Christiano, Motto
and Rostagno, 2014).
The present paper contributes to this literature with a new financial-shock prop-
agation mechanism by introducing the possibility of capital unemployment, whose
fluctuations are mostly driven by this type of shock. The propagation mechanism
proposed for financial shocks in this paper provides two novel dimensions to this lit-
erature. First, the relevant role assigned to financial shocks does not rely on price or
wage stickiness, and holds in the context of a real model that would assign a small role
to financial shocks in the absence of investment search frictions. The role of financial
shocks is a key discussion in the business-cycle literature and an important source of
discrepancy between real and monetary models, with the latter attributing a much
larger effect to these shocks than the former (as discussed in Christiano, Motto and
Rostagno, 2014). The present paper shows that an important part of the discrepancy
between these two branches of the literature can be reconciled by introducing invest-
ment search frictions. In a second contribution to this literature, the present paper
provides a mechanism whereby financial shocks are followed by investment slumps,
as documented in Figure 1.1.3
Investment Dynamics. By studying investment slumps following financial shocks,
this paper relates to the large body of literature studying aggregate investment dy-
3Queralto (2013) constructs a quantitative framework in which financial crises have persistent
effects on economic activity. Since that mechanism relies on endogenous TFP growth, the findings
are complementary to those presented in the present paper.
7
namics (see, for example, Caballero, 1999; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). In par-
ticular, the mechanism of this paper is consistent with the empirical findings that
attribute a key role to financial factors in aggregate investment (see for example
Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajšek, 2014).
Since the set of financial shocks studied in this paper include a shock to the id-
iosyncratic cross-sectional uncertainty of the quality of capital, the findings of this
paper are also related to the recent branch of the literature studying the effect of
uncertainty shocks on aggregate investment and economic activity (see, for example,
Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2012). In these
papers, uncertainty leads firms to adopt a “wait-and-see” strategy, contracting in-
vestment until uncertainty is revealed. The difference with these papers is that the
wait-and-see strategy only implies a short-lived pause in investment: investment re-
covers after uncertainty dissipates. The present paper studies a mechanism by which,
if these shocks lead to a significant increase in capital unemployment, the effects in
investment can be persistent, as observed in the U.S. Great Recession and the typical
financial crisis episode.
In a recent independent work, Rognlie, Shleifer and Simsek (2014) also study
persistent falls in investment such as the one following the U.S. Great Recession.
The key ingredients to their model are an overbuilding of residential capital, nominal
rigidities, and the zero lower bound.4 Therefore the mechanism of their paper and
that of the present paper are complementary interpretations of the investment slump
following the U.S. Great Recession. The result of the present paper also applies to
financial crises in which monetary policy is not constrained by the zero lower bound
and to those in which a residential overbuilding does not take place.
4See also Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012b) and Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) for related
papers studying the persistence of the Great Recession associated to the zero lower bound.
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Search Frictions. By modeling capital unemployment in a search theoretical
framework, this paper relates to the extensive literature studying search frictions
in labor, assets, and goods markets. The relationship with the literature on search
frictions in the labor market was discussed in Section 1.1. Given that physical capital
is both a good and an asset, the search frictions studied in this paper are also related
to those of goods markets or other asset markets. With regard to goods markets,
Bai, Rios-Rull and Storesletten (2012) recently studied search frictions that affect
the purchase of investment goods, as in the present paper. Unlike the present paper,
these frictions only affect the flow of production and not the stock of existing capital
units (which is the main feature of capital unemployment).
In other asset markets, a number of contributions have shown how search frictions
affect the liquidity and returns of assets (for a recent survey, see Lagos, Rocheteau,
and Wright, 2014). In the housing market, search frictions have been used to explain
fluctuations in prices, trading and vacancy rates (see, for example, Wheaton, 1990;
Krainer, 2001; Caplin and Leahy, 2011; Piazzesi, Schneider and Stroebel, 2013). The
main difference with respect to these contributions is that the physical capital con-
sidered in the present paper is a productive asset, and therefore fluctuations in its
unemployment have a direct relationship with economic activity and firms’ invest-
ment.
Capital Utilization. The effect of capital unemployment on economic activity is
related to that studied in the literature on variable capital utilization (for surveys
on capital utilization, see Winston, 1974; Betancourt and Clague, 2008). However,
capital unemployment and capital utilization are two different concepts, related to
different economic mechanisms. To clarify the difference between the two concepts,
it is useful to define a set of categories to classify capital stock, similar to those





































Figure 1.3: A Classification of Capital Stock Status.
Note: The capital stock status is classified defining eight categories similar to those in the labor
market (see, for example, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). Employed capital (Regions 5, 6, 7
and 8) includes units of capital that have been used for production within a period. This includes
capital temporarily idle as part of regular business operations, such as shift changes. Unemployed
capital (Regions 2 and 4) includes units of capital that have not been used for production within
the period and their owners have actively searched to sell or rent the capital unit. Employed and
unemployed capital constitute the “capital force.” Capital outside the capital force (Regions 1 and
3) includes idle units that have not been used for production within the period and whose owners
are not seeking buyers or renters.
example, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). An unemployed unit of capital is a
unit of capital that has not been used for production within the period and whose
owners have actively searched to sell or rent the capital unit. Therefore, while capital
utilization describes the intensity with which capital is used by firms that own or rent
capital (a consumption decision), capital unemployment describes whether owners of
idle capital are unable to sell or rent it (an investment decision). The difference
between capital unemployment and capital utilization then parallels that between
labor unemployment and labor hoarding (see, for example, Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo, 1993; Sbordone, 1996).
Being two different concepts, capital utilization and capital unemployment can
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have different empirical measures. For instance, standard empirical measures of cap-
ital utilization relate to firms’ use of their production capacity.5 Empirical measures
of capital unemployment would instead relate the share of physical capital (owned by
either firms or households) that is idle and available in the market for sale or rent,
such as this paper’s data collected from the commercial real estate market (see Figure
1.2). As illustrated in Appendix A.2 (Figure A.2) for recent U.S. recession episodes,
these empirical measures of capital unemployment and capital utilization can have
significantly different behaviors.
Capital utilization and capital unemployment can also be modeled differently.
Models of capital utilization typically treat it as a control variable whose choice,
related to utilization costs, can be described as an intensive margin (e.g., a higher
utilization rate causes greater depreciation, as in Calvo, 1975; Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Huffman, 1988, Regions 5 and 7 of Figure 1.3) or as an extensive margin (e.g., less-
productive units are left idle, as in Cooley, Hansen and Prescott, 1995; Gilchrist and
Williams, 2000, Region 3 of Figure 1.3). Recent contributions using search frictions
in the product market show that this variable can also be related to the probability of
a firm finding customers (see, for example, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2011; Bai,
Rios-Rull and Storesletten, 2012; Michaillat and Saez, 2013). In the present paper’s
model, capital unemployment is a state variable. The key margins affecting the flows
of unemployed capital to employment are the price of capital posted by sellers and
the mass of capital buyers are willing to purchase at a given price (transition from
Regions 2 and 8 to Regions 5 and 7 of Figure 1.3).
For this reason, this paper will show that different factors affect fluctuations in
5For the U.S., the Federal Reserve Board estimates capacity utilization for industries in manu-
facturing (see Federal Reserve Board, 2014, for a description of the methodology). Gorodnichenko
and Shapiro (2011) use the Survey of Plant Capacity from the U.S. Census Bureau (2014) to con-
struct data on capital utilization. Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), Basu et al. (2013), and Fernald
(2012) provide estimates of factor utilization for the U.S. economy, capturing labor effort and the
work week of capital.
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capital utilization and capital unemployment and that different implications follow
from explicitly modeling capital unemployment (such as the a low rate of investment
when capital unemployment is high). Nevertheless, the concepts of capital utilization
and capital unemployment can be seen as complementary. In fact, once the model
with capital unemployment is extended to study capital reallocation (transitions from
Regions 6 and 8 to Regions 5 and 7 of Figure 1.3), changes in the probability of selling
capital units will affect firms’ capital utilization rates.
1.3 Investment Search Frictions: Basic
Framework
This section introduces investment search frictions into a simple neoclassical growth
model. The framework abstracts from uncertainty, endogenous labor supply and
other frictions – which will be later introduced in the quantitative model – to make
the mechanism clear. Policy functions and transitional dynamics are studied, show-
ing how capital accumulation is affected by existing capital unemployment. In the
standard neoclassical growth model, the process of convergence from an initial capital
stock below the steady state is characterized by a monotonic increase in the capital
stock. By contrast, in the model with investment search frictions, if the initial to-
tal capital stock is below the steady state and the rate of capital unemployment is
sufficiently high, the transitional dynamics for the capital stock are not monotonic,
featuring an initial decrease and a subsequent increase. Therefore, if a shock leads
to a sufficiently high level of capital unemployment, recovery is characterized by an
investment slump, as documented in Figure 1.1.
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1.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and infinite, with four-stage periods. There is no aggregate uncer-
tainty.
Goods. There are consumption and capital goods: Consumption goods are perish-
able; capital goods depreciate at a constant rate, δ > 0. Capital can be traded in
either of two states: matched or unmatched. Only matched capital can be used as
input in the production of consumption goods.
Agents. The economy is populated by a unit mass of identical households and a
unit mass of entrepreneurs. Households consume, produce unmatched physical capital
and (inelastically) supply labor. The representative household has a continuum of
infinitely lived members, a positive fraction of whom are entrepreneurs. Within each
household there is perfect consumption insurance.6 Entrepreneurs have access to
a technology to produce consumption goods, using matched capital and labor as
inputs, and to a search technology to transform unmatched capital into matched
capital. Capital produced by households begins unmatched. Only entrepreneurs can
store matched capital. Capital held by entrepreneurs is denoted employed capital,
and capital held by households is denoted unemployed capital.
Each period, entrepreneurs have a probability ψ > 0 of retiring from en-
trepreneurial activity. The fraction ψ of entrepreneurs who retire from en-
trepreneurial activity is replaced by a new identical mass of entrepreneurs from the
households’ members, so the population of entrepreneurs is constant. Retiring en-
trepreneurs’ capital becomes unmatched and is transferred to the household. Divi-
6The assumption of large families follows Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) and, more recently,
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014). This assumption facilitates
the work in Section 1.4, when financial frictions are introduced explicitly and entrepreneurs are
endowed with net worth. In the current section, this assumption plays no role and is not different
from a framework in which a representative firm produces consumption goods.
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dends from entrepreneurial activity, resulting from capital purchases and production,
are transferred each period to the household.
Physical capital markets. Trade of unmatched capital between entrepreneurs
and households occurs in a decentralized market with search frictions. Search is
directed, following a structure similar to those in Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011) for
the labor market and in Menzio, Shi and Sun (2013) for the money market. In
particular, this market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the price
of unmatched capital, denoted x. Sellers (households) and buyers (entrepreneurs) can
choose which submarket to visit. In each submarket, the market tightness, denoted
θ(x), is defined as the ratio between the mass of capital searched by entrepreneurs
and the mass of unemployed capital offered in that submarket. Households face no
search cost. Visiting submarket x in period t, they face a probability p(θt(x)) of
finding a match, where p : R+ → [0, 1] is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly concave function that satisfies p(0) = 0 and limθ→∞ p(θ) = 1.
Entrepreneurs face a cost per unit searched denominated in consumption goods and
denoted cs > 0. Visiting submarket x in period t, they face a probability q(θt(x)) of
finding a match, where q : R+ → [0, 1] is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly
decreasing function that satisfies q(θ) = p(θ)
θ
, q(0) = 1 and limθ→∞ q(θ) = 0. The cost
of a unit of capital for entrepreneurs in submarket x is denoted Qx (which includes
two components: the price paid to the seller, x, and the search cost in submarket x).
Timing. Each period is divided into four stages: production, separation, search,
and investment. In the production stage, entrepreneurs produce consumption goods
using matched capital from the previous period; employed and unemployed capi-
tal depreciates. In the separation stage, a fraction ψ of entrepreneurs retires and
their capital becomes unmatched. An identical mass of entrepreneurs begins en-
trepreneurial activity with no initial capital. In the search stage, entrepreneurs who
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do not retire and new entrepreneurs purchase unmatched capital from households,
and net dividends in terms of consumption goods are transferred. In the investment
stage, households produce physical capital and consume, and retired entrepreneurs
transfer their capital to households.
1.3.2 Households
Household preferences are described by the lifetime utility function
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ci,t) , (1.1)
where Ci,t denotes consumption of household i in period t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective
discount factor, and U : R+ → R is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly concave function.




(1− p(θt(xk,i,t))) dk + ψ(1− δ)Ket + Ii,t, (1.2)
where Kui,t denotes the stock of unemployed capital held by household i at the begin-
ning of period t, Ket denotes the stock of employed capital at the beginning of period t,
Ii,t denotes the household’s investment in period t, and xk,i,t denotes the submarket in
which unemployed capital unit k is listed by household i in period t. The first term of
the right-hand side of equation (1.2) represents the depreciated mass of capital which
was unemployed at the beginning of period t and was not sold to entrepreneurs for
a given market tightness, θt(x), and submarket choice xk,i,t. The second term of the
right-hand side of equation (1.2) represents the mass of employed capital transferred
from retired entrepreneurs to households. The third term represents the addition
(subtraction) to unemployed capital stock from investment.
The sequential budget constraint of household i is given by
Ci,t + Ii,t =
∫ (1−δ)Kui,t
0
p(θt(xk,i,t))xk,i,t dk +Wth+ Π̃i,t, (1.3)
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where Wt denotes the wage rate in period t, h denotes the household (inelastic)
supply of hours of work to the labor market, and Π̃i,t denotes net transfers in terms
of consumption goods from entrepreneurs to household i in period t – described
further in the next section. The left-hand side of equation (1.3) represents the uses of
income: consumption and investment. The right-hand side of the equation represents
the sources of income: selling unmatched capital in the decentralized market, labor
income, and transfers from entrepreneurs.
Household i’s problem is then to choose plans for Ci,t, Ii,t, Kui,t+1, and xk,i,t that
maximize utility (1.1), subject to the sequence of budget constraints (1.3), the accu-
mulation constraints for unemployed capital (1.2), given the initial levels of capital,
Kui,0 and Ke0, the given sequence of net transfers, Π̃i,t, and the given sequence of
market-tightness functions, θt(x). Denoting Λi,t the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the budget constraint (1.3), in an interior solution, the optimality conditions
are (1.2) and (1.3), and the first-order are conditions
Λi,t = U
′(Ci,t), (1.4)






i,t+1 + (1− p(θt+1(xui,t+1)))
]
, (1.5)
−p(θ(xui,t)) = p′(θt(xui,t))θ′t(xui,t)(xui,t − 1), (1.6)
where xui,t denotes household i’s choice of submarket for unmatched capital in period
t, the unit of capital subindex, k, has been dropped because the optimality condition
with respect to the choice of submarket, xi,t, is the same for all units of capital.
1.3.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have access to a technology to produce consumption goods that uses
matched capital as input:
Yj,t = AtF (K
e







where Yj,t denotes output produced by entrepreneur j in period t, Kej,t ≥ 0 denotes
the stock of matched capital held by entrepreneur j at the beginning of period t, hj,t
denotes hours of work employed by entrepreneur j in period t, At is an aggregate
productivity factor affecting the production technology in period t.
The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize the present discounted value of divi-








where Πej,t denotes net dividends paid by entrepreneur j to the household in period
t, Et denotes the expectation conditional on the information set available at time t
(the expected value is over the idiosyncratic retirement shock), and the household’s
subindex, i, in the shadow value Λt has been dropped since the first-order condi-
tions of the household’s problem are the same for all households. Net dividends of
entrepreneur j are defined by the flow-of-funds constraint:
Πej,t = AtF (K
e







+ ψj,t(1− δ)Kej,t, (1.9)
where ιe,xj,t ≥ 0 denotes the mass of capital purchased by entrepreneur j in sub-
market x in period t, and the stochastic variable ψj,t ∈ {0, 1} takes the value 1 if
entrepreneur j retires from entrepreneurial activity in period t and 0 otherwise, and
satisfies Et−1(ψj,t) = ψ ∀ t, j. The three terms in the right-hand side of equation
(1.9) represent the sources of net dividends transferred from entrepreneurs to house-
holds: The first term represents the output in terms of consumption goods produced
by entrepreneur j in period t. The second term denotes the net purchase of physical
capital, expressed in consumption units, that entrepreneur j makes in the case of not
retiring in period t. The last term represents the transfer of unmatched capital that
entrepreneur j makes to households in the case of retiring in period t. The first two
terms define the net transfer, in terms of consumption goods, that entrepreneur j
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(see the household’s budget constraint (1.3)).
By the law of large numbers, the cost per unit of capital, of mass ιe,xj,t , purchased





The right-hand side of equation (1.10) represents the two components of the cost of




The stock of matched capital for entrepreneur j, who has the opportunity to invest
in period t, evolves according to the law of motion




Denote the period in which entrepreneur j enters entrepreneurial activity as t0j, and
assume entrepreneurs enter entrepreneurial activity with no initial matched capital;
that is, Kej,t0j = 0 ∀ t0j ≥ 0.
7
Entrepreneur j’s problem, is then to choose plans for Kej,t+1, ι
e,x
j,t , and hj,t that
maximize the present discounted value of dividends (1.8) subject to the sequence
of flow-of-funds constraints (1.9), the accumulation constraints for matched capital





, given the initial level of matched capital, Kej,t0j , the given sequence
of aggregate productivity At, the given sequence of prices, Wt, and the given sequence
of market-tightness functions, θt(x). Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated






Lagrange multiplier associated with the nonnegativity constraint for capital purchases
in submarket x in period t + s, the optimality conditions are (1.9), (1.11), ιe,xt ≥ 0,
7A mass one of entrepreneurs starts period 0 with a stock of matched capital Ke0.
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rkt + (1− δ) (ψ + (1− ψ)Qj,t+1)
]
, (1.13)
Qxt = Qj,t + Ξ
x
j,t, (1.14)
and the complementary slackness conditions,




j,t = 0, (1.15)
for all x, where the net revenues from production per unit of matched capital are











The entrepreneurs’ optimality conditions, (1.14) and (1.15), imply that, in equilib-
rium, any submarket visited by a positive number of entrepreneurs must have the
same cost per unit of capital, and entrepreneurs will be indifferent among them.









where the entrepreneur’s subindex, j, has been dropped in the shadow value Qt
because the optimality conditions (1.13)–(1.15) are the same for all entrepreneurs.








For all x ≥ Qt, θt(x) = 0: capital units listed above the value of capital for en-
trepreneurs remain unmatched.
Using the definition of market tightness, the law of large numbers, and the fact
that a household’s choice of submarket, xk,i,t is the same for all units of capital,
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k, and all households, i, the flow of capital that transitions from unemployment














Aggregating the entrepreneurs’ capital-accumulation constraints provides a law of
motion for employed capital:
Ket+1 = (1− ψ)(1− δ)Ket + p(θt(xut ))(1− δ)Kut . (1.18)
where the aggregate stock of employed and unemployed capital in period t are defined,
respectively, by Ket ≡
∫ 1
0




From the household’s capital-accumulation constraint (1.2), and using again the
law of large numbers and the fact that the choice of submarket, xk,i,t, is the same for
all units of capital, k, and all households, i, a law of motion for unemployed capital
is obtained:
Kut+1 = (1− p(θt(xut )))(1− δ)Kut + ψ(1− δ)Ket + It, (1.19)















hj,t dj = h. Aggregating the households’ bud-
get constraints and the entrepreneurs’ flow-of-funds constraints and using the en-
trepreneurs’ optimality conditions and the laws of motion for employed and unem-
ployed capital provides the economy’s resource constraint:
Ct + It + csθt(x
u
t )(1− δ)Kut = AtF (Ket , h). (1.21)




The competitive equilibrium in this economy can then be defined as follows.
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Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium). Given initial conditions for employed and
unemployed capital, Ke0 and Ku0 , and sequences of aggregate productivity, At, a
competitive equilibrium is a sequence of individual allocations and shadow val-
ues {(Ci,t, Ii,t, Kui,t+1, xui,t)i∈[0,1], (Kej,t+1, ι
e,x
j,t , hj,t)j∈[0,1]}, {(Λi,t)i∈[0,1], (Qj,t)j∈[0,1]}, ag-
gregate allocations {Ct, It, Ket+1, Kut+1}, prices {Wt}, and market-tightness functions
{θt(x)} such that
(i) The individual allocations and shadow values solve the household’s and en-
trepreneur’s problems at the equilibrium prices and equilibrium market-tightness
functions for all i and j.
(ii) The market-tightness function satisfies (1.16) for all x.
(iii) The labor market clears.
1.3.5 Characterizing Equilibrium
Efficiency. Given the directed-search structure of the decentralized market, it can
be shown that the competitive equilibrium is efficient in the sense that its allocation
coincides with the solution a social planner would select when facing the same techno-
logical constraints as those faced by private agents, including search effort. Efficiency
is defined and established in the following definition and proposition.
Definition 2 (Efficient allocation). A sequence of allocations, {Ct, It, Kt+1, kut+1, θut },





βtU (Ct) , (1.22)
s.t. Ct + It + csθut (1− δ)kutKt = AtF ((1− kut )Kt, h), (1.23)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It, (1.24)
(1− kut+1)Kt+1 = [(1− ψ)(1− kut ) + p(θut )kut ](1− δ)Kt, (1.25)
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given initial conditions for capital stock and capital-unemployment rate, K0 and ku0 ,
and sequences of aggregate productivity, At.
Proposition 1. The competitive equilibrium is efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. ■
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier of resource constraint (1.23) as Λspt , and the
Lagrange multiplier for employed-capital law of motion (1.25) as (Qspt − 1)Λspt , the
optimality conditions of the social planner’s problem are (1.23)–(1.25), and the first-
order conditions, that after operating, can be expressed as











t+1{At+1F1(Ket+1, h) + (1− δ)[ψ +Q
sp
t (1− ψ)]}], (1.28)
Λspt = βΛ
sp
t+1(1− δ){(1− p(θt+1)) +Q
sp
t+1p(θt+1)− csθt+1}. (1.29)
Equation (1.26) states that the social planner equates the marginal utility of con-
sumption with the social shadow value of wealth, Λspt . Equation (1.27) states that
the planner equates the social marginal costs and benefits of increasing market tight-
ness: The left-hand side of equation (1.27) represents the social marginal cost of
increasing the market tightness, which is given by the cost cs per unit searched; the
right-hand side of equation (1.27) represents the social marginal benefit of increasing
market tightness, which is the product of two terms: the marginal increase in the
probability of matching unemployed capital, given by p′(θut ), and the shadow value
of employed capital in consumption units, (Qspt − 1). Equation (1.28) states that the
planner equates the social marginal cost of increasing the employment rate of capital
in period t, given by Λspt Qspt , with the expected discounted social marginal benefit of
increasing the capital employment rate in period t+1, given by the right-hand side of




t+1, h)) and the expected depreciated value of a unit of employment capital
(given by (1 − δ)[ψ + Qspt (1 − ψ)]). Finally, equation (1.29) states that the social
planner equates the social marginal cost of increasing the capital stock in period t,
given by Λspt , with the expected discounted social marginal benefit of increasing the
capital stock in period t + 1 given by the right-hand side of equation (1.29). Since
newly produced capital is unemployed, the marginal benefit is that of a consumption
unit with probability [1− p(θut+1)], and that of an employed unit of capital (given by
Λspt+1Q
sp
t ) with probability p(θut+1), net of search costs (given by csθut+1).
Policy functions and transitional dynamics. This section studies the policy
functions of the social planner’s problem (1.22), and the resulting process of conver-
gence from an initial capital stock and capital-unemployment rate to the steady-state
path, assuming that aggregate technology is constant over time.
Figure 1.4 shows decision rules for next-period capital stock and next-period
capital-unemployment rate, as a function of the two state variables: current capi-
tal stock and current capital-unemployment rate.8 In each panel, one state variable
varies on the horizontal axis and the others are fixed at a given specified value. If the
current share of unemployed capital is at its steady-state level, the planner’s decision
rules for next-period capital are similar to those of the standard neoclassical growth
model: Increasing the capital stock for levels of current capital stock below the steady
state, decreasing the capital stock for current values of capital above the steady-state
level, as depicted in the top-left panel of Figure 1.4.
This pattern no longer holds if the capital-unemployment rate is above its steady-
state level. As shown on the top-left panel of Figure 1.4, for a sufficiently high
level of the current capital-unemployment rate, next-period’s optimal capital stock
is below its current level even for levels below the steady state. The reason for this
8Functional forms used were those of Section 1.5. Parameter values were set to those used as












































Figure 1.4: Policy Functions.
Note: Decision rules in the social planner’s problem (1.22). In each panel, only one state variable
varies on the horizontal axis. The other state variables is fixed at a given specified value.
is that, as depicted on the top-right panel of Figure 1.4, next-period capital stock
is a decreasing function of the current share of unemployed capital. For instance, if
the stock of capital is at its steady-state level, but the share of unemployed capital is
above its steady-state level, the social planner chooses to decrease the capital stock.
This is because, if the share of unemployed capital is above its steady state, the social
planner wants to reduce next-period share of unemployed capital (see bottom-right
panel of Figure 1.4). In the framework of the present paper, the production of new
capital goods only increases the stock of unemployed capital (see equation (1.2)). For
a given level of consumption, by reducing the stock of capital, the social planner can
dedicate more resources to matching, and reduce the share of unemployed capital.
As implied by the policy functions, the transitional dynamics to the steady state,











Initial Capital Unemployment Rate > Steady State Level
Initial Capital Unemployment Rate = Steady State Level
Figure 1.5: Transitional Dynamics and Initial Capital-Unemployment Rate.
Note: Transitional dynamics from initial capital stock (K0) below the steady-state level for two
alternative values of the initial capital-unemployment rate level (ku0 ).
of capital unemployment. As shown in Figure 1.5, starting from an initial share
of unemployed capital equal to the steady-state level, the stock of capital increases
monotonically, as it would in the standard neoclassical growth model. However, when
the initial share of capital unemployment is sufficiently high, the stock of capital
first decreases, and then increases to catch up with the steady-state level. Capital
unemployment provides a reason why the recovery from a negative shock can be
characterized by an investment slump (as shown in Figure 1 1.1). The remaining
task is then to study which shocks can lead to a significant increase in the capital-
unemployment rate. This will be analyzed quantitatively in Section 1.5.
To further study the economic mechanism induced by the investment search fric-
tion, Appendix A.3 considers a prototype economy with time-varying wedges (in
the spirit of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2007), and maps the equilibrium of the
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economy with search frictions in investment to wedges in the prototype economy.
1.4 A Quantitative Business-Cycle Model with
Investment Search Frictions
This section extends the basic framework of Section 1.3 to a stochastic business-cycle
environment to quantitatively study the proposed mechanism. The model includes
financial frictions and two shocks related to the severity of the financial frictions
that have been studied in the literature as having an important role in U.S. busi-
ness cycles and in the Great Recession: shocks to the cross-sectional idiosyncratic
uncertainty and to the business sector’s net worth (Christiano, Motto and Rostagno,
2014; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012). It also features other frictions and shocks that
the literature has shown to be relevant sources of business-cycle fluctuation in the
U.S. economy (see Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti,
2010, 2011; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012a). In particular, the model incorporates
investment-adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, internal habit formation in
consumption, and four other structural shocks: neutral productivity, investment-
specific productivity, government spending and preferences.
1.4.1 Environment
Goods. As in Section 1.3, consumption goods are perishable, and capital goods
depreciate at a rate δ > 0. Capital goods can be traded in either of two states:
matched or unmatched. Only matched capital can be used as input in the production
of consumption goods.
Agents. The economy is populated by a unit mass of identical households, a unit
mass of entrepreneurs, and an arbitrary large number of financial intermediaries (see
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Figure 1.6). Households consume, supply labor, produce unmatched physical capital
and purchase bonds issued by financial intermediaries. As in Section 1.3, the represen-
tative household has a continuum of infinitely lived members, with a positive fraction
of them being entrepreneurs. Within each household, there is perfect consumption
insurance. Entrepreneurs have access to a technology to produce consumption goods,
using matched capital and labor as inputs, and to a search technology to transform
unmatched capital into matched capital. Capital produced by households begins
unmatched. Only entrepreneurs can store matched capital.
Unlike in Section 1.3, entrepreneurs cannot finance their purchases of capital with
direct transfers from households. Instead, entrepreneurs purchase capital each period
by borrowing from financial intermediaries and by using their own net worth.
Each period, an entrepreneur has a probability ψ > 0 of retiring from en-
trepreneurial activity. The fraction ψ of entrepreneurs that retires from en-
trepreneurial activity each period is replaced by a new equal mass of entrepreneurs
from the households’ members. New entrepreneurs start entrepreneurial activity with
an exogenous and stochastic stock of net worth transferred from the households. Re-
tiring entrepreneurs’ capital becomes unmatched and is traded with households, and
their net worth, after selling the unmatched capital, is transferred to their households.
An unrestricted mass of financial intermediaries can enter the economy each pe-
riod. They can sell bonds to households and lend to entrepreneurs for capital-good
purchases. Additionally, the economy includes a government that conducts fiscal
policy.
Markets. The economy has four competitive markets: goods, labor, physical cap-
ital and credit (see Figure 1.6). The goods and labor markets are frictionless. The
market for physical capital is characterized by search frictions. The credit market is













Figure 1.6: Agents and Markets.
details on the frictions that characterize the credit and physical-capital markets are
provided below.
Credit market. Lending to entrepreneurs is assumed to entail an agency prob-
lem associated with asymmetric information and costly state verification (Townsend,
1979). In particular, entrepreneurs face an idiosyncratic shock whose realization is
private information and can only be known by the lender through costly verification.
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), it is assumed that the idiosyn-
cratic shock is an i.i.d. shock to the quality of capital, denoted ω, whose realization
is known by neither entrepreneurs nor financial intermediaries when lending occurs.
Entrepreneurs finance the purchase of capital partly by borrowing and partly from
their own net worth. The set of contracts offered to entrepreneurs, (Zt+1, Dt+1), spec-
ifies an aggregate state-contingent interest rate, Zt+1, for each loan amount, Dt+1,
to be repaid in case of no default. In the case of default, the financial intermediary
seizes the entrepreneur’s assets. It is further assumed that the capital held by the en-
trepreneur becomes unmatched in the event of default. This form of contract implies
in each period that a cutoff value exists for the realization of ω, denoted ωt, below
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which entrepreneurs default. This formulation also implies that all entrepreneurs
choose the same level of leverage, leading to an aggregation result by which it is not
necessary to keep track of the distribution of net worth among entrepreneurs (which
is particularly suitable for quantitative analysis). Each period t + 1, the realization
of ω is drawn from a distribution Fω,t(ω, σt), where σt is an exogenous shock to the
cross-sectional dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks.
On the other side of the market, it is assumed that financial intermediaries obtain
funds by issuing one-period, non–state-contingent bonds, purchased by households
(similar to deposits). Financial intermediaries are diversified across idiosyncratic
shocks and have free entry.
Physical capital markets. As in Section 1.3, trade of unmatched capital be-
tween entrepreneurs and households occurs in a decentralized market with search
frictions. In addition, this section also includes two centralized markets in which
matched capital can be traded between entrepreneurs at price Qc, and unmatched
capital can be traded between households, financial intermediaries and retired en-
trepreneurs at price Ju. Including these two markets is convenient for technical rea-
sons. In particular, the centralized market in which matched capital can be traded
between entrepreneurs allows the analysis to focus on an equilibrium that does not
depend on the distribution of capital among entrepreneurs.9 The centralized market
in which unmatched capital can be traded facilitates the study of financial interme-
diaries, who, in the event of default, seize the entrepreneur’s capital (recall that the
entrepreneur’s capital becomes unmatched in the event of default). Figure 1.7 sum-
9A key assumption in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) for the result that all entrepreneurs
choose the same level of leverage is the existence of a market in which entrepreneurs can trade
physical capital. This aggregation result, which is particularly convenient for quantitative analysis,
can be extended to the framework of the present paper if entrepreneurs are allowed to trade matched
capital in a centralized market. Studying an economy in which a centralized market for trading














Figure 1.7: Structure of Capital Markets, Quantitative Model.
marizes these three markets for capital, with the participants and forms of trade that
characterize each market.
Search frictions that characterize the decentralized market for unmatched capital
are identical to those in Section 1.3. In particular, search is directed: The market is
organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by the price of unmatched capital,
denoted x, and sellers (households) and buyers (entrepreneurs) can choose which
submarket to visit. In each submarket, the market tightness, denoted θ(x) is defined
as the ratio between the mass of capital searched by entrepreneurs and the mass
of unemployed capital offered in that submarket. Households face no search cost.
Visiting submarket x, they face a probability p(θ(x)) of finding a match, where p :
R+ → [0, 1] is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave
function that satisfies p(0) = 0 and limθ→∞ p(θ) = 1. Entrepreneurs face a cost per
unit searched, cs > 0, denoted in terms of consumption goods. Visiting submarket
x, they face a probability q(θ(x)) of finding a match, where q : R+ → [0, 1] is a
twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing function that satisfies q(θ) = p(θ)
θ
,
q(0) = 1 and limθ→∞ q(θ) = 0. The cost of a unit of capital for entrepreneurs in
submarket x is denoted Qx (which includes two components: the price paid to the
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seller, x, and the search cost in submarket x).
Timing. Time is discrete and infinite, with each period divided into six stages:
production, repayment, separation, borrowing, search and investment. In the pro-
duction stage, entrepreneurs produce consumption goods using capital matched in
the previous period. In the repayment stage, entrepreneurs repay their loans from
the previous period or default; in case of default their capital becomes unmatched
and financial intermediaries monitor and seize the entrepreneur’s production and cap-
ital. In the separation stage, a fraction ψ of entrepreneurs that have not defaulted
retires and their capital becomes unmatched. A new mass of entrepreneurs begins
entrepreneurial activity with no initial capital and with an exogenously determined
net worth. In the borrowing stage, entrepreneurs who do not retire and new en-
trepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries, and financial intermediaries sell
bonds to households. In the search stage, the remaining entrepreneurs purchase un-
matched capital from households and matched capital from other entrepreneurs. In
the investment stage, households produce unmatched physical capital and consume;
retired entrepreneurs transfer their net worth, including unmatched capital, to their
households; and financial intermediaries sell seized unmatched capital to households.
1.4.2 Households




βt{U (Ci,t − ρcCi,t−1)− V (hi,t;φt)}, (1.30)
where Ci,t denotes consumption of household i in period t, hi,t denotes hours worked
by household i in period t; β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor; ρc ∈ [0, 1) is a
parameter governing the degree of internal habit formation; φt denotes an exogenous
and stochastic preference shock in period t (labeled a labor-wedge shock); for every
realization of φt, V (·;φt) : R+ → R is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly
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increasing, strictly convex function; U : R+ → R is a twice continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave function; and Et denotes the expectation
conditional on the information set available at time t.














where Kui,t denotes the stock of unemployed capital held by household i at the be-
ginning of period t, xk,i,t denotes the submarket in which unemployed capital unit k
is listed by household i in period t, ιhi,t denotes the units of unmatched capital pur-
chased by households in the centralized market in period t, Ii,t denotes investment by
household i in period t, Kt denotes aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period
t (taken as given by household i), AIt denotes an exogenous aggregate shock that
affects the production of capital from investment goods in period t (as in Justiniano,
Primiceri and Tambalotti, 2011, labeled an investment-specific technology shock), and
Φ : R → R is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly convex function that intro-
duces investment-adjustment costs. The first term of the right-hand side of equation
(1.31) represents the depreciated mass of capital unemployed at the beginning of pe-
riod t and not sold to entrepreneurs for a given market-tightness function θt(x) and
choice of submarket xk,i,t. The second term of the right-hand side of equation (1.31)
represents the mass of employed capital purchased by the households from retired
and defaulting entrepreneurs. The third term represents the addition (subtraction)
to unemployed-capital stock from investment, net of adjustment costs.
Households have access to a one-period, non–state-contingent bond issued by fi-










where Bi,t denotes the one-period bond holdings chosen by household i at the be-
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ginning of period t, which pays a gross non–state-contingent interest rate, Rt; Wt
denotes the wage rate; Πt denotes net transfers from entrepreneurs and financial in-
termediaries to households in period t – described further in the next sections; and
Tt represents a lump-sum government tax (subsidy) in period t.
Household i’s problem is then to choose the state-contingent sequences of Ci,t,
hi,t, Ii,t, ιhi,t, Kui,t+1, Bi,t and xk,i,t that maximize the expected utility (1.30), subject
to the sequence of budget constraints (1.32) and the accumulation constraints for
unemployed capital (1.31), for the given initial levels of capital and consumption
(Kui,0, Ke0, K0, and Ci,−1), the given sequence of prices (Wt, Jut and Rt), the given
sequence of dividends and taxes (Πt and Tt), the given sequence of market-tightness
functions (θt(x)), and the given sequence of labor wedges (φt) and investment-specific
productivities (AIt). Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint (1.32) as Λi,t, the optimality conditions in an interior solution are (1.32),
(1.31), and the first-order conditions:
Λi,t = U
′(Ci,t − ρcCi,t−1)− βρcEtU ′(Ci,t+1 − ρcCi,t), (1.33)
Λi,tJ
u


















Λi,t = βRtEtΛi,t+1, (1.36)
−p(θ(xui,t)) = p′(θt(xui,t))θ′t(xui,t)(xui,t − Jut ), (1.37)
V ′ (hi,t;φt) = Λi,tWt, (1.38)
where xui,t denotes household i’s choice of submarket for unmatched capital in period
t, and the unit of capital subindex, k, has been dropped because the optimality




Financial intermediaries sell one-period non–state-contingent bonds to households
and lend to entrepreneurs. The set of contracts offered to entrepreneur j specifies
an aggregate, state-contingent interest rate, Zj,t+1, for each loan amount, Dj,t+1,
to be repaid in case of no default. In case of default, the financial intermediary
seizes the entrepreneur’s assets, with a recovery value of (1 − µm)Rj,t+1(ω). Debt
schedules available for entrepreneur j include all contracts (Zj,t+1, Dj,t+1) that allow
a financial intermediary to repay in all states the risk-free bond sold to households,
after diversifying idiosyncratic risk:10
Dj,t+1Rt = [1−Fω(ωj,t+1;σt)]Zj,t+1Dj,t+1 + (1− µm)
ωj,t+1∫
0
Rj,t+1(ω) dFω (ω; σt) , (1.39)
where ωj,t+1 denotes the default threshold in period t + 1 for entrepreneur j with
outstanding debt Dj,t+1 and stock of matched capital Kej,t+1 – to be discussed in detail
in the next section. The left-hand side of equation (1.39) represents the obligations
assumed by the financial intermediary selling the risk-free bond to households. The
right-hand side of equation (1.39) represents the resources obtained by the financial
intermediary from lending, after diversifying over idiosyncratic risk. It includes two
terms, representing resources from entrepreneurs who do not default and resources
from those who do.
It is assumed that in the default state financial intermediaries monitor and seize
the entrepreneur’s production and capital. Hence,
Rj,t+1(ω) = [rkj,t+1 + (1− δ)Jut+1]ωKej,t+1, (1.40)
where rkj,t+1 denotes the net revenues from production per unit of effective capital,
ωKej,t+1 – to be described in detail in the next section.
10For formulations of debt contracts similar to the one presented in this section, see Arellano,
Bai and Zhang (2012) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014).
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1.4.4 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have access to technology to produce consumption goods using labor
and matched capital as inputs. In particular, the output produced by an effective






where yℓ,t denotes output in units of matched capital ℓ in period t and At is an
exogenous aggregate productivity shock affecting the production technology in period
t (labeled the neutral-technology shock).
Each period, entrepreneurs face an i.i.d. shock to the quality of their matched
capital, denoted ω, drawn from a log-normal distribution with c.d.f. Fω(ω; σt) and
satisfying Et(ωt+1) = 1 ∀ t and Vart(log(ωt+1)) = σ2t ∀ t, where σt is an exogenous
aggregate shock to the cross-sectional dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks (labeled the
risk shock, as in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2014). Output produced by en-
trepreneur j with a mass of matched capital Kej,t, with h̃j,t hours worked in each of








where ωj,t denotes the realization of the exogenous and stochastic variable ω for
entrepreneur j in period t. The term ωj,tKej,t denotes the effective mass of matched
capital held by entrepreneur j at the beginning of period t.
Entrepreneurs pay wage rate Wt per hour worked and face convex costs on the
utilization rate. It follows that net revenues from production per unit of effective









uj,t − Cu(uj,t), (1.43)
11This production technology is similar to one in which production is carried out in a continuum
of plants, as, for example, in Cooley, Hansen and Prescott (1995). In this framework, it can be
shown that the aggregate production function of the economy displays constant returns to scale.
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where Cu(u) : R+ → R+ is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly convex function. Note that rkj,t is independent of the mass of matched capital
held by entrepreneur j, Kej,t, and independent of the realization of the idiosyncratic
shock for entrepreneur j, ωj,t.
In this setup, all entrepreneurs face an expected linear rate of return per unit of
capital purchased:
Rk,mj,t+1 ≡










for m ∈ {x, c}. The denominator of the right-hand side of (1.44) represents the
price at which the effective unit of matched capital was purchased. The numerator
of the right-hand side of (1.44) represents the sources of revenue per unit of effective
matched capital. The first component of the numerator represents net revenue from
production. The second component represents the expected revenue from selling
the depreciated unit of effective matched capital. If the entrepreneur retires (with
probability ψ), this effective unit of matched capital is traded unmatched at a price
Jut+1. If the entrepreneur does not retire (with probability 1 − ψ), this effective unit
of matched capital is traded matched at Qct+1.
Entrepreneurs purchase capital using their net worth and borrowing from financial
intermediaries. This means that, at the end of each period t and for any entrepreneur




j,t+1 dx+QctK̃cj,t+1 = Dj,t+1 +Nj,t+1, (1.45)
where Dj,t+1 ≥ 0 denotes debt contracted by entrepreneur j in period t, to be paid in
period t+ 1, Nj,t+1 ≥ 0 denotes the net worth of entrepreneur j at the end of period
t, K̃xj,t+1 ≥ 0 denotes the stock of capital held by entrepreneur j at the end of period
t, purchased in submarket x of the decentralized market at a cost per unit Qxt , and
K̃cj,t+1 ≥ 0 denotes the stock of capital held by entrepreneur j at the end of period
t purchased in the centralized market at a cost Qct per unit. The latter case also
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includes the stock of capital held by entrepreneur j from the previous period, which
is equivalent to selling and repurchasing the unit in the centralized market at price
Qct . Note that
∫
x
K̃xj,t+1 dx + K̃cj,t+1 = Kej,t+1. The left-hand side of equation (1.45)
represents the entrepreneur’s assets, given by the value of the matched capital. The
right-hand side of equation (1.45) represents the entrepreneur’s liabilities and equity,
given by debt with financial intermediaries and net worth.
As in Section 1.3, by the law of large numbers, the cost per unit of capital of mass





The right-hand side of equation (1.46) represents the two components of the cost of




To solve the entrepreneur’s problem, it is useful to define the entrepreneur’s lever-
age and “portfolio weights,” from the components of the entrepreneur’s balance sheet

















for m ∈ {x, c}. From (1.45) and the nonnegativity constraint of capital holdings
(K̃xj,t+1 ≥ 0 for m ∈ {x, c}), it follows that wmj,t ∈ [0, 1] ∀m ∈ {x, c}.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and their objective is to maximize their expected
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j,t+1. The first term in the objective function (1.49) represents the revenue that
will be received in period t + 1 by entrepreneur j. The second term represents debt
repayments to financial intermediaries. Given that the entrepreneur receives revenue
and performs debt repayment only in case of not defaulting, these terms are integrated
over the realizations of ωj,t above ωj,t+1.
From the objective function (1.49), it follows that the expected value for en-
trepreneur j of repaying debt Dj,t+1 in the repayment stage of period t + 1 is given
by
V Rj,t+1 = ωj,t+1R̃
k
j,t+1Lj,tNj,t+1 − Zj,t+1Dj,t+1. (1.50)
Given that the expected value of defaulting is equal to zero, equation (1.50) implies
that the optimal default threshold, ωj,t+1, is implicitly defined by
ωj,t+1R̃
k
j,t+1Lj,tNj,t+1 = Zj,t+1Dj,t+1. (1.51)










which is proportional to net worth Nj,t+1.
Similarly, substituting (1.51) and (1.47) into (1.39) and (1.40), the financial in-
termediaries’ participation constraint is
Lj,t − 1
Lj,t
Rt = [1− Fω (ωj,t+1; σt)]ωj,t+1R̃kj,t+1 + (1− µm)
∫ ωj,t+1
0
ω dFω (ω; σt) R̃k,ψj,t+1,
(1.53)
12The assumption that entrepreneurs are risk neutral maximize their expected net worth follows
the quantitative literature implementing the costly state-verification framework. For a recent study
relaxing this and other assumptions of the standard implementation of costly state verification used
in this paper, see Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013).
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j,t+1 denotes the return of an effective unit of
separated capital, which, similar to (1.44), is defined by
Rk,ψ,mj,t+1 ≡
rkj,t+1 + (1− δ)Jut+1
Qmt
, (1.54)
for m ∈ {x, c}. The combinations
(







define a menu of (t+1)-contingent debt contracts offered to entrepreneurs equivalent
to those defined in (1.39). Let Dt(h̃j,t, uj,t, wxj,t, wcj,t) denote the set of debt schedules
(ωj,t+1, Lj,t) offered to entrepreneurs by financial intermediaries.
Entrepreneur j’s problem is to choose the state-contingent plans h̃j,t, uj,t, Lj,t
and ωj,t+1, wxj,t, and wcj,t, with (Lj,t, ωj,t+1) ∈ Dt(h̃j,t, uj,t, wxj,t, wcj,t) that maximize
the expected net worth (1.52) subject to the sequence of technological constraints,
(1.43), return constraints, (1.44) and (1.54), and nonnegativity constraint for portfolio
weights (wmj,t ≥ 0 for m ∈ {x, c}) for the given sequence of prices (Wt, Qct and
Jut ), debt schedules (Dt(h̃j,t, uj,t, wxj,t, wcj,t)), market-tightness functions (θt(x)), risk
(σt), and neutral-technology shocks (At). With Λej,t+1 as the Lagrange multiplier
on the financial intermediary’s participation constraint, and Ξmj,t as the Lagrange
multiplier associated with nonnegativity constraint for portfolio weights (wmj,t ≥ 0),







































and the complementary slackness conditions
Ξmt ≥ 0, wmt Ξmt = 0, for m ∈ {x, c}, (1.60)
where Γt(ωt+1) ≡ [1−Fω (ωt+1; σt)]ωt+1+gt(ωt+1), gt(ωt+1) ≡
∫ ωt+1
0




. The entrepreneur’s subindex, j, has been dropped
because the objective function is linear in the net worth of entrepreneur j and does
not appear in any of the constraints. Therefore, all entrepreneurs will choose the
same plans (ht, ut, Lt and ωt+1), independent of net worth.
1.4.5 Government
The government is assumed to consume a stochastic amount of consumption goods,
financed each period by levying lump-sum taxes on households. The government
budget constraint is given by
Gt = Tt, (1.61)
where Gt is government spending in period t (labeled the government-spending shock).
1.4.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, all centralized markets clear. For the centralized market for un-
matched capital, equilibrium then requires that∫ 1
0




Kej,t dj denotes the aggregate stock of employed capital at the be-
ginning of period t, and ψt ≡ (1 − gt−1(ωt))ψ + gt−1(ωt) denotes the total share of
employed capital that was separated in period t as a result of entrepreneurs’ retire-
ment and default. The left-hand side of (1.62) represents households’ purchases in
the market for unmatched capital. The right-hand side of (1.62) represents the mass
of capital sold in the market for unmatched capital, from retired entrepreneurs and
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financial intermediaries that seized capital of defaulting entrepreneurs (see Figure
1.7).
Replacing (1.62) in (1.31) and using the law of large numbers and the fact that the
choice of submarket, xk,i,t, is the same for all units of capital, k, and all households,
i, and the choice of investment, Ii,t is the same for all households i, the law of motion
for unemployed capital is













Kui,t di denotes the aggregate stock to unemployed capital at the
beginning of period t, and It =
∫ 1
0
Ii,t di denotes aggregate investment.
Given that matched capital is homogeneous, no arbitrage between centralized and
decentralized markets of matched capital requires Qt = Qct . Moreover, entrepreneurs’
optimality conditions (1.59) and (1.60) imply that, in equilibrium, any submarket
visited by a positive number of entrepreneurs must have the same cost per unit of

















For all x ≥ Qt, θt(x) = 0.
Using the definition of market tightness, the law of large numbers, and the
fact that a household’s choice of submarket, xk,t is the same for all units of cap-
ital k, the flow of capital that transitions from unemployment to employment is










K̃xj,t+1 dx dj. Aggregating the
entrepreneurs’ capital-accumulation constraints and imposing market clearing in the
centralized market provides a law of motion for employed capital:
Ket+1 = (1− ψt)(1− δ)Ket + p(θt(xut ))(1− δ)Kut . (1.66)
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Aggregating production functions (1.42) across entrepreneurs, using the fact that all
entrepreneurs choose the same level of hours worked and utilization for each unit of






where Yt denotes aggregate output in period t.
Let ζt denote the exogenous aggregate net transfer from households to en-
trepreneurs in period t (labeled the equity shock). Aggregate net worth then evolves
following the law of motion
Nt+1 = (1− ψ)[1− Γt−1(ωt)]Rk,ct Qt−1Ket + ζt, (1.69)
where Nt+1 denotes aggregate net worth at the end of period t, and Rk,ct denotes the
return of an effective unit of capital that does not separate in period t, which, similar
to (1.44) and (1.54), is defined by Rk,ct ≡
rkt+(1−δ)Qct
Qt−1
. The first term on the right-
hand side of (1.69) represents the aggregate return obtained from effective matched
capital employed in period t by entrepreneurs who did not default in the default
stage and did not retire in the separation stage. The second term on the right-
hand side of (1.69) represents the exogenous aggregate transfer from households to
new entrepreneurs. The return obtained from effective matched capital employed in
period t by entrepreneurs who did not default in the default stage, but did retire in
the separation stage is transferred to households. It follows that the net transfer from
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entrepreneurs to households is given by




denotes the return of an effective unit of capital that separates
in period t.
Starting from the households’ budget constraint (1.32) and replacing the govern-
ment budget constraint (3.14), the market-clearing condition for unmatched capital
(1.62), the market-clearing condition for the credit and labor markets, the definition
of net revenues from production (1.43) and the participation constraints of financial
intermediaries (1.39) aggregated across entrepreneurs, the expression for aggregate
transfers from entrepreneurs (1.70) yields the economy’s resource constraint,
Ct + It +Gt = Yt − csθt(1− δ)Kut − Ωt − Cu(ut)Ket , (1.71)
where Ωt ≡ µgt−1(ωt)Rk,ψt Qk,t−1Ket and aggregate consumption is defined by Ct ≡∫ 1
0
Ci,t di.
Let Sxt ≡ [At, AIt, Gt, φt, σt, ζt] define the aggregate exogenous state vector of the
economy. The competitive equilibrium in this economy can then be defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Competitive equilibrium). Given initial conditions for em-
ployed and unemployed capital, Ke0 and Ku0 , consumption C−1, and a state-
contingent sequence of aggregate exogenous states, Sxt , a competitive equi-
librium is a state-contingent sequence of individual allocations and shadow
values {(Ci,t, hi,t, Ii,t, ιhi,t, Kui,t+1, Bi,t, xui,t)i∈[0,1], (h̃j,t, uj,t, Lj,t, ωj,t+1, wxj,t, wcj,t)j∈[0,1]},
{(Λi,t)i∈[0,1], (Qj,t)j∈[0,1]}, aggregate allocations {Ct, It, ht, Ket+1, Kut+1, Nt,Πt}, prices
{Qct , Jut ,Wt}, debt schedules {Dt(h̃j,t, uj,t, wxj,t, wcj,t)}, and market-tightness functions
{θt(x)}, such that:
(i) Individual allocations and shadow values solve the household’s and en-
trepreneur’s problems at the equilibrium prices, equilibrium market-tightness
functions, and debt schedules, for all i and j.
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(ii) Debt schedules satisfy financial intermediaries’ participation constraint (1.53).
(iii) The market-tightness function satisfies (1.65) for all x.
(iv) Centralized markets clear.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section conducts a quantitative study of the role of search frictions in investment
based on the model presented in Section 1.4. It begins by specifying assumptions for
functional forms and stochastic processes contained in the model. It then discusses
the empirical methodology for calibration and estimation of the model’s parameters
for the U.S. economy, presents estimation results, and conducts exercises based on
the estimation related to the U.S. Great Recession and business cycles.
1.5.1 Model Estimation
Functional forms. The assumptions made on functional forms are standard in the











where υ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ϕ > 0 is
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.















where κ > 0 is a parameter governing the degree of investment-adjustment costs.








where cu > 0, and h̃ is the steady-state level of hours worked per unit of employed
capital, defined by h̃ ≡ h
Ke
, where h and Ke are the steady-state level of hours
worked and employed capital. As in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014), this
functional form is chosen to obtain a steady-state unity utilization rate independent
of the parameter cu.












where ξ > 0. This functional form has been used in quantitative studies of directed
search in the labor market (see, for example, Schaal, 2012).
Stochastic processes. The six aggregate shocks are modeled as first-order autore-
gressive processes:
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + ϵAt ,
logAIt = ρAI logAIt−1 + ϵIt,
logGt = (1− ρG) logG+ ρG logGt−1 + ϵGt ,
logφt = (1− ρφ) logφ+ ρφ logφt−1 + ϵφt ,
logσt = (1− ρσ) logσ + ρσ logσt−1 + ϵσt ,
ζt = (1− ρζ)ζ + ρζζt−1 + ϵζt ,
where G > 0 denotes steady-state government spending, φ > 0 is a parameter
that determines steady-state hours worked, σ > 0 denotes the steady-state cross-
sectional dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks, ζ denotes steady-state lump-sum trans-
fers from households to entrepreneurs, and it is assumed that ϵit ∼ N(0, σi) ∀ t and
i ∈ {A,AI, G, φ, σ, ζ}.
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Data. The model is estimated using U.S. quarterly data prior to the Great Reces-
sion, from 1980:Q1 to 2007:Q4.13 The data include six time series: real per capita
GDP, real per capita consumption, real per capita nonresidential private investment,
per capita hours worked, credit spreads, and commercial, nonresidential real estate
vacancy rates. Data on GDP, consumption and investment were log-linearly de-
trended. Credit spreads were measured by the difference between the interest rate on
BAA corporate bonds and the three-month U.S. government bond rate. Appendix
A.1 provides more detailed information about the sources and construction of these
data.
Including data on GDP, consumption, investment, and hours is standard in the
empirical business-cycle literature. Including credit spreads is relevant to discipline
the financial friction and financial shocks (see Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2014).
The counterpart of this variable in the model is the difference between the interest
rate paid by entrepreneurs, Zt, and the risk-free rate Rt. Including data on the
commercial-real-estate vacancy rate (see Figure 1.2) is a novel feature of the present
paper and is aimed at disciplining the search friction in investment – specifically, the
two parameters related to search frictions, the curvature of the matching function, ξ,
and the search cost, cs. The counterpart of this variable in the model is the capital-
unemployment rate, kut .
It is assumed that all series are observed with measurement error. Measurement
error in output, consumption, investment, hours worked, credit spreads and vacancy
rates, denoted ϵmeY,t, ϵmeC,t, ϵmeI,t , ϵmeh,t , ϵmes,t and ϵmeku,t, are assumed to be i.i.d. innovations
with mean zero and standard deviation σmei ∀ i ∈ {Y,C, I, h, s, ku}.
Empirical strategy. From the assumed functional forms and stochastic processes
in the previous sections, the model features 27 structural parameters. Let Θ be a
13The estimation period begins in 1980 due to the availability of commercial-real-estate vacancy
rates.
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vector containing all the parameters of the model. This vector also includes the six
nonstructural parameters representing the standard deviations of the measurement
errors on the observables, as discussed in the previous section. The model parameters
are partitioned into two sets: Θ = [Θ1,Θ2]. The first set,
Θ1 ≡ [β, υ, ϕ, α, δ, ψ, µm, G, φ, σ],
contains 10 calibrated or fixed a priori parameters. The remaining 23 parameters,












are estimated using Bayesian methods surveyed in An and Schorfheide (2007). The
following sections discuss the values assigned to parameters fixed a priori and the
estimation of the remaining parameters.
Benchmark model without investment search frictions. To put the results
of the estimated model from Section 1.4 into perspective, a benchmark model for the
U.S. economy is also estimated. This benchmark model, detailed in Appendix A.5,
is identical to the model of Section 1.4 except for the search friction in investment
considered in this paper. The same empirical strategy described in the previous
section is used for the benchmark model. The only differences are that the set of
parameters Θ2 does not include the parameters related to the search friction (i.e., ξ
and cs), and that the structure vacancy data are not included in the estimation as
an observable. Henceforth, the model in Section 1.4 is labeled as the “Model with
Search Frictions” and the benchmark model as “Model No Search Frictions.”
Calibrated parameters. Table 1.1 displays the values assigned to the calibrated
parameters, contained in the vector Θ1 or related targets. The subjective discount





β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
υ 2 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ϕ 1 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
α 0.4 Capital share
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
ψ 0.028 Retirement rate of entrepreneurs
G 0.2 Steady-state share of government spending
h 1 Steady-state hours worked
s 0.02 Steady-state annual spreads
µ 0.2 Steady-state loss in default
F (ω) 0.075 Default rate
Note: The time unit is one quarter.
elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, the aggregate capital share, α, and the depreciation
rate, δ, are set to 0.99, 2, 1, 0.4, and 0.025, respectively, standard values in related
business cycle literature. The labor disutility parameter φ is set at a value consistent
with a steady-state level of hours worked of one. The value of ψ is set to 0.027,
which is consistent with the average annual exit rate of establishments in the United
States for the period 1980–2007 of 11%. This value is also in line with the death
rate of entrepreneurs in quantitative implementations of the costly state-verification
framework. The value of the steady-state share of government spending, G, was set
at 0.2, a standard value in business-cycle studies for the U.S. economy.
The values used for the parameters related to the financial friction (µm, ω, and ζ)
are close to those used in previous quantitative studies of the costly state verification.
In particular, the values of ω and ζ and were set to target values of annual default
rate and annual spreads of 3% and 200 basis points, respectively, which correspond
to the U.S. historical averages (used for example in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist,
1999). To set the value of the parameter µm, note that in the framework of the
present paper, financial intermediaries in the state of default face a loss of the return
of capital Rkt not only related to monitoring costs (as in previous models with costly
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state verification, but without search frictions in investment), but also related to the
fact that capital becomes unmatched in the event of default (and has a return of Rk,ψt
instead of Rkt ; see Sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4). To make the loss in default comparable to
those of previous studies – e.g., between 0.2 and 0.36 in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997);
0.12 in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) – µm was set to target a value of
steady-state loss in default, µ, of 0.2, where the steady-state loss in default is defined







, with Rk,ψ and Rk denoting the steady-state values of
Rk,ψt and Rkt .14
Estimated parameters. Table 1.2 presents the assumed prior distributions of the
estimated parameters contained in the vector Θ2, denoted P (Θ2). For the two pa-
rameters related to the search friction in investment – namely, the curvature of the
matching function, ξ, and the search cost, cs, for which, to my knowledge, estimates
are not available – inverse gamma distributions were chosen. The mean of the distri-
bution of the curvature of the matching function (ξ) was set at the value of 1. The
mean of the distribution of the search cost parameter, cs was set to 0.06 to target a
steady-state level of capital under the mean of the prior distributions equal to the
one observed in the data. For the other parameters, prior distributions were chosen
following the related literature estimating models for the U.S. economy (Smets and
Wouters, 2007; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012a; Christiano, Motto and Rostagno,
2014).
In particular, the standard errors of the innovations are assumed to follow an
inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 0.1 and a standard deviation of 2; the
persistence of the autoregressive stochastic processes, a beta distribution with mean
0.5 and standard deviation of 0.2; the parameter that governs internal habit formation
(ρc), a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.2; the parameter
14In the benchmark model without search frictions, µm = µ.
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that governs investment adjustment costs (κ), a gamma distribution with mean 3
and standard deviation of 2; and the parameter that governs the curvature of capital
utilization costs (cu), an inverse-gamma distribution with mean 2.5 and standard
deviation of 2. Finally, uniform prior distributions were chosen for the innovations of
the measurement error. These variables are restricted to account for at most 6% of
the variance of the corresponding observable time series.
Given the prior parameter distribution, P (Θ2), the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm
was used to obtain draws from the posterior distribution of Θ2, denoted L(Θ2|Y )
where Y is the data sample (see, for example, An and Schorfheide, 2007). Table
Table 1.2
Estimated Parameters on U.S. Data - Model with Search Frictions
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Description Distribution Mean St. dev Mean St. dev
A. Economic parameters
ρc Habit parameter Beta 0.5 0.2 0.62 0.04
κ Investment-adj costs Gamma 3 2 4.3 0.3
ξ Curvature-matching tech Inv Gam 1 0.1 0.50 0.02
cs Search cost Inv Gam 0.06 0.005 0.08 0.01
cu Curvature-utilization Inv Gam 2.5 2 3.1 0.26
B. Stochastic processes
Autocorrelations
ρA Neutral technology Beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.01
ρAI Investment-specific tech Beta 0.5 0.2 0.91 0.05
ρG Government spending Beta 0.5 0.2 0.91 0.02
ρφ Labor wedge Beta 0.5 0.2 0.986 0.004
ρσ Risk Beta 0.1 0.5 0.78 0.04
ρζ Equity Beta 0.1 0.5 0.83 0.05
Standard deviation innovation
σA Neutral technology Inv Gam 0.1 2 0.005 0.0004
σAI Investment-specific tech Inv Gam 0.1 2 0.03 0.003
σG Government spending Inv Gam 0.1 2 0.02 0.002
σφ Labor wedge Inv Gam 0.1 2 0.02 0.002
σσ Risk Inv Gam 0.1 2 0.09 0.01
σζ Equity Inv Gam 0.1 2 0.05 0.005

















Data 4.1 0.82 2.80 1.39 0.45 0.55
Model with search 3.9 0.84 5.93 1.14 0.89 0.56
Model no search 2.8 0.99 4.02 1.08 0.45
Correlations with output
ρ(C,Y ) ρ(I,Y ) ρ(h,Y ) ρ(s,Y ) ρ(ku,Y )
Data 0.90 0.51 0.78 −0.53 −0.28
Model with search 0.36 0.80 0.65 −0.40 −0.21
Model no search 0.63 0.70 0.49 0.17
Autocorrelations
ρ(Yt,Yt−1) ρ(Ct,Ct−1) ρ(It,It−1) ρ(ht,ht−1) ρ(st,st−1) ρ(kut ,k
u
t−1)
Data 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.87 0.99
Model with search 0.94 0.99 0.89 0.92 0.84 0.98
Model no search 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.75
Note: Columns labeled Y , C, I, h, s, and ku refer, respectively, to output, consumption,
investment, hours worked, credit spreads, and capital unemployment in the model. Data
counterparts described in Appendix A.1. The time unit is one quarter. Data corresponds
to the period 1962–2013, except for capital unemployment, which corresponds to the
period 1980–2013.
1.2 presents the posterior estimates of the model parameters with search frictions in
investment.
Model fit. The predictions of the model regarding standard deviations, correlation
with output and serial correlations of the six time series included in the estimation
as observables are presented in Table 1.3, together with their data counterparts. The
predictions of the benchmark model without search frictions in investment are also
presented in Table 1.3 for comparison.
Overall the predictions of the estimated models are in line with empirical second
moments. The predicted standard deviations of the model with search frictions are
in general larger than the one of the model without search frictions. For output,
consumption, hours worked and capital unemployment the predictions of the model
with search friction are similar to those observed in the data; for investment and
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credit spreads the model with search frictions predicts a higher volatility than the one
observed in the data. The correlations with output and autocorrelations predicted by
the estimated models are in general in line with those observed in the data. For the
case of credit spreads, while the estimated model without search frictions predicts
a positive correlation with output, the model with search frictions in investment
predicts a negative correlation with output, as observed in the data.
1.5.2 Quantitative Results
This section presents two exercises based on the estimated model to study the quanti-
tative relevance of the proposed mechanism. The first relates to the Great Recession,
which is an example of a deep financial crisis of the sort that motivated this theo-
retical framework (see Section 1.1). The second exercise studies the role of financial
shocks in U.S. business cycle fluctuations in the presence of search frictions in invest-
ment. Both exercises proceed by comparing the results from the model presented in
Section 1.4 to a benchmark model without investment search frictions, as presented
in the previous section and detailed in Appendix A.5.
Recovery from the U.S. Great Recession. The estimated model is used to
ask whether, following a sequence of shocks such as those experienced by the U.S.
economy in 2008, and without any further shock, the model can predict an investment
slump such as the one observed following the U.S. Great Recession – that, as discussed
in Section 1.1, is an empirical regularity of financial-crisis episodes. To answer this
question, the estimated model is used to smooth the shocks experienced by the U.S.
economy through the last quarter of 2008. Beginning in the first quarter of 2009,
the predicted response of the economy is computed: All shocks are set to zero, and
the driving stochastic processes are only driven by their estimated autoregressive
components; states evolve endogenously.
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Figure 1.8: U.S. Great Recession: Predicted Recovery.
Note: Time-series labeled Observed correspond to the data on real per capital investment and
output, log-linearly detrended (see Appendix A.1 for details). Time-series labeled Model with Search
Frictions and Model No Search Frictions refer, respectively, to predictions from the model presented
in Section 1.4, and to predictions from the benchmark model presented in Appendix A.5. Model
predictions computed since 2009, following the sequence of shocks smoothed from the estimated
models for the period 1980–2007. The time unit is one quarter. For details on the models’ estimations
see Section 1.5.1 and Appendix A.5.
Results from this exercise are displayed in Figure 1.8 and indicate that the model
with investment search frictions predicts a slump of investment following the U.S.
Great Recession even larger than the one observed in the data. The same exercise in
the benchmark model without investment search frictions predicts that both invest-
ment and output should be significantly higher than the levels observed in the data,
as noted in the previous literature (see Section 1.1). The right panel of Figure 1.8
also shows that the proposed model with search frictions in investment can account
for 50% of the difference between the observed recovery and the recovery predicted
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by the benchmark model without search frictions.15
The Role of Financial Shocks in U.S. Business Cycles. The estimated model
can also be used to interpret the sources of U.S. business-cycle fluctuations. Table
1.4 compares the variance decomposition predicted by the model with investment
search frictions to the variance decomposition predicted by the benchmark model
without search frictions. The most remarkable result is the difference between the two
models in term of the contribution of financial shocks. The benchmark model without
investment search frictions assigns a small role to financial shocks, and attributes most
of the predicted movements in output and investment to technology shocks (neutral
and investment-specific) and to labor wedge shocks. The model with search frictions
developed in this paper attributes a relevant role to financial shocks, which account
for 33% of output fluctuations and 56% of investment fluctuations.
This result is of interest since the role of financial shocks is a key discussion in
the business-cycle literature and an important source of discrepancy between real
and monetary models, with the latter attributing a much larger effect to these shocks
than the former (as discussed in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2014). The present
paper shows that an important part of this discrepancy between these two branches
of the literature can be reconciled by introducing investment search frictions. To
understand this result, note that in the model with search frictions in investment,
63% of the predicted movements in capital unemployment are explained by financial
shocks. Studying impulse-response functions, the next section comes back to this
result.
15It is worth noting that the model’s prediction for capital unemployment is in line the data
on vacancy rates observed in the Great Recession. This variable and the prediction for the rest of
the observables are included in Appendix A.2, showing that for all variables the model with search




Shock Y C I h s ku
Model no search
Neutral technology A 31.8 33.1 13.2 15.9 1.3
Investment-specific technology AI 24.5 20.0 55.9 19.4 42.5
Labor wedge φ 42.0 45.3 15.8 60.0 1.6
Government spending G 0.8 1.1 4.6 3.2 0.6
Risk σ 0.1 0.1 3.3 0.4 44.7
Equity ζ 0.7 0.5 7.2 1.1 9.5
Model with search
Neutral technology A 17.4 18.8 7.0 6.0 0.1 0.8
Investment-specific technology AI 4.1 5.4 23.5 11.6 5.6 34.6
Labor wedge φ 44.6 56.9 11.9 54.8 0.2 1.3
Government spending G 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.6 0.0 0.3
Risk σ 0.5 0.3 2.0 0.4 39.1 15.0
Equity ζ 33.0 17.9 54.2 25.6 55.0 47.9
Note: Columns labeled Y , C, I, h, s, and ku refer, respectively, to output,
consumption, investment, hours worked, credit spread, and capital unem-
ployment in the model. Data counterparts described in Appendix A.1.
Impulse responses. To further study the quantitative findings presented in this
section, Figure 1.9 shows the impulse response of capital unemployment, investment,
and output to a one-standard-deviation negative neutral-technology shock and a one-
standard-deviation negative equity shock. The responses of investment and output
in the benchmark model without investment search frictions are also included for
comparison.16 While a negative neutral-technology shock generates a decrease of
capital unemployment, a negative equity shock generates an increase in capital un-
employment. Moreover the response of capital unemployment is 10 times larger in
absolute value in response to a one-standard-deviation equity shock than in response
to a one-standard-deviation neutral-technology shock. For this reason, the responses
of investment and output are more different in the case of the financial shock than in
the case of a neutral-technology shock. The impulse-response functions also indicate
a large and persistent effect on investment and output following a negative financial
16Standard deviations refer to those of the model with search frictions in investment. Appendix

















































Figure 1.9: Impulse-Responses to Contractionary Shocks.
Note: Response of capital unemployment, investment, and output to a one-standard-deviation neg-
ative equity shock (ζ) and a neutral-technology shock (A). Label “Model with Search Frictions
in Investment” and “Model No Search Frictions in Investment” refer, respectively, to the model
responses presented in Section 1.4 and the benchmark model in Appendix A.5. Impulse responses
expressed in percent deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes display quarters after the shock.
shock that is not present in the benchmark model without investment search frictions.
1.6 Capital Reallocation
This section shows that the analytical framework with investment search frictions
developed in this paper can also be used to study capital reallocation. It begins by
extending the model to allow for heterogeneity in capital match-specific productivity.
This extension allows a characterization not only of the transition of capital from
unemployment to employment, but of the transition of capital from employment to
employment, since it adds a motive for trading capital while it remains employed
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(similar to “on the job search” in the labor-market literature; see Menzio and Shi,
2011). A quantitative analysis of the extended model shows that the model’s predic-
tions regarding capital reallocation are in line with those observed in the data. The
model also has predictions regarding misallocation during crises.
1.6.1 Extended Model with Capital Reallocation
The basis of the analytical framework developed in this section is the quantitative
model developed in Section 1.4. The section begins by describing the extended
model’s new assumptions regarding production technology and the market structure
of physical capital. It then discusses the problem of selling employed capital in the
decentralized market, the entrepreneur’s problem, and equilibrium in the extended
framework. The notation used in this section is the same as that presented in Section
1.4.
Production technology. As in Section 1.4, it is assumed that entrepreneurs have
access to technology to produce consumption goods using labor and matched capital
as inputs. Unlike in Section 1.4, each unit of employed capital has a match-specific
productivity. This match-specific productivity is revealed after an unmatched unit of
capital becomes matched, and does not vary until the specific match is destroyed. The
output produced by an effective unit of capital i, with match-specific productivity zi,






where zi ∈ Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zNz}, Nz ≥ 2 and Z ≫ 0.
Physical capital markets. As in Section 1.4, capital held by entrepreneurs is
denoted employed capital, and capital held by households is denoted unemployed
capital. Households can only hold unmatched capital. Trade of unmatched capital
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between entrepreneurs (buyers) and households (sellers) occurs in a decentralized
market with search frictions. The search frictions that characterize the decentralized
market for unmatched capital are identical to those in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. Unlike
in Section 1.4, entrepreneurs now also have access to the decentralized market as
sellers, where they can sell an employed unit of capital as unmatched capital to other
entrepreneurs. When a unit of capital employed with match-specific productivity zi is
traded in the decentralized market, a new match-specific productivity is drawn from
the set Z, with a probability mass function fZ(z) : Z → [0, 1], assumed to be the
same for all t. Let z denote the expected match-specific productivity of a new match
(i.e. z ≡ E(zi)). It is assumed that z ∈ Z.
As in Section 1.4, entrepreneurs also have access to a centralized market in which
they trade matched capital. When a unit of employed capital is traded in the cen-
tralized market it maintains its match-specific productivity. The match-specific pro-
ductivity of any unit of capital is common knowledge. The difference with respect
to Section 1.4 is that now units of capital matched at different match-specific pro-
ductivities will be traded at different prices. The price in the centralized market of
a unit of capital with match-specific productivity zi is denoted Qzi . The price in the
centralized market of a unit of capital matched at the average productivity z will be
denoted Qz.
Finally, as in Section 1.4 there is also a centralized market in which unmatched
capital can be sold by financial intermediaries and retired entrepreneurs to house-
holds at price Ju. Figure 1.10 summarizes these three markets for capital, with the
participants and forms of trade that characterize each market.
Seller’s problem for employed capital. An entrepreneur that holds a unit of
employed capital matched at productivity zi can choose to sell this unit in the de-
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Figure 1.10: Structure of Capital Markets, Model with Capital Reallocation.
their units of unemployed capital. The only difference between entrepreneurs and
households when visiting the decentralized market as sellers is that in the event of
not finding a buyer the price of a unit of matched capital is different from the price
of a unit of unmatched capital. Therefore, entrepreneurs who visit the decentralized
market as sellers and households will typically search in different submarkets. For the
same reason entrepreneurs holding units of capital at different match-specific produc-
tivities will also search in different submarkets. Formally, the seller’s problem for an






{p (θt (xzit ))xzi + (1− p (θt (xzit )))Qzit } , (1.73)
where xzit denotes the submarket visited by an entrepreneur that holds a unit of
capital matched at productivity zi.
Entrepreneur’s problem. As in Section 1.4, entrepreneurs purchase capital us-
ing their net worth and borrowing from financial intermediaries. Including match-
specific productivity into the framework developed in Section 1.4 implies that the en-
trepreneur’s balance sheet now includes different types of assets purchased in the cen-
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j,t+1 = Dj,t+1 +Nj,t+1, (1.74)
where K̃xt+1 denotes the stock of matched capital held by entrepreneur j at the end of
period t, purchased in the submarket x of decentralized market, at a cost Qxt per unit
of capital; and K̃zij,t+1 denotes the stock of capital matched with productivity zi held
by entrepreneur j at the end of period t purchased in the centralized market at price
Qzit . The latter case also includes the stock of capital matched with productivity zi
held by entrepreneur j from the previous period, which is equivalent to selling and
repurchasing the unit in the centralized market at price Qzit .
As in Section 1.4, to solve the entrepreneur’s problem, it is useful to define the
entrepreneur’s leverage and “portfolio weights,” from the components of the en-
























for m ∈ {x, z1, z2, . . . , zNz}.
As in Section 1.4, the expected rate of return per unit of matched capital for the
assets considered in the left-hand side of equation (1.74) is defined by
Rk,zij,t+1 ≡
rk,zij,t+1 + (1− δ)
[









j,t+1fz(zi) + (1− δ)
[





where similar to equation (1.43) in Section 1.4, net revenues from production per unit




































Similarly, the financial intermediary’s participation constraint (equation (1.53) in
Section 1.4) can be expressed as




ω dFω(ω, σt)R̃k,ψj,t+1Lj,tNj,t+1, (1.81)
where R̃k,ψj,t+1 denotes the portfolio return of separated capital, which, similar to Section












From this, the entrepreneur’s problem can proceed as in Section 1.4.
Equilibrium. As in Section 1.4, any submarket visited by a positive number of
buyers must have the same price for capital in equilibrium, and buyers will be indif-

















For all x ≥ Qzt , θt(x) = 0.
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The mass of capital that transitions from employment to employment, denoted




(1− ψt)p(θt(xzit ))(1− δ)Kzit ,
where Kzit denotes the stock of employed capital matched at productivity zi in pe-
riod t. This object will be the main focus of the next section, when studying the
quantitative implications of this model for capital reallocation.
Similar to Section 1.4, market clearing in centralized markets for capital imply




t (1− ψt)(1− p(θt(xzit ))) + [Iuet + Ieet ]fz(zi),
where Iuet denotes the mass of capital that transitions from unemployment to em-
ployment, that using the definition of market tightness, the law of large numbers,
and the fact that a household’s choice of submarket, xi,t is the same for all units of
capital i, is given by Iuet = p(θt(xut ))(1− δ)Kut .
The remaining equilibrium conditions are similar to the model presented in Section
1.4.
1.6.2 Quantitative Analysis
This section studies some quantitative implications of the model regarding capital
reallocation, using the estimated parameters values from Section 1.5. The only new
functional form is that associated to the distribution of match-specific productivities.
The discrete set of of match-specific productivities is assumed to have three values,
labeled low-,medium-, and high-match specific productivity. The steady-state dis-
tribution of match-specific productivities is assumed to be uniform. The dispersion
between low- and high-match specific productivity is set to target a steady state
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Capital EE transition (right axis)
Figure 1.11: Impulse Responses to Contractionary Shocks.
Note: Response of capital employment-to-employment transitions and output to one-standard-
deviation contractionary shocks. Labels Neutral Tech Shock, Investment Tech Shock, Gov Spending
Shock, Labor Wedge Shock, Risk Shock, and Equity Shock, refer, respectively, to shocks to the vari-
ables At, AIt , Gt, φt, σt, and ζt presented in Section 1.4. Impulse responses expressed in percent
deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes display quarters after the shock.
value of capital reallocation of 0.9% per quarter, the average of the range reported in
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
Procyclical capital reallocation. A well-documented stylized fact is that capital
reallocation in the U.S. economy is procyclical (see Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Eis-
feldt and Rampini, 2006). The model presented in this section predicts a correlation
between the mass of capital that transitions from employment to employment and
output of 33.8%. in line with the range between 43.1% and 51.1% correlation between
capital reallocation and output reported in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
Figure 1.11 shows that, in response to most contractionary shocks, the mass of
capital that transitions from employment to employment tends to fall, explaining





Neutral technology A 1.2
Investment-specific technology AI 49.8
Government spending G 0.1
Labor wedge φ 3.2
Risk σ 5.8
Equity ζ 39.9
the lens of the model is that contractionary shocks are generally associated with
less demand of capital from entrepreneurs, which leads sellers visit submarkets with
less favorable terms, both in terms of price of the units of capital and in terms
of the probability of finding a buyer. Therefore, the same factors that lead to a
countercyclical capital unemployment lead to a procyclical capital reallocation.
The estimated model can also be used to interpret the sources of fluctuations in
capital reallocation. Table 1.5 shows the variance decomposition predicted by the
model for the transition of capital from employment to employment and shows that
most of the predicted capital-reallocation movements can be accounted by investment-
specific productivity shocks (49.8%) and financial shocks (45.6%) . These findings
are consistent those of Section 1.5, (most of the variation of capital unemployment
can be explained by investment-specific shocks and financial shocks) and with those
of previous literature explaining procyclical capital reallocation (Cui, 2013).
Misallocation. Empirical evidence points out that recession episodes, and in par-
ticular financial crises, are periods of misallocation (see, for example, Midrigan and
Xu, 2014).
The predictions of the model presented in this section are also consistent with
this empirical finding. Figure 1.12 shows the response to contractionary shocks of
the mass of capital employed with a low match-specific productivity and the mass
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Capital Employed in Low Productivity
Capital Employed in High Productivity
Figure 1.12: Impulse Responses to Contractionary Shocks.
Note: Response to one-standard-deviation contractionary shocks of the mass of capital employed
with a low match-specific productivity (Kz1t , labeled Low Productivity) and the mass of capital
employed at a high match-specific productivity (KzNzt labeled High Productivity) predicted by the
model presented in Section 1.6. Labels Neutral Tech Shock, Investment Tech Shock, Gov Spending
Shock, Labor Wedge Shock, Risk Shock, and Equity Shock, refer, respectively, to shocks to the
variables At, AIt , Gt, φt, σt, and ζt presented in Section 1.4.Impulse responses expressed in percent
deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes display quarters after the shock.
of capital employed at a high match-specific productivity. The share of capital em-
ployed in match-specific productivity increases, especially in response to a negative
equity shock (ζt). This is because reallocation is especially concentrated in units of
capital employed at low match-specific productivity. Therefore, through the lens of
this model, capital misallocation during crises is the other side of procyclical capital
reallocation.
1.7 Conclusion and Future Research
This paper presented a model with investment search frictions in which financial
shocks have a sizable effect in macroeconomic variables though capital unemploy-
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ment. An estimated version of the model for the U.S. economy shows that the pro-
posed mechanism can lead to investment slumps such as the one observed during the
Great Recession. This result is relevant because slow investment recoveries typically
characterize financial crisis episodes.
Using the estimated version of the model to interpret the sources of business-cycle
fluctuations in the U.S. economy, the model assigns a large role (33% of output fluc-
tuations) to financial shocks, in the context of a real model that would have assigned
a negligible role to these shocks (1% of output fluctuations). This result is relevant
because an important source of discrepancy between real and monetary business-cycle
models is the role assigned to financial shocks. This paper shows that incorporating
investment search frictions can reconcile an important part of this discrepancy. Fi-
nally, the paper shows that the framework can be used to explain capital reallocation
and misallocation during crises, as documented by previous empirical literature.
The findings of this paper suggest that two related areas of future research could
be promising to develop. The first area is normative. As shown in the paper, the
directed-search framework studied leads to an efficient allocation. However, combin-
ing the search frictions considered in this paper with asymmetric information would
lead to a scope for policy related to asset purchases and subsidy programs as shown
in Guerrieri and Shimer (2014).
The second area for future research is empirical. In particular, future research
could explore more direct evidence of investment search frictions. For instance, it
would be possible to investigate the existence of a “Beveridge curve” in the physical-
capital market, using data from capital-intermediary firms. It would also be possible
to study the testable implications developed from the model in this paper regarding
the relationship between capital unemployment, economic activity and investment.
This could be done, for instance, using geographical data of the sort used in this






Labor Market, Financial Crises and Inflation:
Jobless and Wageless Recoveries
Guillermo Calvo, Fabrizio Coricelli, and Pablo Ottonello
2.1 Introduction
The slow recovery of unemployment has been one of the most salient features in the
policy debate that accompanied the Great Recession. The fact that, in the context
of high unemployment, US output has recovered its precrisis level has lead many
analysts, in both academic and policy circles, to label the pattern a “jobless recovery”
(see Figure 2.1). In Europe, the pattern of unemployment recovery seems to be even
more dramatic: Six years after the recession began, unemployment has not yet begun
to recover its precrisis level.
This paper casts light on the reasons for jobless recovery in the Great Recession by
studying labor-market recovery in a sample of 116 postwar recession episodes–prior
to the Great Recession–in developed (DMs) and emerging market economies (EMs).
We document two new stylized facts. First, in “low-inflation” recession episodes (i.e.,
annual inflation below 30 percent), financial crises tend to be followed by greater
unemployment than in other recession episodes. Second, in “high-inflation” recession
episodes, financial crises are not followed by jobless recoveries but by “wageless re-
coveries,” characterized by a lower real wage once output recovers its trend. These
findings are summarized in Figure 2.2, which compares the behavior of DMs’ and
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Figure 2.1: Jobless recovery during the Great Recession
Notes: Euro Area includes EA-17, Eurostat definition; GDP in real terms, peak = 100; unemploy-
ment rate in percent. Seasonally adjusted figures.
In DMs, where inflation in the postwar era has been relatively low, financial crises
have been followed by recoveries in which joblessness was significantly higher than in
other recessions. This is in line with Reinhart and Reinhart (2010): During the ten
years following financial crises, unemployment rates remain on average five percentage
points above the average rate ten years prior to the crisis. Similar evidence is provided
by Knotek and Terry (2009), who show that, for the “big five” banking crises (Spain
1977, Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 1991, Japan 1992), unemployment rates
have been higher and more persistent than in recessions not associated with banking
crises.
In EMs, there is a much higher dispersion in inflation rates during financial crises.
Exploiting these differences in inflation rates, we find again a sluggish adjustment
of labor markets during the recovery from financial crises, but the nature of such
adjustment varies with inflation. High-inflation recession episodes are not associated
with jobless recoveries but with wageless recoveries. In contrast, low-inflation EMs
display a pattern similar to that observed in DMs, with financial crises associated
with more intense jobless recoveries. The findings are in line with models of nominal
















































































Figure 2.2: Labor Market Recovery, Financial Crises and Inflation
Notes: See Section 2.2 for a description of the sample and data; u refers to the unemployment rate,
in percent; y refers to real GDP per capita, and w refers to real wages, peak = 100.
recent study in this direction showing the importance of wage rigidity in a crisis
environment, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2013).
The paper conducts an econometric analysis finding that the association between
financial crises and jobless and wageless recoveries, as shown in Figure 2.2, is robust
to controlling for countries’ characteristics (such as labor-market indicators, secular
growth, financial development, and country size) and to characteristics of the reces-
sion episodes (such as duration of the episode or the depth of the output contraction).
To provide evidence on the effect of financial crises in this association, we also carry
out an instrumental variable (IV) strategy using credit-market outcomes prior to the
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recession episode in order to identify the exogenous effect of financial crises on jobless
recoveries.
A common explanation given for the high unemployment observed in the Great
Recession is that output has not recovered its trend. In this line, several papers have
recently argued that jobless recoveries are not a pattern observed in the data, based
on the stability of Okun’s law (e.g., Ball, Leigh and Loungani, 2013; Galí, Smets and
Wouters, 2012). We show that a key difference between our findings and the results
obtained in this literature is related to the measure of jobless recovery used. Esti-
mations of Okun’s law typically focus on the cyclical component of unemployment.
In our study, we measure jobless recovery as the change in unemployment rate from
output peak to recovery. In fact, if we were to measure jobless recoveries as devia-
tions from the “natural rate,” we would also find little trace of jobless recovery. Our
evidence suggests that jobless recoveries mostly occur at lower frequencies than the
ones typically studied in Okun’s law regressions. At first sight, this result could be
interpreted as a sign that financial crises are related to changes in the natural rate of
unemployment (for a theoretical formulation and evidence related to this hypothesis,
see Acemoglu, 2001; Dromel, Kolakez and Lehmann, 2009). However, our evidence
that high-inflation recession episodes do not display jobless recovery suggests that
this might be better characterized as persistent unemployment in the presence of low
inflation and nominal rigidities—and therefore that a policy of generating a spike in
inflation might succeed in reducing the unemployment rate.
To rationalize the findings of our empirical study, we develop a simple analytical
framework in which financial crises—formalized as an exogenous contraction of collat-
eral constraints—can lead to jobless recoveries. The key assumption is that collateral
requirements are lower for projects and firms possessing easily recognizable collateral,
such as physical capital. We thus show that, as a result of a collateral crunch, firms
choose to employ more capital-intensive techniques, implying jobless recovery under
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wage rigidity. It is worth noting that, despite the simplicity of the model, collateral
and other financial issues have not played a central role in the theoretical literature
concerned with jobless recoveries (see Schreft, Singh and Hodgson, 2005; Shimer,
2012; Berger, 2012; Jaimovich and Siu, 2012; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012b).1 We
then test the role of collateral for the sample of DMs, using data on asset prices (house
prices) as a proxy for collateral values, and we find that, in a low-inflation context,
the recovery of collateral variables is significantly associated with jobless recoveries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the sample
of recession episodes and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.3
documents the association between financial crises and jobless and wageless recoveries
and provides evidence from an instrumental variables strategy. Section 2.4 studies
the results’ robustness to the inclusion of additional controls and to the use of other
measures of financial crises and jobless recovery. Section 2.5 presents an analytical
framework to rationalize the association between financial crises and jobless recovery.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Sample Construction
2.2.1.1 Developed- and Emerging-Market Recession Episodes
To analyze the relationship between financial crises and labor-market recovery, we
construct two samples of recession episodes: one for DMs and one for EMs. Con-
structing two separate samples allows us to use quarterly data in the DMs.
1 Financial considerations do play a key role in the dynamics of employment in both the theo-
retical and the empirical literature (for a recent survey see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov,
2012). However, the phenomenon of jobless recovery is different from that of employment fluctua-
tions; it implies delinking employment from output.
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Using quarterly data, we construct a sample of recession episodes during the
period 1950–2006 for 11 DMs: Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. We use
the NBER (for the US) and the ECRI (for the other economies) recession dates to
identify the occurrence of a recession event.2
For EMs, due to limited data availability, we use annual data and construct a
sample of recession episodes from 1980 to 2006. Following Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi
(2006), we identify the occurrence of a recession event as a period of negative annual
change in GDP. To reduce heterogeneity among EMs, we focus on countries that are
integrated into the world capital market, defined as countries included in JP Mor-
gan’s Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI). Countries included in the sample are
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Rus-
sia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.3
For each recession episode in a DM or EM, we define an output peak, trough,
and recovery point using the cyclical component of output per capita. In particular,
given a recession episode, we define an output peak as the period displaying the
maximum cyclical component of output per capita in the window with a positive
cyclical component of output per capita preceding the recession event.4 The recovery
2NBER and ECRI follow similar methodologies to define and date recessions. Countries were
selected on the basis of data and recession dates’ availability. Japan was not considered due to
its strong idiosyncratic differences during this period. We did not include in the sample the 1995
episode in Austria, defined by the ECRI as recession, because there was no output contraction.
3Since we are interested in analyzing the recovery of unemployment in market economies during
the crisis, we excluded from this sample episodes associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union
(in particular, the recession episodes that started prior to 1991 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine).
4If no observation with a positive cyclical component of output exists between the trough of a
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point is defined as the period, after a recession event, in which output per capita
recovers its trend level. The output trough is defined as the period between output
peak and recovery point displaying the minimum level of the cyclical component of
output per capita. Since we are studying the pattern of the recovery from recession
episodes, we do not include in the sample episodes in which output per capita did
not fully recover its trend before the occurrence of another recession episode. We
compute the cyclical component of output using a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with
a smoothing parameter of 1600 for quarterly data and 100 for annual data (Hodrick
and Prescott, 1997; Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). Defining the recovery point of output
per capita in terms of its trend level ensures that differences among episodes are not
driven by different recoveries to trend. Results do not significantly change if we define
the recovery point as the point in which output recovers its precrisis level rather than
its trend. Data on output and population are obtained from OECD, WEO, and WDI
datasets.
With this methodology, we obtain a sample of 45 DM recession episodes, and 71
EM recession episodes, listed in Table B.1 of Appendix B.1. Next we classify recession
episodes according to the inflation rate exhibited during the recession episode.
2.2.1.2 Low- and High-Inflation Recession Episodes
A major difference between DMs and EMs is that recession episodes in the latter
tend to display much higher inflation, as shown in Figure 2.3. In the presence of
nominal wage rigidities, inflation is a potential mechanism to induce a contraction of
real wages and thus restore full employment (see, for example, Galí, 2011, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2013). To explore this hypothesis, we divide the sample of EMs into
“low inflation” episodes and “high inflation” episodes. For each episode, we compute
previous recession episode and beginning of the recession event, the output peak is simply defined
as the period displaying the maximum cyclical component of output per capita between the trough





Low Inflation High Inflation
Figure 2.3: Inflation in Recession Episodes
Notes: Inflation refers to maximum level of annual inflation observed during the episode; See Section
2.2.1 for a description of the sample and data.
Data Source: IMF
the maximum level of inflation for the entire episode. We compute inflation using
the producer price index (wholesale price index or the consumer price index when
not available) obtained from the IMF dataset and national sources. The maximum
annual level of inflation observed in a DM recession episode is 24.6 percent. We define
a high- (low-) inflation episode as one in which the maximum level of the annual rate
of inflation is above (below) 30 percent.5 The threshold considered is the upper
bound identified in Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) to define moderate inflation, and
the cutoff above which ? define high inflation. With this threshold, low-inflation EMs
have an average inflation of 11.9 percent, not statistically different from the average
DM inflation (9.4 percent). The standard deviation is also similar: 7.4 percent for
low-inflation EMs and 6.2 percent for DMs. Thus, the distribution of low-inflation
EMs is comparable, in terms of inflation during recession episodes, to that of DMs.
5In Calvo, Coricelli and Ottonello (2014), we conduct a threshold estimation, following Hansen
(2000), to identify a level of inflation from which EM financial-crisis episodes have a different degree
of jobless recovery. Results confirm the presence of a threshold around 30 percent (point estimate of
31.7 percent). We also study whether, in EM financial crises, one can establish a linear relationship
between the inflation experienced in the episode (the level of inflation or the change in inflation) and
unemployment recovery. We uncovered no strong evidence supporting the statistical significance of
a linear relationship between a continuous measure of inflation and unemployment recovery.
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2.2.2 Definition of Variables
In this section we describe the data sources and the construction of the variables used
in the empirical analysis.
2.2.2.1 Measures of Jobless and Wageless Recovery
To measure jobless recovery, we compute, for each episode, the change in the un-
employment rate between output peak and output recovery point (∆PRu). Looking
at the change in the unemployment rate permits us to abstract from historical dif-
ferences in the average unemployment rate in these economies, which is likely to be
determined by structural characteristics and labor-market institutions. In the Section
2.4, we study the robustness of the results to alternative measures of jobless recovery.
Similarly, to measure wageless recovery, we computed, for each episode, the change
in the (log) real wage between output peak and output recovery point (∆PRw). The
data on unemployment and wages were obtained from WEO, ILO and ECLA datasets
and from national sources. Nominal wages were deflated by the wholesale price index
or producer price index, obtained from OECD and IFS datasets and national sources.
2.2.2.2 Financial-Crisis Episodes
For each recession episode, we construct a dummy variable (fin_crisis) that takes the
value of one if a banking crisis event or a debt default/rescheduling event occurs in a
window from 1 year before the output per capita peak to 1 year after the output per
capita recovery point. This classifies 13 DM episodes as financial crises (29 percent
of the sample) and 57 EM episodes (80 percent of the sample), detailed in Table B.1
of Appendix B.1. Data on banking crises and debt default/rescheduling events are
obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a).
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2.2.2.3 Control Variables
The baseline empirical analysis includes two sets of controls (the set of controls is
further expanded in Section 2.4). First, we control for labor-market indicators (de-
noted by labor_mktP) computed at the output peak. As emphasized in the labor-
market literature, labor-market institutions are likely to affect the response of un-
employment to shocks, including the recovery of unemployment following recession
episodes (see, for example, Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2002; Blanchard, 2006; Furceri
and Mourougane, 2009; Bernal-Verdugo, Furceri and Guillaume, 2012). We use two
variables: a de jure indicator of labor-market legislation (lamrigP) from the recent
dataset on labor-market regulations constructed by Campos and Nugent (2012);6 and
a de facto measure of labor-market rigidities, namely the natural rate of unemploy-
ment (natural_uP), which is likely to be affected by labor-market institutions. For
DMs, we use the natural rate of unemployment reported in the IMF–WEO dataset.
For EMs we compute the average rate of unemployment in the whole sample period
as a proxy for the natural rate of unemployment (to the best of our knowledge, there
is no dataset available that reports the natural rate of unemployment for a large set
of EM countries).
Second, we control for the secular growth experienced throughout the recession
episode, denoted by gd. With g denoting the annual secular growth rate of a given
country and d the duration of a recession episode, the secular growth experienced
throughout the recession episode is defined as gd = g × d. The secular growth rate
for a given country is computed as the average per capita growth rate for the sample
period. The duration of the recession episode is defined as the number of years
from output peak to recovery point. Controlling for this variable is relevant since
6The variable lamrig is an index of labor-market legislation rigidity, constructed in Campos
and Nugent (2012) by reviewing labor-market legislation. This new index extends both in terms
of country coverage and of time span the widely used OECD dataset on employment protection
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Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆PRu 0.022 0.036 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.005 0.023 0.028 0.011 0.006 0.007−0.002
(0.003)(0.007)(0.002) (0.004)(0.004)(0.006) (0.005)(0.006)(0.006) (0.005)(0.005)(0.011)
∆PRw 0.084 0.071 0.089 −0.052−0.074 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.025 −0.114−0.140 0.029
(0.022)(0.033)(0.029) (0.030)(0.037)(0.026) (0.037)(0.051)(0.038) (0.043)(0.049)(0.034)
natural_uP 0.057 0.069 0.052 0.106 0.101 0.124 0.119 0.112 0.138 0.097 0.096 0.107
(0.006)(0.009)(0.007) (0.007)(0.007)(0.016) (0.013)(0.017)(0.019) (0.007)(0.007)(0.025)
lamrigP 1.282 1.406 1.230 1.660 1.670 1.621 1.537 1.505 1.639 1.767 1.798 1.597
(0.144)(0.321)(0.156) (0.057)(0.067)(0.097) (0.082)(0.101)(0.130) (0.075)(0.083)(0.160)
gd 0.082 0.095 0.077 0.083 0.084 0.078 0.066 0.063 0.076 0.083 0.084 0.078
(0.006)(0.010)(0.007) (0.015)(0.017)(0.036) (0.019)(0.023)(0.033) (0.015)(0.017)(0.036)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample and variables definition are detailed in Section 2.2.
countries can have different long-run growth rates and recession episodes might differ
in their duration, which can affect jobless and wageless recoveries. For instance, in a
standard growth model, higher technological progress would lead to a higher growth
of real wages.
2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the sample of recession episodes, splitting
the sample into DM and EM episodes and the latter into low- and high-inflation
episodes. Columns 1–3 indicate that the average DM recession episode displays a
statistically significant jobless recovery (from output peak to recovery, unemployment
increases 2.2 percentage points) but no negative effect on wages (from output peak
to recovery, wages increase 8.4 percent). If we split the DM sample between financial
crises and other recession episodes, we see that financial crises display a greater
increase in unemployment: 3.6 percent in financial crises vs. 1.6 percent in other
recession episodes (see also Figure 2.2).
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Columns 4–6 indicate that the average EM recession episode displays both sta-
tistically significant jobless and wageless recovery, driven by financial-crisis episodes
(other recession episodes do not display a statistically significant jobless or wageless
recovery). However, Columns 7–12 show that splitting the sample in low and high
inflation uncovers two very different patterns: low-inflation financial-crisis episodes
display a statistically significant jobless recovery (from output peak to recovery, un-
employment increases 2.8 percentage points) and no wageless recovery, while high-
inflation financial-crisis episodes display no statistically significant jobless recovery
and a large and statistically significant wageless recovery (from output peak to re-
covery, real wages contract 13 percent). As an illustration of this pattern see Figure
2.2.
Table 2.1 also shows the descriptive statistics of the baseline controls, which indi-
cate that financial crises tend to occur more often in a context of higher labor-market
rigidities, and to have a larger duration (which is reflected in the control variable
gd). DM financial crises tend to occur more often in the context of a high natural
rate of unemployment, whereas EM financial crises tend to occur in the context of
a low natural rate of unemployment. These differences in the raw data point to the
relevance of controlling for different characteristics of the recession episodes and of
labor markets to identify the association between financial crises and labor-market
recovery (Section 2.4 expands further this set of controls).
2.3 Econometric Analysis
2.3.1 Methodology
The baseline empirical model relates jobless and wageless recoveries to financial crises,
controlling for labor-market characteristics and secular growth:
∆PRzi = α + βfin_crisisi +X ′iγ + ϵi. (2.1)
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where ∆PRzi denotes the jobless recovery measure (∆PRui) or wageless recovery mea-
sure (∆PRwi) in recession episode i, X is a vector of controls including labor-market
controls (labor_mktP,i) and secular growth (gdi), and ϵi is a random error term (vari-
ables are defined in Section 2.2). The coefficient of interest is β, the difference in
jobless recovery or wageless recovery displayed by financial-crisis episodes relative to
other episodes.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equation (2.1) provide evidence for
the association between financial crises and jobless recovery, but they cannot suggest
any causality: Financial crises can be endogenous to jobless recoveries. For example,
an increase in the unemployment rate driven by technological factors could induce
a fall in house prices and a decrease in collateral values, triggering a financial crisis.
We provide some evidence on the effect of financial crises on jobless and wageless
recoveries using an IV strategy. The instrument is a variable that captures credit-
market outcomes prior to the recession episode, as is typically done in the literature
to predict financial crises (see, for example, Mendoza and Terrones, 2012; Schularick
and Taylor, 2012; Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche, 2001). Specifically, we use
the cyclical component of real per capita credit at the output peak (creditP).7 Data
on credit were obtained from the IFS dataset and from national sources.
Table 2.2 shows the first-stage relationship for DMs and EMs. The first-stage
coefficients are statistically significant at the one- and 10-percent levels, showing that
credit booms prior to recession episodes are associated with a higher probability of
the recession being financial.
7The cyclical component of real per capita credit was obtained using an HP filter. Results do
not change when we use a log quadratic trend to compute the cyclical component.
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Table 2.2
First Stage: Credit Cycle at the Output Peak and Financial Crises
Dependent Variable: fin_crisis
Developed Emerging Market Economies
Market Economies Low Inflation High Inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
creditP 4.448∗∗∗ 4.900∗∗∗ 4.747∗∗∗ 0.737∗ 0.744∗ 0.768∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗
(1.515) (1.488) (1.514) (0.386) (0.419) (0.403) (0.235) (0.251) (0.241)
natural_uP 2.474 −0.386 0.108 0.448
(2.137) (1.887) (0.602) (0.618)
lamrigP −0.015 −0.023 0.242∗
(0.079) (0.170) (0.134)
gd 1.399 2.818 0.470 0.619 −1.476
(1.972) (1.906) (1.133) (0.885) (1.554)
Observations 45 45 44 23 23 23 33 33 33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent
level; *** at 1 percent level. Sample and variables definition are detailed in Section 2.2.
2.3.2 Empirical Results
Estimation results of Equation (2.1), linking financial crises to jobless and wage-
less recoveries, are reported in Table 2.3. Results for DMs are reported in Panel
A. Columns 1–4 show the association between jobless recoveries and financial crises.
The OLS estimates, reported in Columns 1 and 2, indicate that there is a positive
and statistically significant association between financial crises and jobless recoveries.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the IV estimates are also positive and significant, provid-
ing evidence that the exogenous component of financial crises helps explain jobless
recoveries. Note that the IV coefficients are larger than those of the OLS model,
suggesting that the endogeneity of unemployment and financial crises could underes-
timate the effects. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that jobless recoveries
can be significantly larger during financial crises: When output per capita recovers
its precrisis trend, the divergence from the unemployment rate at its precrisis level
tends to be between 1.8 and 2.8 percentage points greater than in a regular recession.
Note that these figures are similar to those observed in the United States and Eu-
rope during the global financial crisis that started in 2008 (see Figure 2.1). Columns
82
5–8 show the association between wageless recoveries and financial crises. None of
the coefficients of the OLS or IV regressions is statistically significant. Therefore,
in DMs, evidence suggests that financial crises are associated with jobless recoveries
but not with the dynamics of real wages. In particular, there is no trace of wageless
recoveries.
The results for low-inflation EMs are reported in Table 2.3, Panel B. As for DMs,
evidence from OLS and IV estimates suggests that financial crises are associated with
jobless recoveries (Columns 1–4) but not with wageless recoveries (Columns 5–8). The
magnitude of the coefficient of jobless recoveries are similar to the one found for DMs.
The results for high-inflation EMs are reported in Table 2.3, Panel C. In sharp
contrast with DMs and low-inflation EMs, financial crises in high-inflation EMs ex-
perience wageless rather than jobless recoveries. In Columns 1–4, both the OLS and
IV estimates show that financial crises have no statistically significant association
with unemployment recovery. On the other hand, the association between financial
crises and the recovery of real wages is negative and statistically significant, as shown
by the OLS estimates in Columns 5 and 6. Moreover, Columns 7 and 8 show that
the IV estimates are also statistically significant, providing some evidence that the
exogenous component of financial crises can be important in wageless recoveries.
2.4 Robustness
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the results reported in Section 2.3.
In particular, we explore the robustness of the conclusions when i) we use an alter-
native measure of financial crises, ii) we include additional controls, and iii) we use
alternative measures of jobless recovery.
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Table 2.3
Financial Crises and Labor Market Recovery
Dependent Variable: ∆PRu ∆PRw
OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Developed Market Economies
fin_crisis 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗ −0.032 −0.040 −0.141 −0.147
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.052) (0.048) (0.164) (0.159)
natural_uP −0.003 −0.018 −0.138 0.173
(0.074) (0.079) (0.751) (0.913)
lamrigP 0.003 0.003 −0.064∗∗ −0.068∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.028)
gd 0.136∗ 0.112∗ 0.121 0.092 0.857 1.602∗∗ 0.925 1.873∗∗
(0.069) (0.065) (0.074) (0.071) (0.684) (0.603) (0.736) (0.755)
Observations 45 44 45 44 35 34 35 34
Panel B: Emerging Market Economies – Low Inflation
fin_crisis 0.020∗ 0.018∗ 0.076∗ 0.061∗ 0.039 −0.009 −0.401 −0.308
(0.010) (0.010) (0.043) (0.035) (0.107) (0.086) (0.422) (0.299)
natural_uP 0.121 0.196 1.221 0.118
(0.084) (0.149) (0.986) (1.711)
lamrigP 0.001 0.002 −0.019 −0.039
(0.008) (0.011) (0.082) (0.102)
gd −0.019 −0.062 −0.016 −0.080 0.480 0.202 0.406 0.342
(0.050) (0.043) (0.083) (0.061) (0.525) (0.395) (0.746) (0.505)
Observations 23 23 23 23 21 27 21 27
Panel C: Emerging Market Economies – High Inflation
fin_crisis 0.011 0.011 0.024 0.024 −0.247∗∗ −0.236∗ −0.397∗ −0.359∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.023) (0.114) (0.118) (0.202) (0.196)
natural_uP 0.043 0.056 −1.644 −1.951
(0.126) (0.130) (1.193) (1.273)
lamrigP −0.023 −0.022 −0.031 −0.034 1.113∗∗ 1.181∗∗ 1.232∗∗ 1.317∗∗
(0.054) (0.058) (0.056) (0.061) (0.444) (0.498) (0.475) (0.535)
gd 0.000 −0.002 0.080 0.107
(0.012) (0.013) (0.110) (0.118)
Observations 35 35 35 35 33 33 33 33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent
level; *** at 1 percent level. Sample and variables definition are detailed in Section 2.2.
2.4.1 Alternative Measure of Financial Crises
The measure of financial crises used in the baseline specification is a dummy variable
based on the occurrence of banking crises or default/rescheduling events during the
recession window. In this section, we study the robustness of the findings to the use
of a continuous measure of financial crises and credit-market conditions: the contrac-
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tion in credit during the recession episode. In particular, the alternative measure of
financial crises is defined as the change in the cyclical component of real credit per
capita from output peak to recovery point (∆PRcredit_c).8
We estimate the model defined in Equation (2.1) with the alternative measure of
financial crises:
∆PRzi = α+ β∆PRcredit_ci +X ′iγ + ϵi. (2.2)
Table 2.4 indicates that the results using the alternative measure of financial crises
are similar to those obtained in the baseline specification. In particular, Panel A
shows that in DMs, creditless recoveries are associated with jobless recoveries and
seem unrelated to the recovery of real wages. Panel B shows that the same pattern
is observed in low-inflation EMs. Finally, Panel C reports that in high-inflation EMs
creditless recoveries are associated with wageless recoveries and not jobless recover-
ies. In summary, focusing on continuous indicators of credit conditions, rather than
dummy variables identifying financial crises, broadly confirms the results obtained in
the financial-crisis analyses.
2.4.2 Additional Controls
In this section, we study the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional
controls that could be associated with jobless recoveries and financial crises. A first
source of concern could be that the association between financial crises and labor-
market recovery is driven by characteristics of financial crises relative to other reces-
sion episodes that are unrelated to financial factors. For instance, financial crises are
typically associated with a larger output contraction than other recession episodes
8In the recession episodes in which a financial crisis occurs prior to or at the output peak, we
consider the maximum level in the cyclical component of real per capita credit between the beginning
of the financial crisis and the output peak instead of the cyclical component of real per capita credit
at the output peak. Indeed, when a financial crisis starts before the recession episode, the level of
credit at the output peak is already affected by the financial-crisis episode. The cyclical component
of credit was computed using the HP filter, but results do not change if we use a log quadratic trend.
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Table 2.4
Credit Recovery and Labor Market Recovery
Dependent Variable: ∆PRu ∆PRw
OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Developed Market Economies
∆PRcredit −0.104∗∗ −0.104∗∗ −0.109∗∗ −0.103∗∗ 0.654 0.847∗ 0.600 0.606
(0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.044) (0.517) (0.474) (0.640) (0.586)
natural_uP 0.041 0.042 −0.230 −0.230
(0.080) (0.080) (0.721) (0.722)
lamrigP 0.003 0.003 −0.069∗∗ −0.067∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.025)
gd 0.152∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.862 1.616∗∗∗ 0.860 1.584∗∗
(0.074) (0.070) (0.074) (0.070) (0.670) (0.572) (0.671) (0.576)
Observations 45 44 45 44 35 34 35 34
Panel B: Emerging Market Economies – Low Inflation
∆PRcredit −0.034∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗−0.041∗∗ 0.470 0.440∗ 0.472 0.367
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.281) (0.233) (0.326) (0.269)
natural_uP 0.119 0.129 0.340 0.337
(0.081) (0.083) (0.999) (1.037)
lamrigP 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.078) (0.079)
gd −0.014 −0.057 −0.011 −0.058 0.313 0.348 0.312 0.323
(0.048) (0.041) (0.050) (0.041) (0.497) (0.374) (0.501) (0.378)
Observations 23 23 23 23 21 27 21 27
Panel C: Emerging Market Economies – High Inflation
∆PRcredit −0.002 −0.004 −0.020 −0.022 0.277∗ 0.290∗ 0.380∗ 0.367∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.147) (0.153) (0.193) (0.198)
natural_uP 0.028 −0.019 −1.009 −0.962
(0.134) (0.140) (1.192) (1.204)
lamrigP 0.003 0.009 −0.020 −0.033
(0.013) (0.014) (0.111) (0.113)
gd −0.017 −0.012 −0.022 −0.008 1.038∗∗ 0.969∗ 1.083∗∗ 0.982∗
(0.054) (0.058) (0.055) (0.059) (0.447) (0.484) (0.454) (0.487)
Observations 35 35 35 35 33 33 33 33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent
level; *** at 1 percent level. Sample and variables definition are detailed in Section 2.2.
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(see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b). Jobless recoveries could result from deeper reces-
sion episodes if, for example, larger output contractions lead to greater increases in
unemployment and there is hysteresis in unemployment.9 A second source of con-
cern is that country characteristics, such as labor-market or financial-development
indicators, are associated simultaneously with a higher frequency of financial crises
and with jobless recoveries. The two sets of controls we have included in the base-
line specification are aimed at addressing these concerns. In this section we study
additional controls related to both episode-specific to country-specific characteristics.
The following list describes each control:
• Depth of the recession episode (∆PTy). Defined as the log change in GDP per
capita from output peak to trough. Data source: WEO and WDI.
• Country’s financial development (fin_development). Defined as the country’s
historical median (1980–2007) of the ratio of bank-provided domestic credit and
GDP. Data source: WDI.
• Country size (small_country, medium_country and large_country). Defined
as three dummy variables measuring the size of the population of a given
country: small_country takes the value one when the country’s population
is below 20 million and zero otherwise; medium_country takes the value one
when the country’s population is between 20 and 80 million and zero otherwise;
large_country takes the value one when the country’s population is above 80
million and zero otherwise. Definition of thresholds and data source: Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohe, 2014.
• Country fixed effects. This analysis is only carried out for DMs. For EMs, the
use of fixed effects is problematic as the number of countries in the sample is
9Blanchard and Summer (1986) depicted the European experience as reflecting hysteresis in
unemployment, a situation in which the natural rate of unemployment depends on the actual rate
of unemployment. See also Ball (2009).
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too large in relation to the overall sample, given by the number of recession
episodes.
• Additional labor-market controls. For DMs, we can use an additional set of
labor-market controls: those constructed by the OECD, which have been used
in the empirical literature as determinants of unemployment rates across coun-
tries (see, for example, Scarpetta, 1996). In particular, we use unemployment
benefits (ub), the coverage of collective bargaining (colcov), and the degree of
unionization of the labor force (union).
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the estimated coefficient associated with financial crises
in Equation (2.1) including these additional controls. The results indicate that there is
little change in this association between financial-crisis jobless and wageless recoveries
after the inclusion of these variables.
2.4.3 Alternative Measures of Jobless Recoveries
The jobless-recovery measure used in the baseline specification is the change in the
unemployment rate from output peak to recovery. This section studies the robustness
of the results to two possible concerns related to this measure. A first concern might
be that the measure is influenced by a low cyclical rate of unemployment at the output
peak. To address this concern, we construct an alternative measure of jobless recovery,
defined as the difference between the unemployment rate at the recovery point and
the natural rate of unemployment at the output peak (uR − natural_uP). A second
concern might be that the unemployment rate could also influenced by changes in the
participation rate. To address this concern, we construct an alternative measure of
jobless recovery defined as the change in the employment rate between output peak
and recovery (∆PRl).
We estimate Equation (2.1) with these two alternative measures of jobless recov-
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Table 2.5
Financial Crises and Labor Market Recovery—Additional Controls–
Developed Market Economies
Dependent Variable: ∆PRu ∆PRw
Additional OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
Control: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Developed Market Economies
∆PRy 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.023∗∗ −0.043 −0.041 −0.165 −0.168
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.052) (0.048) (0.158) (0.164)
Observations 45 44 45 44 35 34 35 34
fin_development 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.028∗∗ −0.041 −0.046 −0.126 −0.156
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.014) (0.053) (0.049) (0.159) (0.166)
Observations 45 44 45 44 35 34 35 34
country_size 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗ −0.042 −0.042 −0.138 −0.153
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.054) (0.050) (0.153) (0.142)
Observations 45 44 45 44 35 34 35 34
Country FE 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.024 0.027∗ −0.023 −0.019 −0.088 −0.098
(0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.053) (0.054) (0.154) (0.134)
Observations 45 44 45 44 35 34 35 34
ub 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗ −0.039 −0.036 −0.118 −0.137
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.053) (0.048) (0.156) (0.161)
Observations 42 41 42 41 35 34 35 34
colcov 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.028∗∗ −0.042 −0.028 −0.115 −0.157
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.053) (0.048) (0.149) (0.155)
Observations 38 37 38 37 35 34 35 34
union 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.019 0.020 −0.026 −0.039 −0.063 −0.103
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.053) (0.049) (0.163) (0.165)
Observations 37 36 37 36 34 33 34 33
Other Controls Included
natural_uP Y N Y N Y N Y N
lamrigP N Y N Y N Y N Y
gd Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a different regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates
significance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. Sample and variables
definition are detailed in Section 2.2 and 2.4.
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Table 2.6
Financial Crises and Labor Market Recovery—Additional Controls
– Emerging Market Economies
Dependent Variable: ∆PRu ∆PRw
Additional OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
Control: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel B: Emerging Market Economies – Low Inflation
∆PRy 0.023∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.070∗ 0.054∗ −0.001 −0.037 −0.299 −0.193
(0.010) (0.010) (0.036) (0.030) (0.103) (0.079) (0.315) (0.217)
Observations 23 23 23 23 21 27 21 27
fin_development 0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.076 −0.014 −0.433 −0.307
(0.009) (0.010) (0.026) (0.022) (0.124) (0.090) (0.478) (0.301)
Observations 23 23 23 23 21 27 21 27
country_size 0.021∗∗ 0.016 0.021∗ 0.018 0.017 −0.007 −0.343 −0.206
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.100) (0.087) (0.370) (0.365)
Observations 23 23 23 23 21 27 21 27
Panel C: Emerging Market Economies – High Inflation
∆PRy 0.011 0.011 0.026 0.026 −0.229∗ −0.226∗ −0.380 −0.375
(0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.026) (0.119) (0.130) (0.224) (0.237)
Observations 35 35 35 35 33 33 33 33
fin_development 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.020 −0.251∗∗ −0.246∗∗ −0.369∗ −0.327∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.022) (0.115) (0.119) (0.194) (0.187)
Observations 35 35 35 35 33 33 33 33
country_size 0.010 0.009 0.025 0.024 −0.288∗∗ −0.278∗∗ −0.377∗ −0.371∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026) (0.117) (0.117) (0.200) (0.193)
Observations 35 35 35 35 33 33 33 33
Other Controls Included
natural_uP Y N Y N Y N Y N
lamrigP N Y N Y N Y N Y
gd Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a different regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates
significance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. Sample and variables
definition are detailed in Section 2.2 and 2.4.
ery for DMs, in which we have more data coverage on the natural unemployment
and employment rates. The results are presented in Table 2.7 and confirm the find-
ings that emerged from the analysis with the change in unemployment rate as a
jobless-recovery measure, suggesting that jobless recoveries are not driven by a low
unemployment rate at the output peak or by changes in the participation rate.
It is worth noting that the measure of jobless recovery used in this paper differs
from that used in other studies that define a jobless recovery as a deviation from the
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Table 2.7
Financial Crises and Alternative Measures of Jobless Recovery, De-
veloped Market Economies
Dependent OLS OLS IV IV
Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆PRu 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 45 44 45 44
uR − natural_uP 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.024∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 45 44 45 44
∆PRnatural_uP 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.017 0.020∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 45 44 45 44
uR − natural_uR 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 45 44 45 44
∆PRl −0.016∗∗∗−0.016∗∗∗−0.018 −0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 39 38 39 38
Other Controls Included
natural_uP Y N Y N
lamrigP N Y N Y
gd Y Y Y Y
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a different regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates
significance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. Sample and variables
definition are detailed in Sections 2.2 and 2.4.
Okun’s law, the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural unem-
ployment rate (see, for example, Ball, Leigh and Loungani, 2013). To compare our
findings with these studies, we decompose our jobless-recovery measure into two com-
ponents: i) the deviation from Okun’s law at the recovery point (uR − natural_uR),
and ii) the change in the natural unemployment rate between output peak and recov-
ery point (∆PRnatural_u). We estimate Equation (2.1) for each of these measures.
Results are presented in Table 2.7 and indicate that the major part of the effect
found in this paper is driven by changes in the natural rate of unemployment. These
changes would not be captured in studies that focus only on deviations from Okun’s
law. Nevertheless, our evidence that high-inflation recession episodes do not display
jobless recoveries suggests that, more than an increase in the “natural rate,” this
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pattern might be better characterized as persistent unemployment in the presence of
low inflation and nominal rigidities.
2.5 Financial Crises and Jobless Recoveries: A
Simple Analytical Framework
This section develops a simple analytical framework to help explain why financial
crises are associated with jobless or wageless recoveries. This framework is based
on two observations. The first observation, widely documented in the literature, is
that financial crises typically impact collateral values (e.g., a fall in housing prices),
tightening credit for firms. For our sample of recession episodes, this is documented
in Figure 2.4. During financial-crisis episodes, real house prices contract 8.1 percent
from output peak to trough and do not recover once output recover its trend. In
other recession episodes, real house prices only contract 0.8 percent and recover their
precrisis level together with output.




Figure 2.4: House Prices and Financial Crises: Developed Market Economies
Notes: See Section 2.2 for a description of the sample and data; y refers to real GDP per capita,
houseP refers to real house prices, peak = 100. Data on real house prices obtained from Cesa-Bianchi,
Cespedes and Rebucci (2014).
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The second observation that motivates our analytical framework is that not all
firms’ projects require the same collateral per unit cost. Collateral requirements are
lower for projects and firms possessing easily recognizable collateral (e.g., tangible
assets) or “intrinsic collateral” (Calvo, 2011). As a large component of such intrinsic
collateral is given by physical capital, tighter lending conditions might imply that
credit is directed more towards projects that involve physical capital at the expense of
projects involving job creation, thus reducing the labor intensity of aggregate output.
In the rest of this section, we begin by formalizing this hypothesis and then provide
some empirical evidence on the suggested channel. The model is based on a collateral
channel, although it is conceivable that other specifications of the credit market could
lead to similar conclusions.
2.5.1 Analytical Framework
Consider a firm that produces homogeneous output by means of capital (K) and
labor (L). The production function is denoted by AF (K,L), where A stands for
neutral technical progress, and function F displays positive marginal productivities
and strictly convex isoquants; F is linear homogenous and twice continuously dif-
ferentiable. Factors of production have to be hired a period in advance for which
credit is required. Therefore, assuming that capital is fully depreciated at the end of
the period, and the relevant rate of interest is zero (assumptions that can be relaxed
without affecting the central results), profits are given by
AF (K,L)− (K +WL), (2.3)
where W stands for the wage rate plus search and other costs associated with labor
hiring (measured in terms of output).
We assume that firms face a credit constraint,
K +WL ≤ Z + (1− θ)K, (2.4)
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where Z > 0 and 0 ≤ θ < 1 . The left-hand side of Expression (2.4) corresponds
to credit needs, while the right-hand side stands for total collateral. Total collateral
consists of “extrinsic collateral,” Z, defined as collateral provided by assets other
than those involved in the project, and “intrinsic collateral,” (1− θ)K, defined as the
collateral embodied in the project. This helps to capture a situation in which, under
credit constraints, capital may be easier to finance than labor. If loans are not repaid,
(1− θ)K can still be recovered by the creditors. In contrast, funds spent hiring labor
cannot be recovered from the workers (unless somebody more skillful than Shylock
is involved in the deal!). If K is its own collateral, for example, θ = 0, then this
constraint boils down to wL ≤ Z: labor would be the only input subject to a credit
constraint, and capital could be accumulated in the standard manner.
This form of collateral constraint is related to the literature on the inalienability of
human capital (Hart and Moore, 1994). In this framework, entrepreneurs cannot be
costlessly replaced and can repudiate contracts by withdrawing their human capital.
It is also related to the literature on asset tangibility. For example, Almeida and
Campello (2007) show that pledgeable assets support more borrowing because such
assets mitigate contractibility problems: Tangibility increases the value that can be
captured by creditors in default states. Tangibility as a characteristic of assets used
as collateral in debt contracts plays a central role in the corporate finance literature
(Tirole, 2005).
The firm’s problem is to choose K and L to maximize (2.3) subject to (2.4).
Denoting with λ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the credit constraint (2.4),
the optimality conditions are given by (2.4), the first-order conditions,
AFK(K,L) = 1 + λθ, (2.5)
AFL(K,L) = W (1 + λ), (2.6)
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and the complementary slackness conditions,
λ ≥ 0, λ(Z − θK −WL) = 0. (2.7)
Conceivably, Z is determined by the amount of collateral that the firm can credibly
post, in addition to capital. A financial crisis can be modeled in this context as a
contraction in Z that triggers binding credit constraints. Proposition 2 shows that
in this environment, under binding collateral constraints and for a given Z and W ,
the profit-maximizing technology becomes more capital intensive as A increases.
Proposition 2. Around a solution of the firms’ problem (K∗, L∗) in which credit






Proof: See Appendix B.2.
This means that output and capital will grow faster than employment. Employ-
ment will lag behind output, which is the defining characteristic of a jobless recovery.
Figure 2.5 illustrates Proposition 2. As in Proposition 2, we focus on the case in
which the credit constraint is strictly binding. The straight line in blue stands for
the credit constraint (2.4), whose slope is given by −θ/W . The convex curves are
isoprofit lines. Under these conditions, recalling linear homogeneity, one can show
that the isoprofit lines in the (L,K) plane are strictly convex, and have the same
slope along constant-L/K rays from the origin. Solid and dashed lines correspond to
two different families of isoprofit lines. An increase in the neutral technical progress
parameter, A, implies that the isoprofit line becomes steeper,10 and thus an increase
in A is equivalent to a shift from the solid to the dashed isoprofit lines. Equilibrium
under the solid lines holds at the blue tangent point, while that under the dashed
10By conditions (2.5) and (2.6), on a given isoprofit line ∂L∂K = −
AFK(K,L)−1















FK and thus sign ∂
∂L
∂K
∂A < 0, implying that the isoprofit lines in Figure 2.4 become steeper as A
increases.
95
Figure 2.5: Optimal Input Vector under Credit Constraint
Notes: Blue line depicts the credit constraint (2.4), black curves are isoprofit lines. Solid and dashed
lines correspond to two different families of isoprofit lines; an increase in A is equivalent to a shift
from the solid to the dashed isoprofit lines.
lines holds at the red point. Therefore, under binding credit constraints, an increase
in A implies an increase in the capital-to-labor ratio.
Although a quantitative study including the mechanism suggested in this section
is beyond the scope of this paper, Appendix B.3 presents a numerical experiment
using the analytical framework presented in this section and shows that the model
can predict a jobless recovery in line with the one observed in the data for the US
Great Recession.
2.5.2 Some Empirical Evidence on the Collateral Channel
To further study the transmission mechanism of the analytical framework presented
in the previous section, we relate jobless recoveries to the contraction in collateral
values, using data on real house prices as proxies for collateral values. These data
on real house prices were obtained from Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes and Rebucci (2014).
We estimate an equation similar to (2.1):
∆PRzi = α + β∆PThouse_pi +X ′iγ + ϵi. (2.8)
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where ∆PThouse_pi denotes the change in (log) real house prices from output peak
to trough for recession epsiode i. Due to data availability, we provide evidence only
for the DM sample. Table 2.8 presents results and suggests a negative relationship
between the house-price contraction from output peak to trough and jobless recov-
eries. This result holds for all specifications, using baseline controls and additional
controls (Section 2.4), such as country fixed effects.
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Table 2.8
Collateral Values and Jobless Recovery Developed Market Economies
Dependent Variable: ∆PRu (Estimation Method: OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
∆PRhouse_p−0.052∗∗−0.054∗∗−0.051∗∗−0.049∗∗−0.049∗∗−0.053∗∗−0.057∗∗−0.063∗∗∗−0.049∗∗−0.052∗∗−0.054∗∗−0.052∗∗−0.043∗∗−0.043∗∗−0.052∗∗−0.054∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
natural_uP 0.023 0.023 −0.024 −0.110 0.027 0.031 0.096 0.023
(0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.124) (0.093) (0.097) (0.083) (0.093)
lamrigP 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
gd 0.162∗ 0.147∗ 0.165∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.132∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.099 0.142 0.141∗ 0.146 0.122 0.016 0.071 0.162∗ 0.147∗∗















Country FE N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y
Observations 38 37 38 37 38 37 38 37 38 37 36 35 35 34 38 37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. Sample and variables
definition are detailed in Sections 2.2 and 2.5.
98
2.6 Conclusions
Financial crises are associated with bad labor-market outcomes. This is a central piece
of evidence, which this paper shows for both DMs and EMs. An equally important
piece of evidence is that the relationship between financial crises and labor-market
outcomes depends on the inflation during the crisis episode. In low-inflation cases
(all DMs cases and EMs cases that exhibit inflation below 30 percent annual rate
during the recession episode), real wages appear to be downward inflexible, and the
brunt of the adjustment comes in the form of high unemployment, measured at the
point at which per-capita output recovers its trend. In contrast, under high inflation
(EMs cases that exhibit inflation above 30 percent annual rate during the recession
episode), unemployment goes back to precrisis levels at the output-recovery point,
but real wages are significantly lower.
This suggests that labor-market outcomes during financial crises cannot easily
be alleviated by standard expansionary monetary policy. For instance, the evidence
suggests that a sharp rise in the price level can help to restore full employment, but
at the expense of sharply lower real wages (close to −13 percent according to the av-
erage in high-inflation EMs; see Figure 2.2). This indicates that the use of monetary
expansion to palliate high unemployment may encounter severe political opposition.
Moreover, the EM experience is not helpful to assess the political feasibility in DMs
because high inflation was an inevitable consequence of capital flight and resultant
maxi-devaluations, not a calculated policy outcome. It is worth noting, incidentally,
that there is no evidence in our sample that persistent inflation helps to lower unem-
ployment (see Calvo, Coricelli and Ottonello, 2014). In the majority of high-inflation
episodes, they occurred mostly within the crisis window and were followed by a return
to previous inflation rates. Therefore, the evidence in no way contradicts the vertical
Phillips curve conjecture.
Financial-crisis episodes are dramatic events that involve the central nervous sys-
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tem of capitalist economies. Hence, there are strong a priori intuitive considerations
that make one expect those crises to be deeper and longer than most of the others. It
is much less obvious why the labor market should suffer a significantly more powerful
blow. To address this issue, the paper presents a simple model in which the financial
shock takes the form of a drop in loan collateral values, and firms are assumed to
be subject to a binding collateral constraint. This is a standard assumption in the
macroeconomic literature (see, for example, Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov,
2012). The relatively new twist in the model is that it assumes that labor costs
are harder to collateralize than physical capital because, as a general rule, a share
of physical capital can be attached by the creditor in case of default, while hiring
costs, for example, are more like “autumn leaves,” hard to grab and harder to price.
This slants credit in favor of capital-intensive projects and exacerbates a jobless or
wageless recovery. Preliminary tests of this conjecture are encouraging.
The additional evidence about the role of loan collateral further supports the view
that standard fiscal and monetary policies may be ineffective in speeding full recovery
and suggests that studying policies that address the weaknesses of the credit market
should take center stage. Examples include debt restructuring and labor subsidies.
Searching for policies of this kind that are both effective and politically viable should




Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy Under
Collateral Constraints and Wage Rigidity
Pablo Ottonello
3.1 Introduction
During external crises, exchange-rate policy in emerging market economies (EMs)
seem to leave policymakers between a rock and a hard place: Preventing currency
depreciation could bring more unemployment, but if liabilities are denominated in for-
eign currency, currency depreciation could increase debt in terms of domestic income,
leading to financial destabilization, and compromising credit access. The potential
conflict for exchange-rate policy between these two welfare concerns, credit access
and unemployment, is often a central element of the policy debate, as was observed
during the East Asian and Latin American crises in the late 1990s (Fischer, 1998;
Calvo, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002) and during the peripheral European crises that started
in 2008 (see, for example, Krugman, 2010; Feldstein, 2011).
This paper conducts a quantitative analysis of the optimal exchange-rate policy
when facing this “credit access–unemployment” trade-off. It constructs an environ-
ment that provides a theoretical justification for this trade-off, combining two frictions
that have been largely studied in the literature: a downward nominal wage rigidity
(as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2011), and a financial friction by which external
borrowing is denominated in the international unit of account and limited by the
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value of collateral in the form of tradable and nontradable income (as in Mendoza,
2002). In this framework, credit-access and unemployment are two conflicting factors
affecting welfare: Devaluations are associated with a welfare gain – by decreasing the
real value of wages they reduce involuntary unemployment – but are also associated
with a welfare cost – by increasing the value of external debt in terms of domestic
income, they tighten the collateral constraint and can trigger an endogenous “sudden
stop.”1
The main finding, in calibrated versions of the model, is that two features char-
acterize the optimal exchange-rate policy during financial crises (defined as episodes
of binding credit constraints). First, the optimal allocation generally implies a large
real exchange rate depreciation (between a 17 and 40 percent fall on average in the
relative price of nontradables), which is achieved by allowing for nominal currency de-
preciation. The reason is that, the welfare costs related to higher unemployment and
lower consumption are typically higher than the welfare costs related to intertempo-
ral misallocation of consumption. Second, optimal currency depreciation is generally
lower than that associated with full employment. Thus, the optimal policy is con-
sistent with a managed-floating exchange-rate policy, frequently observed in EMs
during financial crises (see, for example, Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Moreover, the
real exchange-rate depreciation and current account adjustment under the optimal
exchange rate policy during episodes of binding collateral constraints is in line with
the dynamics observed in the data during sudden stops. The paper shows that the
nature of the shocks and the structural characteristics of the economy are key deter-
minants for the optimal degree of “fear of floating” during financial crises: Higher
external interest rates, a larger intertemporal or intratemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, or a large mobility of labor across sectors, call for a smaller unemployment; a
1Calvo (1998) labeled sudden stops episodes of large and abrupt reversals in external credit
flows that characterize EMs. For a review of the Fisherian debt-deflation approach to sudden stops,
including the form of collateral constraint used in this paper, see Korinek and Mendoza (2013).
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more elastic labor supply, or a higher share of income that can be used as collateral,
call for more contained currency depreciation.
Welfare under the optimal exchange-rate policy is compared to that under a full-
employment and a fixed exchange-rate regimes. The full-employment exchange-rate
regime is costly in terms of welfare for making consumption adjust more than what
is optimal during periods of binding collateral constraints. The fixed exchange-rate
regime is costly for inducing an inefficient adjustment to negative shocks with involun-
tary unemployment, in periods of both nonbinding and binding collateral constraints.
This different nature of welfare costs generally makes the fixed exchange-rate regime
more costly, in terms of welfare, than the full-employment exchange-rate regime. The
welfare cost of the full-employment and fixed exchange-rate regimes, with respect to
the optimal exchange-rate policy, are larger in regions of the state-space where the
collateral constraint binds, with an average welfare cost during periods of binding
collateral constraints of 0.06 percent and 1.8 percent of consumption per period,
respectively.
This is the first paper that conducts a quantitative study of nominal exchange-
rate policy under a collateral constraint by which debt is limited by the value of
collateral in the form of tradable and nontradable income. Introduced in Mendoza
(2002), this form of financial friction has been widely used to capture the main styl-
ized facts about sudden stops in EMs.2 This form of collateral constraint causes
endogenous sudden stops through Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation mechanism: Binding
constraints lead to deleveraging, which leads to a fall in the price of nontradables,
which further tightens the collateral constraint. Previous studies using this form of
financial friction have considered real models, in which the policy instrument during
periods of binding collateral constraints is a tax (subsidy) on nontradable or tradable
2See, for example, Mendoza (2005), Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009), Korinek (2011),
Bianchi (2011), Benigno et al. (2011,2012a,b,c).
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goods (see, for example, Benigno et al., 2012a). The present paper expands this liter-
ature by considering a nominal model and a monetary instrument, which present the
policymaker a different trade-off: While subsidizing nontradable goods leads simul-
taneously to increased employment and higher prices of nontradable goods (relaxing
the credit constraint), currency depreciation leads to an increase in employment and
a decrease in the price of nontradable goods (tightening the credit constraint).3
The paper is related to the large body of literature that studies nominal exchange-
rate policy in small open economies during financial crises. A key difference with
respect to this literature is the form of financial friction studied in the present paper,
which in turn leads to different policy implications. For instance, in a large subset
of this literature, borrowing access is linked to asset prices: Cespedes, Chang, and
Velasco (2004), Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), Curdia (2007), and Gertler, Gilchrist,
and Natalucci (2007) study economies featuring the financial accelerator mechanism
(see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999). In a recent related paper, Fornaro (2013)
study an economy with a collateral constraint that limits external debt to a fraction
of the market value of asset holdings (as in Bianchi and Mendoza, 2011). In these
frameworks, currency depreciations have a positive effect on output, that leads to
higher asset prices and improved credit access. As a consequence, contrary to the
present paper’s result, in these papers flexible exchange rates lead to more financial
stability during crises than fixed exchange rates. In the present setup, borrowing
access is linked to goods prices: Debt denominated in a foreign currency is limited
by the market value of tradable and nontradable income. The combination of a
nontradable sector and liability dollarization creates a currency mismatch that makes
currency depreciation financially destabilizing (in line with the traditional “original
3In particular, it can be shown that in the model economy presented in Section 3.2, using taxes
on nontradable or tradable consumption together with the capital-control tax, a Ramsey planner
can achieve an allocation characterized by full employment and nonbinding collateral constraint in
all states. See Benigno et al. (2012b) for a similar result in an economy without wage rigidity.
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sin” argument; see Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza, 2005; Calvo, 1999).
The hypothesis of currency depreciations being financially destabilizing has been
previously formalized, for instance, in Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001), and
in Braggion, Christiano, and Roldos (2009) using credit constraints on firms. In
these papers, however, currency depreciations are financially destabilizing because
they cause output contraction. In the present paper, currency depreciations are not
contractionary (they reduce unemployment), but the associated currency mismatch
reduces the value of income, leading to a large consumption adjustment under binding
credit constraints and entailing a welfare cost. For these reasons, the form of financial
friction considered in this paper gives rise to a trade-off between credit access and
unemployment that has not been formally studied in the literature of exchange-rate
policy in small open economies during financial crises.
The policy choice under the trade-off studied in this paper has engendered a long-
standing and still lively policy debate. Keynes, for instance, was first actively opposed
to the return of Britain to the gold standard after World War I, arguing that it would
be associated with high unemployment (Keynes, 1925). However, when the Great
Depression started, Keynes recommended against devaluation, claiming that now the
costs in terms of debt revaluation and financial destabilization would outweigh the
benefits (Irwin, 2011). In the same line, Diaz-Alejandro (1965), analyzing Argentina’s
exchange-rate policy in the 1950s, highlighted the possibility that devaluations would
lead to negative wealth effects and adjustment in consumption from income distribu-
tion and balance-sheet effects. This policy debate was triggered again by the crisis
in peripheral Europe that started in 2008, in which there are, simultaneously, high
unemployment and high debt levels denominated in euros. Moreover, the empirical
literature suggests that both sides of the debate are supported by evidence. Cross-
country regressions for EMs tend to show both that fixing the exchange rate during
financial crisis episodes is associated with larger output contractions (see, for exam-
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ple, Ortiz et al., 2009), and that currency mismatch plays a key role in determining
the access to international credit markets (see, for example, Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Mejia, 2008).
Finally, it is worth noting that while most of the above-mentioned literature on
nominal exchange rate policy in small open economies during financial crises compare
different (possibly nonoptimal) exchange-rate regimes, the present paper derives the
fully optimal exchange-rate policy.4 The paper shows that the optimal allocation
is a nonmonotonic function of the states; therefore, considering the optimal policy,
instead of comparing exchange-rate regimes, is relevant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model econ-
omy. Section 3.3 defines three possible exchange-rate regimes in this setup (optimal,
full-employment, and fixed exchange-rate policies) and provides analytical results de-
scribing the exchange-rate policy trade-off that emerges in this economy. Section
3.4 presents the quantitative analysis comparing the aggregate dynamics and welfare
under the three exchange-rate regimes. Section 3.5 examines the sensitivity of results
to different calibrations and changes in the baseline model’s assumptions. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 The Model Economy
This section describes the model economy used to conduct exchange-rate policy analy-
sis. It extends the two-sector (tradable and nontradable), dynamic, stochastic, small
open economy model with a downward nominal wage rigidity from Schmitt-Grohe
4Optimal monetary policy has been largely studied in open economies with complete asset mar-
kets, and in open economies in which the financial friction is that financial markets are incomplete;
see, for example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001), Devereux and
Engel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2005), De Paoli (2009), Corsetti,
Dedola, and Leduc (2010), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011). The present paper constitutes a con-
tribution in this direction for a small open economy in which financial frictions include an imperfect
access to credit markets, with the presence of occasionally binding collateral constraints.
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and Uribe (2011), to include a collateral constraint in the form of tradable and non-
tradable income. The economy only has access to a one-period, non-state-contingent
debt instrument, denominated in units of tradable goods, capturing liability dollar-
ization. The model then features a nominal rigidity and two financial frictions that
will interact to determine the exchange-rate policy trade-off.
Tradables are endowed to the economy, and their price is determined by the law of
one price. Nontradables are produced by the economy, and their price is determined
by domestic demand and supply. Fluctuations in the small open economy are driven
by exogenous shocks to the value of the tradable endowment (which can be interpreted
as shocks to terms of trade or to productivity in the tradable sector) and to the interest
rate on external debt, two sources of business-cycle fluctuations that have been widely
studied in EMs (Mendoza, 1995; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006).
3.2.1 Households





βtU (ct) , (3.1)
where ct denotes consumption in period t; the function U (·) is assumed to be con-
tinuous, twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave; the subjective discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1), and Et denotes expectation conditional on the information set
available at time t.
The consumption good is assumed to be a composite of tradable and nontradable





















where cTt denotes tradable consumption and cNt denotes nontradable consumption.
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Each period, households receive a stochastic endowment (yTt ) and profits from
the ownership of firms producing nontradable goods (Πt). They inelastically supply
h hours of work to the labor market. (Section 3.5 relaxes these assumptions studying
production in the tradable sector and an elastic labor supply.) Due to the presence
of the wage rigidity (discussed in detail in the next sections), households will only be
able to sell ht ≤ h hours in the labor market. The level of actual hours worked (ht)
is determined by firms and is taken as given by the households.
Households have access to a one-period, non-state-contingent bond denominated
in units of tradable goods that can be traded internationally paying an exogenous
and stochastic gross interest rate Rt. The model therefore assumes full liability dol-





first-order Markov process. Debt acquired in period t is taxed at rate τ dt . Households’












yTt + wtht +Πt
)
− Tt, (3.3)





denotes the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables, wt denotes
the wage rate in terms of tradable goods, and Tt denotes a lump sum transfer in
period t.
It is assumed that households face a collateral constraint by which external debt
cannot exceed a fraction κ of income:
dt+1 ≤ κ
(
yTt + wtht +Πt
)
, (3.4)
where κ > 0. This form of collateral constraint, introduced in Mendoza (2002), has
been used extensively in the literature on small open economies to capture the effect of
currency mismatch on external credit-market access: While collateral includes income
from both tradable and nontradable sectors, external debt is fully denominated in
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units of tradables. The credit-market frictions from which this constraint arises are
not modeled here explicitly, but this form of collateral constraint can be seen as
describing an environment in which lenders manage default risk by imposing a debt
limit linked to households’ current income, as is typically the case of lending criteria
in mortgage or consumer credit markets.5 Empirical evidence suggests that current
income is a significant determinant of credit market access (Jappelli, 1990).
In addition, households are assumed to face a no-Ponzi game constraint of the
form
dt+1 ≤ dN , (3.5)
where dN denotes the natural debt limit. As in Aiyagari (1994), this is defined as
the maximum value of external debt that the household can repay almost surely
starting from that period, assuming that its tradable consumption is zero forever.
Formally, denoting yT as the minimum possible level of tradable endowment and R
as the maximum possible level of external interest rate, the natural debt limit is
defined as dN ≡ R
R−1y
T . Since the collateral value in the credit limit (3.4) depends on
relative prices which can be affected by policy variables, constraint (3.5) is imposed
in addition to (3.4) is in order to prevent Ponzi schemes induced by the policymaker
(Mendoza, 2005; Benigno et al., 2012b).
The household problem is to choose state-contingent plans for ct, cTt , cNt , and
dt+1 that maximize the expected utility (3.1) subject to the consumption aggregation
technology (3.2), the sequential budget constraint (3.3), the collateral constraint (3.4),
and the no-Ponzi game constraint (3.5), for a given initial debt level, d0; for the given
sequence of prices, wt and pt; for the given sequence of hours worked, ht, profits, Πt,
stochastic tradable endowment, yTt , and interest rate, Rt; and for the given sequence
5Korinek (2011) shows that this form of the collateral constraint can be rationalized as a
renegotiation-proof form of debt contract in an imperfect credit market in which households can
renegotiate external debt and lenders can extract at most a fraction of borrowers’ current income if
debt is renegotiated.
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of policies, τ dt and Tt.
Denoting by λt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint
(3.3) and by µt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint






























and the complementary slackness conditions










Each period, operating in competitive labor and product markets, firms hire labor to
produce the nontradable good, yNt . Profits each period are given by
Πt = ptF (ht)− wtht,
where the production function, F (·), is assumed to be increasing and concave.
The firms’ problem is to choose ht to maximize profits given prices pt and wt. The
first-order condition of this problem is
ptF
′ (ht) = wt. (3.10)
This condition implicitly defines the firms’ demand for labor.
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3.2.3 The Labor Market
Nominal wages (Wt) are assumed to be downwardly rigid as in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2011):6
Wt ≥ γWt−1,
for γ > 0.
It is assumed that the law of one price holds for tradable goods, implying that
P Tt = EtP
T∗
t , where Et is the nominal exchange rate and P T∗t is the foreign currency
price of tradable goods. Assuming that P T∗t is constant and normalized to one, wages










where ϵt is the gross depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate: ϵt ≡ EtEt−1 .
However, actual hours worked cannot exceed the inelastically supplied level of hours:
ht ≤ h. (3.12)
When the nominal wage rigidity binds, the labor market can exhibit involuntary
unemployment, given by h − ht. This implies a slackness condition must hold at all








6The assumption of an asymmetric nominal wage rigidity is consistent with empirical evidence
using microeconomic data (e.g., Gottschalk, 2005; Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk, 2010; Daly,
Hobijn, and Lucking, 2012).
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This condition means that when the nominal wage rigidity is not binding, the labor
market must exhibit full employment, and if it exhibits unemployment, it must be
the case that the nominal wage rigidity is binding.
3.2.4 The Government
The government determines the exchange-rate depreciation, ϵt, and imposes a pro-
portional tax (subsidy) on debt τ dt , which is rebated lump sum to households (Tt), to
balance its budget each period:
dt+1
Rt
τ dt = Tt. (3.14)
Section 3.3 defines different exchange-rate regimes and how the capital-control tax is
determined.
3.2.5 General Equilibrium Dynamics
The market for nontradable goods clears at all times:
cNt = F (ht). (3.15)
Combining the equilibrium price equation, (3.8), with condition (3.15), the firms’










ξ F ′ (ht) . (3.16)
Combining condition (3.15) with households’ budget constraint, (3.3), the defi-
nition of firms’ profits, and the government’s budget constraint, (3.14), the resource
constraint of the economy becomes
dt+1
Rt
= dt + c
T
t − yTt . (3.17)
Using the definition of firms’ profits, the equilibrium price equation, (3.8), and
the market clearing condition for nontradables, (3.15), the collateral constraint, (3.4),
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The general equilibrium dynamics are then given by stochastic processes
{cNt , cTt , ht, pt, wt, dt+1, λt, µt, Tt}∞t=0 satisfying the set of equations (GE):



































(3.11): wt ≥ γ wt−1ϵt ,
(3.12): ht ≤ h,
(3.13):
(





(3.14): Tt = τ dt dt+1R
−1
t ,










ξ F ′ (ht) ,
(3.17): dt+1R−1t = dt + cTt − yTt ,














given an exchange-rate policy {ϵt}∞t=0, a capital-control tax policy {τ dt }∞t=0, initial
conditions w−1 and d0, and exogenous stochastic processes {yTt , Rt}∞t=0.
3.3 Exchange-Rate Regimes: Definitions and
Analytical Results
This section formally defines the optimal exchange-rate policy, and discusses the
trade-off between credit access and unemployment that exchange-rate policy can face
in the model economy presented in the previous section. Analytical results relating
113
credit access and unemployment are established, providing a framework for under-
standing the quantitative characterization of the optimal exchange-rate policy to be
presented in the next section. Two additional exchange-rate regimes are also defined
in this section – full-employment and fixed exchange-rate policy – to provide standard
benchmarks for the study of the optimal exchange-rate policy.
3.3.1 Definition of Exchange-Rate Regimes
This section defines three possible exchange-rate regimes: optimal, full-employment,
and fixed exchange-rate policy. Exchange-rate regimes are defined conditional on an
optimal capital-control tax policy (τ dt ). The reason for using this capital-control tax is
twofold. First, previous literature has shown that both the credit constraint and the
downward wage rigidity considered in this paper embody a pecuniary externality that
may induce inefficient external borrowing (Bianchi, 2011; Beningo et al., 2012a; and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2013).7 The optimal capital-control tax policy eliminates
any borrowing inefficiency, and allows for a comparison across exchange-rate regimes
isolating the effect of exchange-rate policy from this distortion.
Second, without the optimal capital-control tax, the set of restrictions for the
optimal policy includes a forward-looking constraint (namely, the household’s in-
tertemporal borrowing decision (3.6)). As shown in Kydland and Prescott (1977),
Bellman’s (1957) principle of optimality fails in this context, and standard dynamic
programming techniques cannot be applied. Using an optimal capital-control tax
7Inefficient borrowing arises when the social costs of borrowing differ from the private costs of
borrowing. Bianchi (2011) shows that in an endowment economy, the collateral constraint in the
form of tradable and nontradable income induces overborrowing, in the sense that the social costs
of borrowing exceed the private costs of borrowing; in this setup, the constrained social planner
borrows less than the competitive equilibrium. Beningo et al. (2011, 2012a) define overborrowing
(underborrowing) as a situation in which a constrained social planner would take on less (more)
debt than decentralized agents; in this sense, the authors find that whether an economy with this
form of collateral constraint features overborrowing or underborrowing depends on the structure of
the economy (e.g., endowment or production), and on the calibration. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2013) show that the downward wage rigidity, combined with a fixed exchange-rate policy, induces
overborrowing.
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technically simplifies the problem, allowing for the use of standard dynamic pro-
gramming techniques. Nevertheless, Section 3.5 studies the sensitivity of the optimal
exchange-rate policy to the assumption of optimal capital-control taxes by restricting
the Ramsey planner’s set of available instruments to the nominal exchange rate. In
this context, time-invariant optimal policies under commitment are obtained using
the recursive saddle-point method developed in Marcet and Marimon (2011).
3.3.1.1 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy
Definition 4. The optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes is






that maximize households’ expected lifetime utility (3.1)
subject to the set of equations describing the general equilibrium dynamics (GE).
To characterize the allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal
capital-control taxes, I set up the Ramsey problem dropping constraints (3.6)–(3.9),







(3.5), (3.12), (3.17), and (3.18) also satisfy (GE). The Ramsey problem is then to






, subject to (3.5), (3.12), (3.17), and
(3.18). The dynamics under the optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-





































d′ ≤ dN ,
h ≤ h,
where time subscripts for variables dated in period t have been dropped, and a prime






function for households under optimal exchange-rate and capital-control tax policies.
This formulation will be used in the quantitative analysis.
3.3.1.2 Full-Employment Exchange-Rate Policy
For this regime, consider an exchange-rate policy aimed at maintaining full employ-
ment at all states and dates: Under the full-employment policy,
ht = h, ∀t. (3.20)
Definition 5. The full-employment exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control






that maximize households’ expected lifetime utility
(3.1) subject to the set of equations describing the general equilibrium dynamics (GE),
and the full-employment constraint (3.20).
To characterize the optimal allocation under the full-employment policy, I follow
the same strategy as for the optimal exchange-rate policy and drop constraints (3.6)–







(3.17), (3.18), and (3.20), also satisfy (GE) and (3.20). Therefore, the dynamics under
the full-employment exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes can be














































denotes the value function for households under the full-
employment exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes.
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3.3.1.3 Fixed Exchange-Rate Policy
Finally, consider a policy aimed at keeping the exchange rate fixed at all states and
dates: Under the fixed exchange-rate policy or currency peg,
ϵt = 1, ∀t. (3.22)
Definition 6. The fixed exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes is






that maximize households’ expected lifetime utility (3.1)
subject to the set of equations describing the general equilibrium dynamics (GE), and
currency peg constraint (3.22).
To characterize the allocation under the currency peg with optimal capital-
control taxes, I follow a similar strategy to that of the optimal exchange-rate policy
and drop constraints (3.6)–(3.9) and (3.14)–(3.15). Appendix C.1 shows that any{
dt+1, c
T
t , ht, wt, ϵt
}
that satisfy (3.5), (3.11)–(3.13), (3.16)–(3.18), and (3.22), also
satisfy (GE) and (3.22). Thus, the dynamics under the currency peg with optimal
capital-control tax policy can be expressed with the Bellman equation,
V PEG
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sX , d, w−1
)
denotes the value function for households under the cur-
rency peg and optimal capital-control taxes and the subscript −1 is used to indicate
variables dated in period t− 1.
3.3.2 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy, Unemployment and
Credit Limit: Analytical Results
This section studies the relationship between unemployment and the credit limit
under the optimal exchange-rate policy. Although, given the complexity of the model,
a numerical solution is required for a full characterization, some analytical results can
be obtained to show the trade-off involved in exchange-rate policy. These results will
be relevant to understanding the next section’s numerical solution for the dynamics
of the economy under the optimal exchange-rate policy. Proposition 1 characterizes
the allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy defined in the previous section.
Proposition 3. Under the optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control
taxes (Definition 1) the following conditions hold at all dates and states:















• If ξ ≥ 1, ht = h.
Proof. See Appendix C.2. ■
Two conclusions follow from this result. First, the allocation under the optimal
exchange-rate policy and capital-control taxes features no unemployment under no
binding collateral constraints. Given that the capital-control tax eliminates any in-
efficient borrowing, eliminating unemployment when the credit constraint does not
bind leads to a welfare gain (a higher consumption of nontradables), without any
welfare cost.8
8Note that while the presence of incomplete financial markets leads to inefficient consumption
fluctuations relative to an economy with complete asset markets, eliminating unemployment does
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Second, if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one, a slackness
condition is established between unemployment and the collateral constraint under
the optimal exchange-rate policy: If the collateral constraint is not binding, the labor
market must exhibit full employment, and if there is unemployment, the collateral
constraint must be binding. As discussed at the end of this section, empirical evidence
from EMs provides wide support for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution being
less than one. To understand the role of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
and the interaction between unemployment and the collateral constraint under the
optimal exchange-rate policy, a discussion is in order regarding the trade-off facing
exchange-rate policy in this economy.
3.3.2.1 The Credit-Access–Unemployment Trade-off
Parallel to the traditional inflation–unemployment trade-off in the New Keynesian
literature, the exchange-rate policy in this economy may face a “credit-access–
unemployment” trade-off. Under binding nominal downward wage rigidity, a de-
preciation of the nominal exchange rate decreases real wages and, thus, helps reduce
unemployment. But it is also associated with a real exchange-rate depreciation, which
decreases the value of nontradable output in tradable units. Recall that the collateral
in this economy is given by the value, in tradable units, of tradable and nontradable
output. Accordingly, if the price effect (real exchange-rate depreciation) dominates
the quantity effect (employment increase), an exchange-rate depreciation can de-
crease the collateral value and tighten the credit limit. The price effect dominates
the quantity effect if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradables
and nontradables is less than one (ξ < 1). As discussed in the next section, this
assumption is widely supported by empirical evidence from EMs. Under this as-
sumption, the following proposition can be established:
not lead to more inefficient consumption fluctuations.
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, for any debt level d∗t+1
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Proof. See Appendix C.2. ■
This result shows that for any debt level that does not satisfy the credit limit under
full employment, there exists a level of employment below full employment for which
the real exchange rate is sufficiently appreciated to ensure the credit limit is satisfied
for that debt level. This result stems from the fact that if the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution is less than one (ξ < 1), the collateral constraint is decreasing in the
level of employment.9 This provides a theoretical justification for the existence of
the exchange-rate policy debate, typically observed during financial crises in EMs,
that weighs the two policy objectives. The optimal choice under this trade-off can be
characterized using the first-order conditions of the optimal policy problem (3.19):
Remark 1 If ξ < 1, in an allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy with























where ϕµt , and ϕFt denote the nonnegative multipliers associated with the collateral
constraint (3.18), and the resource constraint (3.17), respectively, in the Ramsey
problem of optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes.
9If the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than or equal to one (ξ ≥ 1), the
credit access–unemployment trade-off vanishes, as implied by Proposition 3. In particular, if the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to one (ξ = 1), employment does not influence the
collateral constraint. If the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one (ξ > 1), the
credit-access–unemployment trade-off overturns, and a decrease in unemployment also helps relax
the collateral constraint.
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Proof. See Appendix C.2. ■
Equation (3.24) shows that in any optimal allocation in which there is unemployment,
the Ramsey planner equates the marginal benefit of increasing employment, given by
the marginal utility of nontradable consumption, to its marginal cost in terms of
tightening the collateral constraint. Equation (3.25) shows that the shadow price of
relaxing the credit constraint for the Ramsey planner, ϕµt , is the wedge between the
current shadow value of wealth for the Ramsey planner and the expected value of
reallocating wealth to the next period. This shows a relevant aspect of the trade-off
involved in exchange-rate policy: While the costs of exchange-rate depreciations are
associated with intertemporal misallocation of consumption, their benefits are related
to a higher level of consumption.
3.3.2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Intratemporal Elasticity of
Substitution
As shown in Propositions 3 and 4, a tension exists between credit access and un-
employment only if the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable
goods is less than one (ξ < 1). If this is the case, tradable and nontradable goods are
gross complements, and the price effect (real exchange-rate depreciation) associated
with increasing employment dominates the quantity effect (employment increase).
As a result, exchange-rate depreciation can decrease the collateral value and make
the credit limit tighter.
There is wide support from the empirical literature for the intratemporal elas-
ticity of substitution being less than one. In a sample of developed and emerging
market economies, Stockman and Tesar (1995) estimate a value of the elasticity of
substitution of 0.44. Separating the samples of developed and emerging economies,
Mendoza (1995) finds values of the elasticity of 0.74 and 0.43, respectively. In studies
for EMs, Gonzalez-Rozada et al. (2004) found estimates in the range between 0.4
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and 0.48 for Argentina and Lorenzo, Aboal, and Osimani (2005), found estimates in
a range between 0.46 and 0.75 for Uruguay.10
Moreover, following this empirical literature, the studies referenced in the present
paper that calibrate a two-sector, small open economy model generally use a param-
eter value of the elasticity of substitution in the range between 0.44 and 0.83.
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
The objective of this section is to quantitatively characterize the aggregate dynamics
of the model economy under the optimal exchange-rate policy and to compare its per-
formance, in terms of welfare, to that under the full-employment and fixed exchange-
rate policies, both during periods of financial crises and under regular business-cycle
fluctuations.
3.4.1 Calibration and Computation
To characterize the aggregate dynamics under the different exchange-rate regimes,
calibrated versions of the functional equations (3.19), (3.21) and (3.23) are solved
numerically. Due to the presence of occasionally binding constraints, I resort to
the method of value-function iteration over a discretized state-space to compute the
numerical solutions.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the consumption aggregator is assumed to be a CES
aggregator. I also assume a CRRA period utility function and an isoelastic form for
10Ostry and Reinhart (1992) found evidence inconclusive in this respect with estimates between
0.66 and 1.44, depending on the EM region and the instrumental variable considered. For a survey on
the methodologies used to estimate the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable







F (h) = hα
N
. (3.26)
The model is calibrated at the annual frequency, to match Argentinean data.
Argentina is used as a benchmark to conduct this exercise as an EM country whose
exchange-rate regimes and financial crises have been widely studied, particularly in
the two branches of the literature this paper combines.
All parameter values used in the baseline calibration are shown in Table 3.1. The
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to σ = 2, a standard value
in the business-cycle literature for small open economies (see, for example, Mendoza
1991). The intratemporal elasticity of substitution is set to ξ = 0.44, using the
estimates of Gonzalez-Rozada et al. (2004) for Argentina (see Section 3.3.2 for a
review of the literature on this parameter). I set αN = 0.75, following the evidence in
Uribe (1997) on the labor share in the nontradable sector in Argentina, and γ = 0.96,
following the evidence in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) on downward nominal
wage rigidity. The mean level of tradable output and the labor endowment (h) are
normalized to one.
The parameters {β, a, κ} are used to match three key moments in the ergodic
distributions of the model under the optimal exchange-rate policy to the ones observed
in historical Argentinean data (for the period 1975–2011). The three data moments
considered are typically targeted in the related literature (following Bianchi, 2011): an
average level of external debt-to-GDP ratio of 21 percent, a share of tradable output
in GDP of 32.9 percent, and a frequency of sudden stops of 5.5 percent. A sudden
stop in the model is defined as a period in which the economy exhibits a change in
the current account larger than one standard deviation, following Eichengreen, Gupta





σ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ξ 0.44 Intratemporal elasticity of substitution
a 0.295 Share of tradables
β 0.8 Annual subjective discount factor
κ 0.263 Share of income used as collateral
αN 0.75 Labor share in nontradable sector
γ 0.96 Degree of downward nominal rigidity
of EMs.11 (See the Data appendix for further details on data sources, and on the
construction of the series). The parameter values obtained from this calibration are
β = 0.8, a = 0.295 and κ = 0.263. Section 3.5 studies the sensitivity of the optimal
policy to this calibration.
It is assumed that the two exogenous driving forces, the tradable endowment and























∼ i.i.d. N (∅,Ω) and R denotes the mean interest rate level.
The parameters of this stochastic process are estimated using Argentinean data
since 1983. Tradable endowment is measured with the cyclical component of value
added in agriculture and manufacturing. Interest rates on external debt are measured
as the sum of EMBI spreads and the Treasury-bill rate. (Section 3.5 studies an
economy with interest rate shocks calibrated to those of the risk-free rate). Since
the data on EMBI spreads for Argentina is available since 1994, the series were
extended back to 1983, using the Neumeyer and Perri (2005) dataset, which uses a
measure similar to the one considered here. The interest rate series is then deflated
with a measure of expected dollar inflation. (See the Data appendix for further
11The frequency for EMs is similar to the frequency in Argentina during this period, and to other
empirical estimates, such as Calvo et al. (2008).
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details on data sources, and on the construction of tradable endowment and interest
rates.) The years 2002–2005, in which Argentina defaulted and was excluded from
international markets (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013), are not included in the estimation.




 , Ω̂ =
 0.002 −0.001
−0.001 0.001
 , R̂ = 1.113.
This process is approximated with a Markov chain, setting a grid of 15 equally









, yielding 225 exogenous states. To estimate
the transition-probability matrix, I use the method proposed by Terry and Knoteck
(2011) extending Tauchen (1986).12
Finally, to approximate the aggregate dynamics of the economy under the optimal
and the full-employment policies, I discretize the endogenous state space (dt) using
1,001 equally spaced points. To approximate the dynamics under a currency peg, I
use 251 equally spaced points for debt (dt) and 250 equally spaced points for the log of
previous period wage (wt−1). The next sections present the results of the quantitative
analysis.
3.4.2 Policy Functions
This section analyzes the policy functions under the optimal exchange-rate policy
and compares them to those under the two benchmark exchange-rate regimes: full-
employment and fixed exchange rate.
Figure 3.1 shows decision rules for the nominal devaluation rate, the real exchange
rate, unemployment, and next-period debt as a function of the state variables: current
debt, tradable endowment, and the external interest rate. In each panel, only one
12I am grateful to Stephen J. Terry and Edward S. Knotek II for sharing the code for the
Markov-chain approximations of vector autoregressions, which were used in this paper to estimate
the transition-probability matrix of the stochastic process.
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state variable varies (on the horizontal axis), and the remaining state variables are
fixed at their unconditional means (under the optimal policy, if the state is endoge-
nous). In each panel, a shaded region depicts the state-space in which the collateral
constraint binds under the optimal policy. The panels on the right do not have a
shaded region since varying the interest rate – while keeping the rest of the states
fixed at their respective means – is not sufficient to make the collateral constraint
bind.
The decision rules for the nominal devaluation rate and real exchange rate under
the optimal policy are nonmonotonic, in sharp contrast with the decision rules under
the full-employment or fixed exchange-rate policies. The change of the sign in the
slope under the optimal policy occurs at the point at which a higher initial level of
debt or a lower tradable endowment entails a binding credit constraint. In the region
of nonbinding collateral constraint, the decision rules of optimal and full-employment
policies coincide, as implied by Proposition 3. In this region, currency depreciation
is increasing in the initial debt level and the interest rate, and decreasing in the level
of tradable endowment. In the region of binding collateral constraint, while currency
depreciation in the full-employment policy continues to be increasing in the initial
debt level and decreasing in the level of tradable endowment, currency depreciation
under the optimal exchange-rate policy becomes decreasing in the initial debt level
and increasing in the level of tradable endowment. Positive unemployment emerges
under the optimal exchange-rate policy in the region of binding collateral constraint,
increasing in the initial level of debt and decreasing in the level of tradable endowment.
The decision rule for next-period debt under the optimal policy is monotonic, as it
would be without an endogenous collateral constraint. Again in sharp contrast, under
the full-employment policy, the decision rule for next-period debt is nonmonotonic,
with a change in the slope at the point at which a higher initial level of debt or a
lower tradable endowment implies a binding credit constraint (for a similar result in
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an endowment economy, see Bianchi, 2011). Hence, consistent with Proposition 4,
the optimal policy restores the monotonicity in the policy functions of debt by making
the decision rule of the real exchange rate nonmonotonic. In other words, the optimal
choice under the credit-access–unemployment trade-off implies no corner solution: the
optimal policy is willing to choose unemployment in the region of binding collateral
constraint to allow for a higher next-period debt.
The decision rules for the currency peg show that this regime, in contrast to the
optimal and full-employment policies, implies positive unemployment in the state-
space regions in which the collateral constraint does not bind. In these regions, the
fixed exchange-rate regime makes the downward rate rigidity binding. Consistent
with this, the decision rule of the real exchange rate under the currency peg displays
less sensitivity than that of the other two exchange-rate regimes.
3.4.3 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy during Financial
Crises
Under no binding collateral constraints, the optimal exchange-rate policy always
consists of depreciating the nominal exchange rate in response to negative shocks
to achieve full employment, as implied by Proposition 3. This section character-
izes the optimal exchange-rate policy under periods of binding collateral constraints,
or financial crises, and compares the dynamics of the economy under the different
exchange-rate regimes.
To do this, the calibrated version of the model is simulated for 2 million quarters,
identifying periods in which the collateral constraint is binding under the optimal
exchange-rate policy. The beginning of a financial crisis episode (t = 0) is defined
as the first period in which the collateral constraint binds. The responses of the











































































































Figure 3.1: Policy Functions.
Note: The real exchange rate is expressed in log deviations from its sample mean. Devaluation
rate, unemployment rate and next-period debt are expressed in levels. In each panel, only one
state variable varies (on the horizontal axis), and the remaining state variables are fixed at their
unconditional means (under the optimal policy, if the state is endogenous). Shaded regions denote
regions of the state-space in which the collateral constraint binds under the optimal policy.
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Figure 3.2 depicts the average external shock during a financial-crisis episode.
In the two years that precede such an episode, tradable endowment contracts and
interest rates increase. At the crisis trough (t = 0), tradable output is 10 percent
below its mean, and the annual interest rate is 16 percent, 4 percentage points above
its mean. In the three years following the trough, both tradable output and the
interest rate recover their precrisis levels.











































Figure 3.2: Financial Crises – Exogenous Variables.
The average responses of the nominal exchange rate and endogenous variables
under the different exchange-rate regimes are shown in Figure 3.3. Optimal and full-
employment exchange-rate policies display striking similarities and offer a sharp con-
trast to the response under a currency peg. Even under binding collateral constraints
(t = 0), the optimal exchange-rate policy does not fix but it substantially depreciates
the nominal exchange rate, 52 percent on average. This depreciation is less than
that under the full-employment policy (71 percent). As a result, some involuntary
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unemployment emerges under binding collateral constraints (1.6 percent on average
at the crisis trough). However, unemployment under the optimal exchange-rate pol-
icy is significantly lower than that observed under the currency peg (6.2 percent on
average at the crisis trough).
In periods of binding collateral constraints, the large real-exchange-rate deprecia-
tion under the optimal exchange-rate policy (the relative price of nontradable goods
being 39 percent below its mean at the crisis trough), implies a large adjustment of
external debt and tradable consumption. Under the optimal policy, the contraction
of tradable consumption is much larger than the contraction in nontradable con-
sumption: at the crisis trough, tradable consumption is 20.8 percent below its mean,
while nontradable consumption is only 1.2 percent below its mean. The intuition for
this result is that while the benefits of reducing unemployment are related to higher
nontradable consumption (by market clearing of nontradables) its costs are related to
intertemporal miscallocation of consumption. In this sense, sudden stops (understood
as large current-account adjustments), are in fact part of the endogenous response
to large negative external shocks under the optimal exchange-rate policy to prevent
greater unemployment. This is again in sharp contrast to the behavior under the cur-
rency peg, where, for the same exogenous shock, external debt continues increasing
and the current-account deficit expands; at the crisis trough, tradable consumption is
7.6 percent below its mean and nontradable consumption 4.2 percent below its mean.
The large, but still contained, optimal currency depreciation during periods of
financial crises is consistent, for instance, with the typical behavior observed in EMs
during the global financial turbulence of 2008 (see Figure 3.4). During this episode,
EMs considerably depreciate the exchange rate (24 percent on average), but also
contain the depreciation, as can be observed in the fall in international reserves. Calvo
(2013) shows that this pattern of large nominal depreciation (more than 20 percent on
average) with simultaneous exchange-rate intervention is the typical policy observed
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Figure 3.3: Financial Crises – Endogenous Variables.
Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, and external debt expressed in log deviations from their
sample means. Current account expressed in deviations of its sample mean. Devaluation rate and
unemployment rate expressed in levels.
in EMs during periods of sudden stops since 1980.
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Figure 3.4: Exchange-Rate Policy in Emerging Market Economies– Lehman
Episode.
Note: Nominal exchange rate and international reserves figures were computed as the simple average
for the countries included in the EMBI, except countries with no separate legal tender (Ecuador,
El Salvador, and Panama). The countries included in the sample are Algeria, Argentina, Be-
larus, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Korea, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Data sources: See Data appendix.
3.4.4 Means and Volatilities by Exchange-Rate Regime
Table 3.2 shows that the differences between the optimal and full-employment policies
during periods of binding collateral constraint (analyzed in Section 3.4) translate, on
the one hand, into a lower volatility of tradable consumption and total consumption,
and, on the other hand, into a higher average unemployment rate. This reflects the
fact that, under binding collateral constraints, the optimal policy allows for lowering
nontradable consumption to improve intertemporal allocation of consumption. The
differences in first and second moments between optimal and full-employment policies
are slight since the unconditional probability of binding collateral constraints is low
(1.5 percent).
The currency peg displays a larger difference in terms of the average unemploy-
ment rate with respect to the optimal exchange-rate regime. The reason is that, as
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previously analyzed, currency pegs also display unemployment when the collateral
constraint does not bind but the wage rigidity does. This response of currency pegs
to negative shocks also results in a higher volatility of nontradable consumption and
total consumption with respect to the other two regimes.
3.4.5 Welfare and Exchange-Rate Regimes
This section compares welfare under the different exchange-rate regimes. The welfare
costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect to an exchange-rate regime j are
computed as the percentage increase in the consumption stream under exchange-
rate regime i that will make the representative household indifferent between that
consumption stream and the one under the exchange-rate regime j. Formally, the

























where i, j ∈ {OP,FE, PEG}.
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Since welfare costs are state dependent, Figure 3.5 begins by showing the welfare
costs of the full-employment and fixed exchange-rate policies, with respect to the
optimal exchange-rate policy, as functions of the states, and the welfare cost of the
fixed exchange-rate policy, with respect to the full-employment exchange-rate policy,
as a function of the states. As in Figure 3.1, in each panel only one state variable
varies (on the horizontal axis), and the remaining state variables are fixed at their
unconditional means (under the optimal policy, if the state is endogenous). In each
panel, a shaded region show where in the state space the collateral constraint binds
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Table 3.2
Means and Volatilities by Exchange Rate Regime
OP FE CP
Means
µ(c) 0.98 0.98 0.98
µ(cT ) 0.94 0.94 0.95
µ(cN) 1.00 1.00 0.99
µ(p) 2.09 2.09 2.16
µ(u) 0.04 0.0 0.8
µ(d) 0.64 0.64 0.52
Volatilities
σ(c) 2.86 2.89 3.0
σ(cT ) 8.3 8.4 5.8
σ(cN) 0.4 0 2.3
σ(p) 40.7 41.3 25.3
σ(u) 0.5 0.0 2.9
σ(d) 0.04 0.04 0.12
Note: OP, FE and CP denote optimal exchange-rate policy, full-employment exchange-rate policy,
and currency peg, respectively, as defined in Section 3.3. The variables c, cT , cN , p, u, and d,
denote, respectively, consumption, tradable consumption, nontradable consumption, relative price of
nontradables, unemployment rate, and external debt. Volatilities and mean unemployment expressed
in percent. Moments computed using parameters from Table 3.1.
under the optimal policy. As in Figure 3.1, the panels on the right do not have a
shaded region since varying the interest rate – while keeping the rest of the states
fixed at their respective means– is not sufficient to make the collateral constraint
bind.
The welfare costs of the full-employment policy with respect to the optimal pol-
icy are increasing in the initial debt level, and decreasing in the level of tradable
endowment and the interest rate. Welfare costs of the full-employment policy are
significantly higher in the regions of the state space in which the collateral constraint
binds. The higher welfare costs of the full-employment policy in this region stem
from the fact that in these states, the decision rules from the optimal policy differ
from those of the full-employment policy, implying a looser credit limit, as shown in
the study of the policy functions in Section 3.4. This suggests that the welfare costs
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Welfare Costs of Full−Employment Policy with respect to Optimal Policy

















































Welfare Costs of Currency Peg with respect to Optimal Policy


















































Welfare Costs of Currency Peg with respect to Full−Employment Policy

















Figure 3.5: Welfare Costs by State.
Note: the welfare costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect to an exchange-rate regime j are
defined as the percentage increase in the consumption stream under exchange-rate regime i that
will make the representative household indifferent between that consumption stream and that under
the exchange-rate regime j in a given state. In each panel, only one state variable varies (on the
horizontal axis); the remaining state variables are fixed at their unconditional means (under the
optimal policy, if the state is endogenous). Shaded regions denote regions of the state-space in
which the collateral constraint binds under the optimal policy.
of the full-employment policy are decreasing in the interest rate because a higher
interest rate leads to a reduction in the shadow value from relaxing the constraint.
The welfare costs of the currency peg with respect to the optimal and full-
employment policies are nonmonotonic. In the region of nonbinding collateral con-
straint, welfare costs are decreasing in the level of endowment, and for high levels of
debt or interest rates, welfare costs are increasing in the initial debt level and the
interest rate. The intuition is that in the region of nonbinding collateral constraint,
while the optimal policy maintains full-employment (Proposition 3), the currency peg
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Table 3.3
Welfare Costs by Exchange-Rate Regime
Welfare Costs of: Full-Employment Policy Currency Peg Currency Peg
with respect to: Optimal Policy Optimal Policy Full-Employment Policy
Mean 0.006 0.576 0.568
Standard Deviation 0.023 0.324 0.325
Maximum 2.7 5.065 5.063
Minimum 0.001 0.22 −1.71
Note: welfare costs expressed in percent. The welfare costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect
to an exchange-rate regime j are defined as the percentage increase in the consumption stream
under exchange-rate regime i that will make the representative household indifferent between that
consumption stream and the one under the exchange-rate regime j in a given state.
displays a positive level of unemployment, which is increasing in the initial debt level
and the interest rate, and decreasing in the tradable endowment (see Section 3.4).
In the regions where the collateral constraint binds, the welfare costs of the unem-
ployment generated by the currency peg are increasing in the initial debt level and
decreasing in the level of tradable endowment. The intuition is that, in this region,
the optimal policy displays a positive unemployment, which, as shown in Section 3.4,
is increasing in the debt level and decreasing in tradable endowment.
Table 3.3 shows the moment of the distribution of welfare costs and indicates that
the average welfare costs of the full-employment policy with respect to the optimal
policy (0.006 percent) are significantly lower than the welfare costs of the currency
peg with respect to the optimal policy (0.58 percent).13
Finally, Figure 3.6 shows welfare costs during financial crisis episodes (as defined
in Section 3.4). It can be observed that financial crises are periods in which the
welfare costs of both the full-employment policy and the currency peg increase. The
13Formally, the mean of the welfare costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect to an exchange-








where πi(st) denotes the unconditional probability of state st under exchange-rate regime i.
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Figure 3.6: Welfare Costs During Financial Crises.
Note: The welfare costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect to an exchange-rate regime j are
defined as the percentage increase in the consumption stream under exchange-rate regime i that will
make the representative household indifferent between that consumption stream and the one under
the exchange-rate regime j in a given state. See Section 3.4 for the definition of a financial crisis
episode.
size of the increase in the welfare costs of the full-employment policy are, again, much
smaller than the increase in the welfare costs of currency pegs: At the crisis trough
the welfare costs of the full-employment and currency peg policies, with respect to the
optimal exchange-rate policy, are 0.06 percent and 1.83 percent, respectively. As a
consequence, the welfare costs of the currency peg with respect to the full-employment
exchange-rate regime also rise during financial crises, reaching 1.77 percent at the
crisis trough, meaning that currency pegs are particularly costly in terms of welfare
during periods of binding collateral constraints.
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3.4.6 Data and Model Predictions
This subsection compares the data with the predictions of the model, during both
financial crises and regular business cycles. Although the structure of the model is
relatively simple, several features of the data are in line with the predictions of the
model, as in previous literature using similar model structures. The predictions of
the model are compared with data from Argentina, the economy for which the model
economy was calibrated. Figure 3.7 illustrates the fact that Argentina, as did most
EMs, alternated between different exchange-rate regimes during the period of study
(Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff, 2010). For this reason, the predictions of the three
exchange-rate regimes are relevant to a comparison of the data.
Figure 3.8 shows that, in most dimensions, the dynamics of the average sudden
stop episode in the data is within the predictions of the model during a financial
crisis episode (as defined in Section 3.4).14 The average episode in the data is con-
structed using three sudden-stop episodes observed in Argentina in 1982, 1989, and
2001 (Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody, 2006; Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2006). The
current-account reversal, the real-exchange-rate depreciation, and the contraction in
real wages observed in the average sudden-stop episode in the data are similar in
magnitude to the predictions of the model under the optimal exchange-rate policy.
The increase of unemployment in the data is also within the predictions of the model,
between the unemployment predicted by the currency peg and that predicted under
the optimal policy. This can be related to the fact that, as Figure 3.7 indicates,
sudden-stop episodes are periods of transition between exchange-rate regimes. A di-
mension in which the quantitative behavior of the average sudden-stop episode is
not in line with the model is in nontradable-output and consumption. Although the
14Nominal exchange rates and external debt were excluded from the comparison due to hyper-
inflation episodes and default episodes that occurred in some of these periods (for hyperinflation
episodes, see Sargent, Williams, and Zha, 2009; for default episodes, see Cruces and Trebesch, 2013).
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Figure 3.7: Exchange-Rate Regimes in Argentina and Emerging Market Economies.
Note: Data on exchange-rate regimes from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2010). Classification
codes: 1. No separate legal tender, preannounced peg or currency board arrangement, preannounced
horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2 percent, or de facto peg; 2. preannounced
crawling peg, preannounced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2 percent, de facto
crawling peg, or de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2 percent; 3. de facto
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/−5 percent, moving band that is narrower than
or equal to +/−2 percent, managed floating; 4. freely floating; 5. freely falling; 6. dual market in
which parallel-market data is missing.
model predicts a significant contraction in these two variables, the contraction ob-
served in the data is larger. Since the behavior of unemployment in the data is in
line with the predictions of the model, a key factor driving the larger fall in output
in the data is the contraction in measured total factor productivity (TFP), typically
observed during sudden stop episodes (see Calvo et al., 2006). In particular, the
average sudden stop episode in the data displays a contraction in measured TFP
of 7 percent.15 However, to maintain a simple structure, the model does not feature
15Data on measured TFP for Argentina obtained from Aravena and Fuentes (2013). I am grateful
to Claudio Aravena for sharing the data on measured TFP.
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Model − Optimal Policy
Model − Currency Peg
Data
Figure 3.8: Financial Crises – Model and Data.
Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, real GDP and consumption expressed in log deviations from
their sample means in the model, and from a log quadratic trend in the data. Current-account-to-
GDP ratio expressed in deviations from its sample mean in the model and from a quadratic trend
in the data. Unemployment rate expressed in levels in the model, and in deviation from t− 2 values
in the data. See Section 3.4 for the definition of a financial crisis episode.
Data sources: see Data appendix.
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Table 3.4




σ(Y ) 8.2 1.6 1.5 2.6
σ(C)/σ(Y ) 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.2
σ(u) 3.2 0.5 0.0 2.9
σ(p) 19.2 40.7 41.3 25.3
σ(w) 23.3 30.5 31.0 17.3
σ(TB/Y ) 2.8 2.0 2.1 1.6
σ(CA/Y ) 2.8 1.4 1.5 1.6
Correlations with output
ρ(C, Y ) 98.6 75.2 72.8 86.3
ρ(u, Y ) -23.0 -28.5 - -81.1
ρ(p, Y ) 76.3 77.8 78.8 54.3
ρ(w, Y ) 78.5 77.7 78.8 51.8
ρ(TB/Y, Y ) -95.5 -29.6 -28.6 -6.4
ρ(CA/Y, Y ) -88.3 7.9 7.8 41.0
Autocorrelations
ρ(Yt, Yt−1) 74.9 55.3 57.3 49.1
ρ(Ct, Ct−1) 74.9 36.0 33.6 53.0
ρ(ut, ut−1) 75.3 8.7 - 27.5
ρ(pt, pt−1) 68.1 43.3 41.4 83.8
ρ(wt, wt−1) 62.3 43.3 41.4 87.9
ρ(TBt/Yt, TBt−1/Yt−1) 70.2 10.3 5.5 46.7
ρ(CAt/Yt, CAt−1/Yt−1) 56.5 -12.9 -16.7 33.7
Note:Values expressed in percent. OP, FE and CP denote optimal exchange-rate policy, full-
employment exchange-rate policy, and currency peg, respectively, as defined in Section 3.3. The
variables Y , C, TB, and CA denote, respectively, output, consumption, trade balance, and current
account, expressed in real terms; the variables u, p, and w denote, respectively, unemployment rate,
relative price of nontradables, wages in units of tradables. Moments in the data were computed for
the period 1980–2011. Variables in the data were quadratically detrended. Moments predicted by
the model were computed using parameters from Table 3.1. Data sources: see Data appendix.
TFP shocks in the nontradable sector, or an endogenous propagation mechanism that
shows up as measured TFP (e.g., capacity utilization, as in Gertler et al., 2007, or
imported intermediate inputs as in Mendoza and Yue, 2012).
Table 3.4 shows that, in several dimensions, the second moments observed in the
Argentinean data are in line with the second moments predicted by the model. The
141
observed standard deviations of the unemployment rate, the real wage and the real
exchange rate are in line with those predicted by the model. The data is closer to
the predictions of the model under a currency peg, which can be related to the fact
that, as illustrated in Figure 3.7, in more than 60 percent of the periods since 1980,
Argentina was under either a peg or a narrow crawling peg. The model also captures
that consumption volatility exceeds output volatility, which is a key feature of EM
business cycles (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe, 2014). The
ratio of standard volatility of consumption to standard volatility of output observed
in the data is 1.1, close to the 1.2 predicted under a currency peg. Despite the fact
that the volatility of unemployment in the data is similar to the volatility predicted
by the model, the volatility of output in the data is significantly higher than the
volatility of output predicted by the model. Similar to what was discussed for sudden-
stop episodes in the previous paragraph, the higher volatility of output in the data,
with respect to the model, can be explained by measured TFP: If the variations in
the Solow residual observed in the data are extracted from output, the volatility of
output in Argentina in the period of study decreases to 1.9 percent, which is in line
with the predictions of the model.
Another relevant dimension observed in the data for Argentina, and in general
for EMs, which is qualitatively captured by the model is the countercyclical trade
balance (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe, 2014). However, the
correlation of the trade balance with output observed in the data is less in absolute
value than the one predicted by the model. Since the correlation with net factor
income from abroad is strongly procyclical both in the data and in the model, the
model predicts a procyclical current account. As discussed in Benigno et al. (2012a),
an element that could make the model predict a more countercyclical trade balance
and current account is the presence of investment (see, for example, Backus, Kehoe,
and Kydland, 1993). For the rest of the variables, the correlations with output
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observed in the data are in line with those predicted by the model. Finally, the
autocorrelations observed in the data are also consistent with those predicted by
the model. For output, consumption, unemployment, trade balance and the current
account, the autocorrelation coefficient observed in the data are higher than those
predicted by the model, while the correlation coefficient of the real wage and the real
exchange rate observed in the data are within the model’s predictions.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions
This section studies how the characterization of the optimal exchange-rate policy dur-
ing financial crises is affected by alternative parametrizations of the model, alternative
shocks, and alternative modeling assumptions.
3.5.1 Parameter values
This section shows that the main conclusions regarding the characterization of the op-
timal exchange-rate policy during financial crises are robust to alternative parameter
values. In particular, Figure 3.9 shows the average values of nominal exchange-rate
depreciation, real exchange rate, unemployment, and tradable consumption under the
optimal exchange-rate policy during periods in which the collateral constraint binds
for alternative parameter values. The focus is on financial crises since, as shown in
Proposition 3, periods of nonbinding collateral constraint are always characterized by
full employment under the optimal exchange-rate policy, independent of parameter
values.
I begin by studying alternative values for the intratemporal elasticity of substi-
tution, considering values in the range used in the literature, between ξ = 0.4 and
ξ = 0.83 (see Section 3.3.2 for a survey). The value of this parameter used in the
baseline calibration is ξ = 0.44, following the estimates of Gonzalez-Rozada et al.
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(2004) for Argentina. As explained in Section 3.3.2, this parameter determines the
extent to which exchange-rate depreciations decrease collateral values. If ξ ≥ 1, there
is no negative effect of a currency depreciation on collateral values, and the optimal
policy is always to achieve full employment. As expected from this, Figure 3.9 in-
dicates that the higher the value of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, the
lower the unemployment rate under the optimal exchange-rate policy. In this sense,
the conclusions obtained in the baseline calibration are conservative with respect to
this parameter value: A higher intratemporal elasticity of substitution would imply

















































































































Figure 3.9: Sensitivity of Optimal Policy during Financial Crises.
Note: Figures denote the value of each variable at the trough (t = 0) of the average financial crisis
episode. See Section 3.4 for the definition of a financial crisis episode.
I then study alternative values for κ, the parameter that governs the collateral
constraint. To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical estimate available
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of this parameter. In the baseline calibration this parameter was set to κ = 0.263
to match the probability of sudden stops. I now consider alternative values for the
collateral parameter ranging from κ = 0.2 (average debt-to-GDP ratio in Argentinean
data) to κ = 0.645 (maximum debt-to-GDP ratio in Argentinean data). Results in
Figure 3.9 indicate that, in this range of parameter values, the higher the collateral
parameter, the lower the depreciation rate under the optimal exchange-rate policy,
and the higher resulting unemployment and tradable consumption. The difference is
nontrivial: for instance, with a value of κ = 0.645 the average depreciation rate in
a period of financial crisis is 10.3 percent and the resulting unemployment rate, 5.3
percent (which compares to 1.6 percent in the baseline scenario). The intuition for this
result is that, the higher the collateral parameter, the higher the effect that containing
real exchange-rate depreciation has on collateral values, and thus the higher the
benefits of containing depreciation. However, even in this case, it can be observed that
the optimal policy features a large real exchange-rate depreciation during financial
crises (a 24 percent fall in the relative price of nontradable goods), implying that it is
optimal to contract tradable consumption more than nontradable consumption and
employment.
In the third place, I study the sensitivity, of the optimal policy during financial
crises, with respect to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In the baseline
calibration, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution was set to σ = 2,
a standard value in the business-cycle literature. Since, as studied in Section 3.3.2,
the benefits of credit-market access are related to the intertemporal allocation of
consumption, this is a key parameter in the optimal exchange-rate policy. The range
of values of the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution consider is from
σ = 2 to σ = 5, the value estimated in Reinhart and Vegh (1995) for Argentina.
Results for this range of parameter values are shown in Figure 3.9. As expected,
a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution is associated with a lower optimal
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exchange-rate depreciation during financial crises. Quantitatively, the conclusions
are similar to those obtained in the baseline calibration. For instance, for σ = 5 the
optimal policy in financial crises is a large nominal and real exchange-rate depreciation
of 35 percent.
Finally, it worth mentioning that γ, the degree of wage rigidity, does not affect
the allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy, except for the value of the
optimal nominal depreciation rate, ϵt. This can be seen from the fact that γ does not







under the optimal exchange-rate policy. It follows that the real
exchange-rate depreciation, under the optimal exchange-rate policy, does not depend
on γ either. The only variable under the optimal exchange-rate policy that is affected
by γ is the nominal exchange-rate depreciation: the lower the γ, the lower the average
nominal exchange-rate depreciation required to implement the optimal allocation
during a financial crisis episode, as illustrated in Figure 3.9.
In summary, the main findings regarding the optimal exchange-rate policy during
financial crises in previous sections are robust with respect to alternative values of
structural parameters: The optimal exchange-rate policy implies, on average, large
real exchange-rate depreciations during financial crises; this is achieved by depre-
ciating the nominal exchange rate, and implies a relatively small increase in the
unemployment rate as compared to the decline in tradable consumption.
3.5.2 Stochastic structure
The baseline quantitative analysis (Section 3.4) includes interest rate shocks, and
uses the contractual interest rate to calibrate these shocks. This section considers in-
stead three alternative stochastic structures: i) an economy with interest-rate shocks
calibrated to those of the risk-free rate; ii) an economy with no interest-rate shocks;
and iii) an economy with no interest rate shocks but shocks to the parameter κ, that
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governs the collateral constraint. These sensitivity analyses are important because, in
the presence of credit constraints, calibrating the model using the EM’s contractual
interest rate (as in the baseline calibration), which incorporates default risk, could
lead to overestimating the costs of borrowing during crises. It is shown that the
optimal policy under these alternative stochastic structures still features large nom-
inal and real exchange-rate depreciations during financial crises (between 20 and 25
percent). However, since higher interest rates lead to a lower shadow value from re-
laxing the credit constraint, the optimal currency depreciation under these stochastic
structures is half of that under the baseline stochastic structure.
The first case considers an economy with interest-rate shocks calibrated to those of
the risk-free rate. As in the baseline calibration, it is assumed that the two exogenous
driving forces – tradable endowment and interest rate – follow a first-order VAR of
the form in (3.27), with the risk-free rate taking the place of the country’s interest
rate. The risk-free rate is measured by a US real interest rate (Treasury-bill rate,
deflated with a measure of expected dollar inflation, constructed as detailed in the
Data appendix). Following Uribe and Yue (2006), I assume that the risk-free rate
follows a univariate process (i.e., Φ21 = 0). The parameters of the stochastic process
are estimated for the same period and using the same methodology as in the baseline
calibration. The parameters {β, a, κ} are used, as in the baseline calibration, to
match the average level of external debt-to-GDP ratio, the share of tradable output
in GDP, and the frequency of sudden stops observed in the data. All the rest of the
parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (Table 3.1).
The second case considers an economy with no interest-rate shocks. In this econ-
omy, tradable endowment shocks are the only source of uncertainty and are assumed
to follow the same stochastic process as in the baseline calibration. The fixed gross in-
terest rate is set to 1.018, the average US real interest rate from 1980 to 2011. Again,
as in the baseline calibration, the parameters {β, a, κ} are used to match the average
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level of external debt-to-GDP ratio, the share of tradable output in GDP, and the
frequency of sudden stops observed in the data, with all the rest of the parameters
set as in the baseline calibration (Table 3.1).
Finally, the third case considers an economy with no interest-rate shocks, but
instead with shocks to the parameter κ, that governs the collateral constraint. These
types of shocks have been used in the literature to capture sudden stops driven by
shocks to foreign investors’ confidence in EMs (see, for example, Benigno and Fornaro,
2012; Bianchi, Hatchondo and Martinez, 2013). Formally, the collateral constraint















where κt follows a first-order Markov process. As is standard in this literature, we
assume for simplicity that κt ∈ {κL, κH}, with κL < κH . The value of κH is set to
an arbitrarily high value such that the collateral constraint never binds in period t if
κt = κ





match the average external debt-to-GDP ratio, the share of tradable output in GDP,
and the frequency of sudden stops observed in the data. Following Benigno and
Fornaro (2012), the probability of entering a low-collateral-constraint state, denoted
πLκ , is set to 0.1 (Jeanne and Ranciere, 2011), and the probability of exiting a low-
collateral-constraint state, denoted πHκ , is set to 0.5 (Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009). The
other parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (Table 3.1).
Figure 3.10 displays the optimal nominal exchange rate and endogenous variables
for the average financial crisis episode (as defined in section 3.4), under the base-
line and the three alternative stochastic structures. The optimal nominal and real
exchange-rate depreciation during the average financial crisis episode, under the three
alternative stochastic structures, is between 20 and 25 percent. Thus, independently
of the assumption on the behavior of interest rates during financial crisis episodes, it
is optimal to allow for large currency depreciation, and to induce a relatively small
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No Interest Rate Shocks
Risk−Free Interest Rate Shocks
κ Shocks
Figure 3.10: Financial Crises – Optimal Policy under Alternative Stochastic Struc-
tures.
Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, and external debt expressed in log deviations from their
sample means. Current account expressed in deviations from its sample mean. Devaluation rate
and unemployment rate expressed in levels. See Section 3.4 for the definition of a financial crisis
episode.
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increase in the unemployment rate compared to the adjustment of tradable consump-
tion. However, the fact that, under the alternative stochastic structures, currency
depreciation is half that under the baseline structure suggests that the behavior of
interest rates during a financial crisis is key to determining the optimal degree of “fear
of floating.” In particular, when a financial crisis occurs with no significant increase
in interest rates, optimal policy calls for a more contained depreciation, a smaller
current-account adjustment and a larger increase in unemployment than when the
episode occurs with a sizable increase of interest rates.
3.5.3 Model structure
This section studies the characterization of optimal exchange-rate policy after relaxing
two assumptions of the baseline model: endowment in the tradable sector and inelastic
labor supply.
3.5.3.1 Production in the Tradable Sector
This subsection relaxes the baseline model’s assumption of tradable endowment and
instead considers production in the tradable sector. This a relevant modification to
study since, as shown in Benigno et al. (2012a), labor reallocation is an important
mechanism in dealing with financial crises in the presence of a collateral constraint
like the one studied in this paper. To facilitate the reallocation mechanism it will be
assumed – in sharp contrast to the baseline model – that labor is perfectly mobile
across sectors.
As in the nontradable sector, production in the tradable sector is now assumed
to be conducted by firms that operate in competitive labor and product markets,
each period hiring labor to produce the tradable good, yTt , and using an isoelastic








αT − wthTt ,
where hTt denotes labor employed in the tradable sector, ZTt denotes productivity in
the tradable sector, assumed to be exogenous and stochastic.
The firms’ problem is to choose hTt to maximize profits given prices wt and pro-
ductivity ZTt . The first-order condition of this problem is
ZTt α
T (hTt )
αT−1 = wt. (3.29)
Total hours worked is now given by the sum of hours worked in the tradable sector






The rest of the equilibrium conditions are the same as in the baseline economy.
To calibrate the model, the labor share in the tradable sector is set to αT = 0.5,
following evidence in Uribe (1997). The parameters {β, a, κ} are used, as in the
baseline calibration, to match the average level of external debt-to-GDP ratio, the
share of tradable output in GDP, and the frequency of sudden stops observed in the
data. All the rest of the parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (Table 3.1).
Given the lack of historical sectoral data on measured TFP for Argentina, and to
facilitate comparison with the baseline calibration, it is assumed that the stochastic
process is the same as in (3.27), with ZTt taking the place of yTt .
Figure 3.12 shows that the optimal exchange-rate policy in the economy with pro-
duction in the tradable sector features less unemployment than in the baseline econ-
omy. This is because, in this modified setup, currency depreciations have a larger
benefit than in the baseline economy, to reallocate resources and increase production
in the tradable sector. This increase in tradable production, in turn, reduces the
tightening in the collateral constraint and the required current-account adjustment.
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Therefore, in equilibrium, even if currency depreciation is smaller than in the baseline
economy, unemployment is also smaller than that observed in the baseline economy.
These results indicate that the degree of labor mobility across sectors is a key charac-
teristic of the economy for determining the optimal degree of “fear of floating,” and
also the severity of financial crises in terms of unemployment and current-account
adjustment.
3.5.3.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
In this section, the assumption of inelastic labor supply is relaxed. I assume, instead




βt (U (ct)− v (ht)) , (3.31)
where the function v (·) is assumed to be continuous, twice differentiable, strictly
increasing and convex.
The first-order condition with respect to hours worked is given by
v′ (hst) = wtλt, (3.32)
where hst denotes the number of hours supplied by households to the labor market.
Actual hours worked cannot exceed labor supply, meaning that labor-market con-
ditions (3.12) and (3.13) are replaced respectively by





(hst − ht) = 0. (3.34)
The rest of the equilibrium conditions are the same as in the baseline economy.
To calibrate the model, we assume the functional form







where φ > 0 and θ > 0. The values of h and φ, are set to 3 and 1.5 to match an
average level of hours worked at unity (to preserve the size of the nontradable sector),
assuming that households at full employment spend one third of their time working.
The value of θ is set to 1.6 which corresponds to an elasticity of labor supply of 1.25,
following the estimates in Mendoza (2010). The parameters {β, a, κ} are used, as in
the baseline calibration, to match the average level of external debt-to-GDP ratio,
the share of tradable output in GDP, and the frequency of sudden stops observed in
the data. The other parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (Table 3.1).
Figure 3.12 shows that the optimal exchange-rate policy in an economy with an
endogenous labor supply features significantly more unemployment during financial
crises than in the baseline economy, showing that labor elasticity is also a relevant
characteristic of the economy for determining the optimal degree of “fear of floating.”
The contraction in the level of employment is greater than in the baseline economy
since, in this setup, decreasing employment has a benefit not only in terms of relaxing
the credit constraint, but also in terms of increasing leisure. However, most of this
increase in unemployment is driven by an increase in the labor supply: Unlike the
Ramsey planner, agents do not incorporate the effect that increasing employment
has on tightening the collateral constraint, and increase labor supply during financial
crises, given the large contraction in consumption that occurs during these episodes.
While currency depreciation is smaller than in the baseline economy, the optimal
allocation is still characterized by a relatively large real exchange-rate depreciation
during financial crises (a 21 percent fall in the relative price of nontradable goods),
implying a relatively small decrease in nontradable consumption rate compared to
that of tradable consumption.
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Endogenous labor supply (els)
Tradable Production (tp)
Figure 3.11: Financial Crises – Optimal Policy under Alternative Model Structures.
Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, external debt, and tradable output expressed in log deviations
from their sample means. Current account expressed in deviations from its sample mean. Devalua-
tion rate, unemployment rate, and labor supply expressed in levels. See Section 3.4 for the definition
of a financial crisis episode.
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3.5.4 No Capital-Control Taxes
So far, the paper has characterized the optimal exchange-rate policy as conditional
on the use of an optimal capital-control tax. As discussed in Section 3.3, this optimal
capital-control tax eliminates any inefficient borrowing that might stem from the
collateral constraint or from the downward wage rigidity. This section studies the
sensitivity of the optimal policy to this assumption by extending the analysis to
the case where the only instrument available to the Ramsey planner is the nominal
exchange rate.
The Ramsey planner is assumed to have access to a commitment technology.
Since the household’s intertemporal optimality condition (3.6) is part of the set of
restrictions, the Ramsey problem cannot, as in Section 3.3, be expressed with a
standard recursive formulation.16 However, the method developed in Marcet and
Marimon (2011) can be applied to reformulate the nonrecursive problem with forward-
looking variables as a recursive saddle-point problem.17 This approach implies the
inclusion of the Lagrange multipliers associated with forward-looking constraints (in
this case, equation (3.6)) as costate variables. As shown in Appendix C.4, using this
method the dynamics under the optimal exchange-rate policy (without capital-control
16This problem does not arise when the Ramsey planner has access to an optimal capital-control
tax since, as shown in Appendix C.1, the capital-control tax can always be picked so that the optimal
allocation satisfies the intertemporal optimality condition (3.6).
17For related applications of the Marcet and Marimon (2011) method, see Adam and Billi (2005),
Monacelli (2008), and Svenson (2010).
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taxes) can be expressed with the recursive saddle-point problem:
WOP
(




















































































where the costate variable ϕ̃D denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s
intertemporal optimality condition (3.6) chosen in the previous period by the Ramsey
planner and can be interpreted as the value to the planner of promises that must be
honored from past commitments. To approximate the dynamics under the optimal
exchange-rate policy, the functional equation (3.36) is solved numerically.18 The
parameters used are the same as in Table 3.1.
Figure ?? shows that the dynamics during financial crisis episodes under the opti-
mal exchange-rate policy without capital-control taxes are similar to those under the
18The presence of additional states and controls in the case of optimal policy without an optimal
capital-control tax makes the numerical approximation computationally more demanding. For this










equally spaced points for (dt), and 21 equally spaced points for (ϕ̃Dt ). For comparison purposes (in
this section only) these grids were also used to solve numerically for the optimal exchange rate with
optimal capital-control taxes
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optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes. The main difference
is that, in the case without capital-control taxes, the optimal allocation displays a
higher nominal and real exchange-rate depreciation and, as a result, a smaller unem-
ployment and a larger current-account adjustment. Therefore, without capital-control
taxes, the optimal policy commits to make credit-access tighter during financial crisis
episodes, increasing the private costs of borrowing.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper conducts a quantitative study of the optimal exchange-rate policy fac-
ing a trade-off between credit access and unemployment, which captures a central
discussion of the policy debate typically observed during financial crises in EMs. In
the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity, allowing for nominal exchange-rate
depreciations can help attenuate unemployment. In the presence of liability dollariza-
tion and collateral constraints linked to of tradable and nontradable income, fighting
real exchange-rate depreciation alleviates the consumption adjustment.
The main finding is that the optimal exchange-rate policy during financial crises
is consistent with managed-floating exchange-rate regimes, widely used by EMs in
periods of sudden stops: It is optimal to allow for large currency depreciation (between
a 17 and 40 percent average fall in the relative price of nontradable goods), but also
to contain currency depreciation with respect to full-employment levels. The bias of
the optimal policy towards large currency depreciation is related to the fact that the
welfare costs from unemployment and lower consumption typically outweigh those of
intertemporal misallocation of consumption.
The findings of the paper suggest that simple policy recipes will, in general, not be
optimal during EMs’ financial crises. For instance, both full-employment and fixed–
exchange-rate regimes entail relatively large welfare costs compared to the optimal
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Without Optimal Capital Control Taxes
Figure 3.12: Financial Crises – Optimal Policy with No Capital-Control Taxes.
Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, and external debt expressed in log deviations from their
sample means. Current account expressed in deviations of its sample mean. Devaluation rate and
unemployment rate expressed in levels. See Section 3.4 for the definition of a financial crisis episode.
exchange-rate policy during financial crisis episodes – 0.06 percent and 1.8 percent of
consumption per period, respectively. Moreover, the paper shows that the optimal
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degree of “fear of floating” during financial crises depends on the nature of the shocks,
and structural characteristics of the economy. This means that what is optimal during
a financial crisis episode in a given economy might not be optimal in another economy
or in an episode involving a different combination of shocks.
A novel finding is that sudden stops, understood as large current-account adjust-
ments, are generally part of the endogenous response to large negative shocks under
the optimal exchange-rate policy. In other words, while exchange-rate policy could
prevent sudden stops by resisting real exchange-rate depreciation, the associated un-
employment costs make this policy suboptimal.
In future research, several extensions related to the present paper’s framework
could be considered. First, the paper abstracts from capital accumulation. Including
capital accumulation would be computationally demanding, but would enrich the
study of the trade-off faced by the policymaker. Second, the paper studies the optimal
exchange-rate policy when the policymaker has access to a commitment technology.
An interesting area of future research is the optimal time-consistent exchange-rate
policy in a framework in which the policymaker does not have commitment. Third,
the paper assumes that all debt is denominated in a foreign currency. A relevant
extension would be a study of the interaction between exchange rate policy and
optimal currency composition of external debt under the framework of this paper.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Financial-Crises, Investment, and Capital Stock
To study investment recovery during financial crises, I construct a sample of post-
WWII recession episodes in advanced economies. The sample includes annual data
from 1950 to 2013 for 22 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States.
Only recessions prior to 2007 were considered.
A recession event is identified by a period of contraction in annual real GDP per
capita (a similar empirical strategy is followed, for example, in Calvo, Izquierdo and
Talvi, 2006). Given a contraction in GDP per capita, the output peak is defined as
the period prior to the beginning of a recession episode; the recovery point is defined
as the period in which output per capita recovers its precrisis level; the output trough
is defined as the period with the lowest level of GDP per capita between output peak
and recovery point.1
1More formally, for each country i the algorithm to identity recession episodes can be described
a follows. Let yit denote GDP per capita of country i in period t.
(i) Set t0 = 1950.
(ii) Let Γp = {τ ∈ [t0, 2007] : yi,τ < yi,τ−1}. If Γp = ∅ country i has no more recession episodes.
If Γp ̸= ∅ set p = min{Γp} − 1. Let Γr = {τ ∈ [p, 2007] : yi,τ > yi,p}. If Γr = ∅ country i
has no more recession episodes. If Γr ̸= ∅ set r = min{Γr}. Denote with p the recession peak
and with r the recession trough.
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Table A.1
Sample of Recession Episodes
Financial crises Other episodes
Country Peak Country Peak Country Peak Country Peak Country Peak
Australia 1989 Australia 1950 Denmark 1973 Ireland 1951 Spain 1974
Canada 1981 Australia 1955 Denmark 1979 Ireland 1955 Spain 1992
Denmark 1987 Australia 1960 Finland 1952 Ireland 1965 Sweden 1976
Denmark 1992 Australia 1973 Finland 1956 Ireland 1974 Sweden 1980
Finland 1990 Australia 1976 Finland 1976 Ireland 1982 Switzerland 1951
France 1992 Australia 1981 France 1974 Italy 1974 Switzerland 1957
Greece 1989 Austria 1951 Germany 1966 Italy 2001 Switzerland 1974
Greece 1991 Austria 1974 Germany 1974 Japan 1973 Switzerland 1981
Iceland 1982 Austria 1977 Germany 1981 Netherlands 1957 Switzerland 1990
Iceland 1987 Austria 1980 Germany 1992 Netherlands 1974 Switzerland 2001
Italy 1992 Austria 1983 Germany 2001 Netherlands 1980 Taiwan 2000
Japan 1992 Austria 1992 Greece 1961 Netherlands 2001 United Kingdom 1957
Japan 1997 Belgium 1957 Greece 1973 Norway 1981 United Kingdom 1968
Norway 1987 Belgium 1974 Greece 1979 Portugal 1957 United Kingdom 1979
Spain 1978 Belgium 1980 Iceland 1950 Portugal 1973 United States 1953
Spain 1980 Belgium 1992 Iceland 1956 Portugal 1982 United States 1957
Sweden 1990 Canada 1953 Iceland 1960 Portugal 1992 United States 1969
United Kingdom 1973 Canada 1956 Iceland 1966 Portugal 2002 United States 1973
United Kingdom 1990 Canada 1989 Iceland 1974 Spain 1952 United States 1979
United States 1990 Denmark 1954 Iceland 2001 Spain 1958 United States 1981
Recession episodes are then classified into financial crises and regular recession
episodes. Following Calvo, Coricelli and Ottonello (2012) a financial crisis is defined
as a recession episode in which a banking-crisis event (as defined in Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009a) took place between the output peak and the recovery point. Regular
recession episodes are recession episodes not classified as financial crises. With this
methodology, a sample of 100 recession episodes is obtained, with 20 financial crises
and 80 regular recession episodes (see Table A.1). For each recession episode t = 0 is
defined as the output trough. Variables of interests are then averaged in a window
around t = 0 (from t = −2 to t = 4).
The source of the data used to identify recession episodes and construct the time
series of average recession episodes shown in Figure 1.1 was Feenstra, Inklaar and
(iii) Set t0 = r and repeat from (ii) until the country has no more recession episodes.
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Timmer (2013), Penn World Tables, downloaded from http://www.ggdc.net/pwt.
In particular, the following data were used:
1. Real GDP: Real GDP at constant 2005 national prices.
2. Real Capital Stock: Capital stock at constant 2005 national prices.
3. Population.
4. Real Per Capita GDP: Constructed as (4) = (1) / (3).
5. Real Per Capita Capital Stock: Constructed as (5) = (2) / (3).
6. Share of gross capital formation at current PPPs
The time series used in Figure 1.1 were (4), (5) (for each country, expressed in percent
deviation from a log-quadratic trend), and (6) (for each country, expressed in percent
deviation from its mean 1950–2013).
For the U.S. Great Recession the following time series were used for Figure 1.1:
1. Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product, billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted at
annual rates. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, http://www.bea.
gov), National Income and Product Accounts Tables (Table 1.1.5).
2. Nominal Investment: Gross private domestic fixed investment. Source: BEA,
National Income and Product Accounts Tables (Tables 1.1.5).
3. Real GDP: Gross domestic product, billions of chained (2009) dollars, seasonally
adjusted at annual rates. Source: BEA, National Income and Product Accounts
Tables (Table 1.1.6).
4. Real Capital Stock: Private fixed assets, chain-type quantity indexes. Source:
BEA, Fixed Assets Accounts Tables (Table 2.2).
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5. Civilian Noninstitutional Population, 16 years and over. Source: Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey.
6. Real Per Capita GDP: Constructed as (6) = (3) / (5).
7. Real Per Capita Capital Stock: Constructed as (7) = (4) / (5).
8. Investment Rate: Constructed as (8) = (2) / (1).
The time series used in Figure 1.1 were (6), (7) (expressed in percent deviation from
a log-quadratic trend) and (8) (expressed in percent deviation from its mean 1950–
2013).
A.1.2 Capital Unemployment
The data on capital unemployment for structures in the U.S. economy – used in Fig-
ure 1.2 and in the model estimation of Section 1.5 – were constructed as a weighted
average of quarterly vacancy rates of office space, retail space, and industrial space.
Data were obtained from CBRE (http://www.cbre.com/EN/Pages/Home.aspx) and
REIS (https://www.reis.com/). Weights for office space, retail space, and indus-
trial space were defined using data on Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed As-
sets, Equipment, Structures, and Intellectual Property Products by Type, source
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, http://www.bea.gov), Table 2.1. The
following items were included to compute the weight. For Office space: “Office”;
for retail space: “Multimerchandise shopping”, “Food and beverage establishments”,
“Commercial warehouses”, and “Other commercial”; for industrial space: “Manufac-
turing”, “Power and communication”, and “Mining exploration, shafts, and wells.”
These items jointly represent 60.5% of nonresidential structures. The weights were
computed as the average of the share of each item over the period 1980–2012, which
is similar to the period for which the data on vacancy rates is available (1980–2013).
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A.1.3 Bayesian Estimation
The following data for the U.S. economy were used to construct the quarterly time
series used in the model estimation of Section 1.5:
1. Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product, billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted at
annual rates. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, http://www.bea.
gov) National Income and Product Accounts Tables (Table 1.1.5).
2. Nominal Consumption: Sum of personal consumption expenditures, durable goods
and services, billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. Source: BEA,
National Income and Product Accounts Tables (Table 1.1.5).
3. Nominal Investment: Sum of gross private domestic fixed nonresidential invest-
ment in structures, equipment and software. Source: BEA, National Income and
Product Accounts Tables (Tables 1.1.5 and 5.3.5).
4. Real GDP: Gross domestic product, billions of chained (2009) dollars, seasonally
adjusted at annual rates. Source: BEA, National Income and Product Accounts
Tables (Table 1.1.6).
5. GDP Deflator: constructed as (5) = (1) / (4).
6. Nonfarm Business Hours Worked. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, http:
//www.bls.gov/), Major Sector Productivity and Costs.
7. Civilian Noninstitutional Population, 16 years and over. Source: BLS, Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey.
8. 3-Month Treasury Bill, Secondary Market Rate. Source: Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED, http://www.stlouisfed.
org/).
9. Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield. Source: FRED.
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10. Real Per Capita GDP: constructed as (10) = (4) / (7).
11. Real Per Capita Consumption: constructed as (11) = ((2) / (5)) / (7).
12. Real Per Capita Investment: constructed as (12) = ((3) / (5)) / (7).
13. Per Capita Hours Worked: constructed as (13) = (6) / (7).
14. Credit Spreads: constructed as (14) = (1 + (9)) / (1 + (8)).
15. Capital Unemployment: constructed based on data on vacancy rates of nonresi-
dential commercial real estate (office, retail, and industrial sectors). Methodology
detailed in A.1.2.
The six time series used in the Bayesian estimation were (10), (11), (12), (13), (14)
and (15), with (10), (11), (12) log-linearly detrended.
A.2 Additional Figures



















































































































Capital Unemployment (left axis)
Labor Unemployment (right axis)
Figure A.1: Unemployment of Capital and Labor, Euro Economies, 2007–2013.
Note: Capital unemployment (structures) refers to the vacancy rates of office space (http:
//www.jll.eu/emea/en-gb/). Labor unemployment refers to the unemployment rate (http:
//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/). Data is expressed in
percent.
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Capital Unemployment (left axis)
Utilization (right axis)
Figure A.2: Unemployment of Capital and Utilization, U.S. Recession Episodes.
Note: Capital unemployment (structures) constructed based on vacancy rates of office, retail and
industrial units. Data source: CBRE and REIS. See Appendix A.1 for details. Data on utilization
refers to estimates of factor utilization for the U.S. economy in ?, capturing labor effort and the work
week of capital. Capital Unemployment expressed in percent. For each recession episode, utilization
index = 100 at the output peak.





































Model with Investment Search FrictionsModel no Investment Search Frictions






Figure A.3: Impulse-Responses to a Neutral-Technology Shock.
Note: Response of output, investment, consumption, hours worked, credit spreads, and capital
unemployment to a one-standard-deviation neutral-technology shock (A). Label “Model with Search
Frictions in Investment” and “Model No Search Frictions in Investment” refer, respectively, to the
model responses presented in Section 1.4 and the benchmark model in Appendix A.5. Impulse
responses expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
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Figure A.4: Impulse-Responses to an Investment-Specific Technology Shock.
Note: Response of output, investment, consumption, hours worked, credit spreads, and capital un-
employment to a one-standard-deviation investment-specific technology shock (AI). Label “Model
with Search Frictions in Investment” and “Model No Search Frictions in Investment” refer, respec-
tively, to the model responses presented in Section 1.4 and the benchmark model in Appendix A.5.
Impulse responses expressed in percent deviations from steady state.

































Model with Investment Search FrictionsModel no Investment Search Frictions







Figure A.5: Impulse-Responses to a Government Spending Shock.
Note: Response of output, investment, consumption, hours worked, credit spreads, and capital
unemployment to a one-standard-deviation government spending shock (G). Label “Model with
Search Frictions in Investment” and “Model No Search Frictions in Investment” refer, respectively,
to the model responses presented in Section 1.4 and the benchmark model in Appendix A.5. Impulse
responses expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
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Model with Investment Search FrictionsModel no Investment Search Frictions







Figure A.6: Impulse-Responses to a Labor-Wedge Shock.
Note: Response of output, investment, consumption, hours worked, credit spreads, and capital un-
employment to a one-standard-deviation labor-wedge shock (φ). Label “Model with Search Frictions
in Investment” and “Model No Search Frictions in Investment” refer, respectively, to the model re-
sponses presented in Section 1.4 and the benchmark model in Appendix A.5. Impulse responses
expressed in percent deviations from steady state.









































Model with Investment Search FrictionsModel no Investment Search Frictions
Figure A.7: Impulse-Responses to a Risk Shock.
Note: Response of output, investment, consumption, hours worked, credit spreads, and capital
unemployment to a one-standard-deviation risk shock (σ). Label “Model with Search Frictions
in Investment” and “Model No Search Frictions in Investment” refer, respectively, to the model
responses presented in Section 1.4 and the benchmark model in Appendix A.5. Impulse responses
expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
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Model with Investment Search FrictionsModel no Investment Search Frictions
Figure A.8: Impulse-Responses to an Equity Shock.
Note: Response of output, investment, consumption, hours worked, credit spreads, and capital
unemployment to a one-standard-deviation equity shock (ζ). Label “Model with Search Frictions
in Investment” and “Model No Search Frictions in Investment” refer, respectively, to the model
responses presented in Section 1.4 and the benchmark model in Appendix A.5. Impulse responses
expressed in percent deviations from steady state.
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A.3 Mapping from Investment Search Frictions
to Wedges
To further study the economic mechanism induced by the search friction in invest-
ment, this section considers a prototype economy with time-varying wedges (in the
spirit of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2007), and maps the equilibrium of the econ-
omy presented in Section 1.3 with search frictions in investment to wedges in the
prototype economy.
The prototype economy corresponds to a neoclassical growth model, with no disu-
tility from labor, and with time-varying exogenous productivity, taxes on capital
income, and government consumption. Agents in this economy are households, firms,














r̂kt K̂t + Ŵth+ Π̂
f
t , (A.2)
K̂t+1 = (1− δ)K̂t + Ît, (A.3)
where “hats” represent variables in the prototype economy; Ĉt denotes consumption
in period t, Ît denotes consumption in period t, K̂t denotes the stock of capital held
by households in period t, r̂kt denotes the rental rate of capital in period t taken
as given by households, τ̂ kt denotes a capital-income-tax in period t, Wt denotes the
wage rate in period t taken as given by households, h denotes the household (inelastic)
supply of hours of work to the labor market, T̂t denotes lump-sum taxes levied by
the government on households in period t, and Π̂ft denote lump-sum transfers from
the entrepreneurs to households in period t taken as given by households.
Firms rent capital and employ labor from households each period, in competitive
markets, to maximize profits, given by Π̂ft ≡ ÂtF (K̂t, ĥt) − r̂kt K̂t − Ŵtĥt, where Ât
denotes aggregate productivity in period t.
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The government budget constraint in the prototype economy is given by
Ĝt = T̂t, (A.4)
where Ĝt denotes an exogenous government consumption in period t.
Definition 7 (Equilibrium in the prototype economy with wedges). Given initial
conditions for capital, K̂0, and a sequence of wedges {Ât, Ĝt and τ̂ kt }, an equilibrium
in the prototype economy with wedges is a sequence of allocations {C̃t, Ĩt, K̃t+1} such
that three conditions are satisfied:












K̂t+1 = (1− δ)K̂t + Ît (A.6)
Ĉt + Ĝt + Ît = ÂtF (K̂t, h). (A.7)
Equation (A.5) is the standard intertemporal optimality condition for the house-
hold’s problem, with the rental rate of capital rkt replaced by its equilibrium value,
r̂kt = ÂtF1(K̂t, h). Equation (A.7) is the resource constraint of the prototype economy
obtained by aggregating the households’, firms’, and government’s budget constraints
and using the definition of firms profits.
To establish the mapping with the economy with investment search frictions, let
the efficiency wedge in the prototype economy, Ât, be given by
Ât = At(1− kut )α, (A.8)
where variables without “hat” denote allocations in the economy with investment
search frictions (Definition 2). Let the capital-income tax in the prototype economy









t − 1)− csθut . (A.9)
Let government consumption in the prototype, Ĝt, be given by
Ĝt = csθ
u
t (1− δ)kutKt. (A.10)
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Then the following equivalence result can be established.
Proposition 5. Let {Ct, It, Kt+1, kut+1, θut } denote equilibrium allocations of the econ-
omy with investment search frictions (Definition 2), for given initial conditions for
capital stock and capital-unemployment rate, K0 and ku0 , and sequences of aggregate
productivity, At. If the efficiency wedge is given by (A.8), the capital-income-tax wedge
is given by (A.9), and the government consumption wedge is given by (A.10), the al-
locations {Ct, It, Kt+1} constitute an equilibrium of the prototype economy (Definition
7).
Proof. See Appendix A.4. ■
From this proposition, it follows that the investment search frictions proposed
in this section manifest themselves as three wedges in a neoclassical growth model
without search frictions. First, an efficiency wedge, as shown in (A.8), is the direct
result of capital unemployment, the fact that only a fraction, 1 − kut , is used for
production in period t in the economy with investment search friction. Second, an
investment wedge, as shown in (A.9), relates the marginal benefits of saving to the
shadow value of employed capital, net of search costs. Third, a government spending
wedge, as shown in (A.10), subtracts search costs from the resources available to
the economy each period. It is relevant to note that the wedges of the prototype
economy without search frictions, defined in (A.8)–(A.10) depend on the evolution
of the endogenous state variable, kut . Therefore, the allocation of other models with
friction that manifest themselves as efficiency, investment or government spending




A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using the equilibrium market-tightness function (1.17), the first-order condition for
households (1.6) can be expressed as
− csθt(xut )q′(θt(xut )) = p′(θt(xut ))q(θt(xut ))(xut − 1), (A.11)
From Definition 1 and equation (A.11), it follows that sequences {Ct, It, Ket+1,
Kut+1, Λt, Qt, θut , xut } are a competitive equilibrium if an only if they satisfy the
following conditions
U ′(Ct) = Λt, (A.12)
Λt = βΛt+1(1− δ){p(θut+1)xt+1 − (1− p(θut+1))}, (A.13)





t+1, h) + (1− δ) (ψ + (1− ψ)Qt+1)
]
, (A.15)




Ket+1 = (1− ψ)(1− δ)Ket + Aetp(θut )(1− δ)Kut , (A.17)
Kut+1 = (1− θut )(1− δ)Kut + ψ(1− δ)Ket + It, (A.18)
AtF (K
e
t , h) = Ct + It + csθ
u
t (1− δ)Kut . (A.19)
To show that the competitive equilibrium is efficient, it must be shown that if
sequences {Ct, It, Ket+1, Kut+1,Λt, Qt, θut , xut } satisfy (A.12)–(A.19), they also satisfy
the social planner’s optimality conditions (1.23)–(1.29). Replacing the definitions of
capital-unemployment rate (1.20) and total capital stock in (A.17),(A.18), and (A.19),
and operating, equations (1.23), (1.24), and (1.25) are obtained. Pick Λt = Λspt ;
replacing in (A.12), equation (1.26) is obtained. Pick Qt = Qspt ; replacing in (A.15),
equation (1.28) is obtained. Replacing (A.16) in (A.14), and operating, equation
(1.28) is obtained. Finally, replacing (A.16) in (A.13), equation (1.29) is obtained.
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A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 5
To establish the mapping between the economy with investment search frictions and
the prototype economy with wedges, it must be shown that if sequences {Ct, It,
Kt+1, kut+1, θut } satisfy the social planner’s optimality conditions (1.23)–(1.29), and
wedges are defined by (A.8)–(A.9), then the allocations {Ct, It, Kt+1} also satisfy
(A.5)–(A.7).
Replacing the definition of the efficiency wedge, (A.8), and the definition of the
government consumption wedge, (A.10), on the resource constraint of the social plan-
ner’s problem, (1.23), the resource constraint of the prototype economy, (A.7), is ob-
tained. Replacing equation (1.26) and the definition of the capital-income-tax wedge
on the planner’s optimality condition (A.6), equation (1.23) is obtained. Finally, the
social planner’s capital-accumulation constraint (1.24) coincides with the prototype
economy’s capital-accumulation constraint, (A.5). Therefore, equations (A.5)–(A.7)
are satisfied.
A.5 Benchmark Business Cycle Economy
This section presents the benchmark business-cycle model used in Section 1.5 for
comparison with the model developed in Section 1.4. The only difference between
the two models is that the benchmark economy does not include investment search
frictions. The notation used in this section is the same as that presented in Section
1.4.
Goods. As in Section 1.4, there are perishable consumption goods, and capital
goods that depreciate at a rate δ > 0. Unlike 1.4, there is no distinction between
matched and unmatched capital.
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Agents. As in Section 1.4, the economy is populated by a large number of identical
households, entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries (see Figure 1.6).
Markets. As in Section 1.4, the economy has four competitive markets: goods,
labor, physical capital and credit (see Figure 1.6). The goods and labor markets are
frictionless. Unlike Section 1.4, the market for physical capital is also frictionless.
In this market, households and entrepreneurs trade capital at the price Qt. The
credit market is characterized by frictions associated with asymmetric information in
lending as described in Section 1.4.






βt{U (Ci,t − ρcCi,t−1)− V (hi,t;φt)},










The only difference with respect to the household’s problem presented in Section 1.4
is that households sell their capital stock to entrepreneurs in a centralized market at
the price Qt.










s.t. Lj,t − 1
Lj,t
Rt = [1− Fω (ωj,t+1;σt)]ωj,t+1Rkj,t+1 + (1− µm)
∫ ωj,t+1
0











rkj,t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
.
The difference with respect to the entrepreneur’s problem presented in section 1.4 is
that entrepreneurs only purchase capital in a centralized market at the price Qt.
190
Equilibrium. In equilibrium all markets clear. Similar to Section 1.4, aggregate
net worth evolves following the law of motion
Nt+1 = [1− Γt−1(ωt)]RktQt−1Kt + ζt. (A.20)
The net transfer from entrepreneurs to households is given by
Πt = [1− Γt−1(ωt)]RktQt−1Kt − ζt. (A.21)
The aggregate capital stock evolves following the law of motion










The economy’s resource constraint is given by
Ct + It +Gt = At(Kt)
α (ht)
(1−α) − Ωt − Cu(ut)Kt, (A.23)
where Ωt ≡ µgt−1(ωt)RktQk,t−1Kt.
An equilibrium in the benchmark economy can then be defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Competitive equilibrium). Given initial conditions for capital, K0
and consumption C−1, and a state-contingent sequence of aggregate exogenous states,
Sxt , a competitive equilibrium is a state-contingent sequence of individual allocations
and shadow values,
{(Ci,t, hi,t, Ii,t, ιhi,t, Kui,t+1, Bi,t, xui,t)i∈[0,1], (h̃j,t, uj,t, Lj,t, ωj,t+1)j∈[0,1]},{(Λi,t)i∈[0,1], (Qj,t)j∈[0,1]},
aggregate allocations, {Ct, It, ht, Ket+1, Kut+1, Nt,Πt}, prices, {Qct , Jut ,Wt}, and debt
schedules {Dt(h̃j,t, uj,t)}, such that:
(i) Individual allocations and shadow values solve the household’s and en-
trepreneur’s problems at the equilibrium prices and debt schedules, for all i
and j.
(ii) Debt schedules satisfy financial intermediaries’ participation constraint (1.53).




Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 List of Recession Episodes
Table B.1 lists the recession episodes included in the empirical analysis. The identi-
fication of recession episodes and their classification into low and high inflation and




Financial Crises Other Episodes
Country Peak Country Peak Country Peak Country Peak
Developed Market Economies
Australia 1990 Austria 1974 Italy 1980
Canada 1981 Austria 1981 Spain 1992
France 1992 Austria 1974 Sweden 1970
Germany 1974 Austria 1980 Sweden 1975
Germany 1980 Austria 1992 Sweden 1980
Italy 1992 Austria 2001 Switzerland 1974
Spain 1980 Canada 1990 Switzerland 1981
Sweden 1990 France 1974 Switzerland 1990
United Kingdom 1974 France 1980 Switzerland 2001
United Kingdom 1979 France 1982 United States 1953
United Kingdom 1990 France 2002 United States 1957
United States 1981 Germany 1966 United States 1960
United States 1990 Germany 1991 United States 1969
Germany 2001 United States 1973
Italy 1970 United States 1980
Italy 1974 United States 2001
Emerging Market Economies
Low Inflation Algeria 1985 Mexico 2000 Chile 1997
Algeria 1992 Morocco 1980 Morocco 1991
Argentina 1994 Morocco 1982 Morocco 1994
Brazil 1997 Morocco 1986 Morocco 1996
Colombia 1995 Panama 1982 Philippines 1990
Côte d’Ivoire 1982 Panama 1986 Tunisia 1981
Côte d’Ivoire 1986 Peru 1997 Tunisia 1985
Côte d’Ivoire 1991 Philippines 1997 Venezuela 1997
Côte d’Ivoire 1998 South Africa 1981
Côte d’Ivoire 2001 South Africa 1984
Korea 1996 South Africa 1989
Malaysia 1984 Thailand 1996
Malaysia 1997
High Inflation Algeria 1989 Mexico 1994 Argentina 1984
Argentina 1980 Nigeria 1980 Dominican Rep 1989
Argentina 1987 Peru 1981 Ecuador 1986
Argentina 1998 Peru 1987 Lebanon 1991
Brazil 1980 Philippines 1983 Mexico 1985
Brazil 1987 Russia 1997 Uruguay 1994
Brazil 1991 Turkey 1993
Bulgaria 1995 Turkey 1997
Chile 1981 Turkey 2000
Dominican Rep. 2000 Uruguay 1981
Ecuador 1981 Uruguay 1998
Ecuador 1998 Venezuela 1980
El Salvador 1980 Venezuela 1988
Indonesia 1997 Venezuela 1992
Lebanon 1988 Venezuela 1995
Mexico 1981 Venezuela 2001
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B.2 Proofs
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Around a solution of the firms’ problem (K∗, L∗) in which λ > 0, the complementary
slackness condition (2.7) implies that (2.4) holds with equality: (Z− θK−WL) = 0.
First, consider the case with θ > 0. This means that L = (Z/W − (θ/W )K) ≡ L(K),





















































Finally (2.4) holding with equality implies that ∂L/∂A < 0 and thus ∂L/∂A <
∂K/∂A. Second, consider the case with θ = 0. Equation (2.4) holding with equal-
ity implies that L = Z/W and thus ∂L/∂A = 0. Equation (2.5) implies that
AFK(K,Z/W ) = 1, and the implicit function theorem implies that ∂K/∂A > 0
and thus ∂L/∂A < ∂K/∂A.
B.3 A Quantitative Exercise of the Analytical
Framework
In this section, we perform a simple quantitative exercise to show that the analytical
framework presented in Section 2.5 can rationalize actual jobless recovery episodes. In
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particular, we calibrate the model and compare its predictions with actual data from
the US Great Recession. We begin by assuming the technology is Cobb–Douglas:
F (K,L) = KαL1−α. (B.1)
We assume, for simplicity, that θ = 0, corresponding to the case in which K is its own
collateral. Furthermore, we assume that real wages are constant (∆wt = 0 for every
t). This assumption is consistent with US data for the Great Recession (Shimer,
2012). We now solve the model for the case in which the credit constraint is binding,
and thus Equation (2.4) holds with equality. Thus, wL = Z and profits can be
expressed as
AZ1−α = Kα − (K + Z). (B.2)






Hence, assuming discrete time and denoting for any variable X, ∆xt = logXt −
logXt−1, we get





Our aim is to compare the model’s prediction for L and K with US data during the
Great Recession. The time unit is set equal to a quarter. We obtain data for L,
K, A and utilization from Fernald (2012). For L, we use hours worked; for A, we
use total factor productivity adjusted by utilization. We estimate Z, as the process
consistent with the model that reproduces the actual behavior of Y , that is, using
(B.4) and (B.5), ∆zt = ∆yt−1/(1−α)∆at. Following the estimate of Fernald (2012)
for 2007, we set α = 0.35 the year prior to the crisis. Results are presented in Figure
B.1. Panels a) and b) show the behavior of A and Z, the model’s inputs. It can
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a) Total Factor Productivity





















Figure B.1: Model Predictions: US Great Recession
Data Source: TFP adjusted by utilization, observed labor, capital and utilization: Fernald (2012)
be seen that A increases throughout the episode, while the estimated Z displays a
sharp contraction, consistent with the behavior of output. Panels c) and d) depict
the behavior of L and K. It can be observed that employment behavior predicted
by the model tracks closely the actual path of employment. In particular, the model




Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Omitted Constraints in Ramsey Problems
In Section 3.1, to characterize the allocation under the different exchange-rate
regimes, I follow the strategy of setting up the Ramsey problem dropping constraints;
this Appendix shows that the omitted constraints are satisfied.
C.1.1 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy






that satisfy (3.5), (3.12), (3.17), and (3.18)





















(3.7). Choose τ dt = 1 − Rtβ
Etλt+1+µt
λt














ξ F ′ (ht) to satisfy (3.16). Given wt−1,
pick ϵt to satisfy (3.11) with equality: ϵt = γ wt−1wt . Finally, since (3.11) holds with
equality, (3.13) always holds:
(





C.1.2 Full-Employment Exchange-Rate Policy






that satisfy (3.5), (3.17), (3.18), and













































to satisfy (3.16). Given wt−1, pick ϵt to satisfy (3.11) with equality: ϵt = γ wt−1wt . Fi-
nally, by (3.20) and (3.12), (3.13) always holds:
(





C.1.3 Fixed Exchange-Rate Policy




t , ht, wt, ϵt
}
that satisfy (3.5), (3.11)–(3.13),
(3.16)–(3.18), and (3.22), also satisfy (GE) and (3.22). Pick cNt = F (ht) to satisfy







ξ to satisfy (3.8). Pick µt = 0. This makes (3.9) holds.
















satisfy (3.6). Choose Tt to satisfy (3.14) as: Tt = τ dt dt+1R−1t .
C.2 Proofs
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The Ramsey problem of optimal exchange-rate policy under an optimal capital-






, subject to (3.5), (3.12),

















































where ϕFt , ϕ
µ
t , ϕηt , and ϕWt are Lagrange multipliers.
The optimality conditions associated with this problem (provided dt+1 < dN) are
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(3.12), (3.17), (3.18), the first-order conditions
ϕFt
Rt












































and the complementary slackness conditions

























First, consider the case with ξ < 1. Assume, contrary to the statement of the









. By (C.5) it follows that ϕWt = 0. By (C.3), and since cTt > 0,
ht > 0 F
′ (ht) > 0, UcAN
(







< 0, this implies that ϕµt > 0,













Second, consider the case with ξ ≥ 1. Assume, contrary to the statement of the
proposition, that under the optimal exchange-rate policy, at some date t, ht < h.
By (C.3), and since cTt > 0, ht > 0 F ′ (ht) > 0, UcAN
(














C.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4









t − dt + yTt
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By assumption d∗t+1 > d
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t − dt + yTt
) 1




> 0, by the assumption that
d∗t+1 > d
(




, it also follows that d∗t+1 > κyTt , and thus h∗t > 0.
C.2.3 Proof of Remark 1
As shown in Section 7.2.1, the optimality conditions associated with the problem
of optimal exchange-rate policy with capital-control taxes (Definition 1) are (3.12),
(3.17), (3.18), (C.1), (C.2) (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5). In an allocation in which at time
t, ht < h, by (C.5) it follows that ϕWt = 0. Replacing in (C.3), (3.24) is obtained.
C.3 Data Appendix
1. Sectoral data, Argentina: Constructed using data on value added from agriculture,
manufacturing, and services from the WDI dataset. The tradable sector was de-
fined as the sum of agriculture and manufacturing sectors. The nontradable sector
was defined as services. Data on relative prices was constructed using current and
constant value added on each sector.
2. External debt, Argentina: Measured using net foreign assets, obtained from Lane
and Milesi-Ferreti (2007) dataset.
3. National accounts, Argentina: Output, consumption, and net exports, obtained
from WEO dataset.
4. Interest rates: For Argentina, since 1994, the country interest rate on external debt
was measured as the sum of country EMBI spreads and the US Treasury-Bill rate,
obtained, respectively, from Datastream and the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis
datasets. The series were extended back to 1983 using Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
dataset, which uses a measure similar to the one considered here. The risk-free
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rate was measured with the Treasury-Bill rate. The interest rate series is then
deflated with a measure of expected dollar inflation. In particular, Rt is measured





, where it denotes the interest rate on Argentinean






the one-step-ahead forecast of an estimated AR(1). US CPI data was obtained
from the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis dataset. For EMs, spreads (Figure 4) were
measured with the EMBI, obtained from Datastream.
5. Unemployment rate, Argentina: Obtained from INDEC. Since 2003, excludes gov-
ernment social plan “Jefas y Jefes ” .
6. Nominal wage, Argentina: Obtained from Calvo, Coricelli and Ottonello (2012)
dataset.
7. Balance of payments, Argentina: Current account and factor services obtained
from IFS dataset.
8. Measured TFP, Argentina: Obtained from Aravena and Fuentes (2013) dataset.
9. Nominal exchange rates and international reserves, EMs: Obtained from IFS
dataset.
C.4 Recursive Formulation of the Optimal
Exchange-Rate Policy without
Capital-Control Taxes
This section shows how to obtain a recursive formulation of the problem of
optimal exchange-rate policy without capital-control taxes, using the recursive
saddle-point method developed in Marcet and Marimon (2011). Without capital-
control taxes, the general equilibrium dynamics are given by stochastic processes
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{cNt , cTt , ht, pt, wt, dt+1, λt, µt}∞t=0 satisfying the set of equations (GE′): {(3.5)–(3.9),
(3.11)–(3.13), (3.15)–(3.18)} given an exchange-rate policy {ϵt}∞t=0, initial conditions
w−1 and d0, and exogenous stochastic processes {yTt , Rt}∞t=0.
To characterize the allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy, without
optimal capital-control taxes, and under commitment, I begin by setting up the





t , ht, λt, µt
}
that satisfy (3.5)–(3.7), (3.9), (3.12), (3.17), and (3.18), also

















ξ F ′ (ht) to satisfy (3.16). Given wt−1,
pick ϵt to satisfy (3.11) with equality: ϵt = γ wt−1wt . Finally, since (3.11) holds with
equality, (3.13) always holds:
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cTt , F (ht)
))
(C.6)
s.t. dt+1 ≤ dN ,
λtR
−1



























t = dt + c
T















To obtain the recursive formulation using the method of Marcet and Marimon
(2011), the following steps are followed (as in Adam and Billi, 2005). First, set
the Lagrangean of problem (C.6), denoting ϕDt the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the forward looking constraint (3.6). Since equation (3.6) is forward-looking,
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some terms in the Lagrangean involve period t Lagrange multipliers multiplied by
period t + 1 controls (e.g., ϕDt Etλt+1). Second, in these terms, relabel the Lagrange
multipliers multiplied by period t + 1 controls as ϕ̃Dt+1. This relabeling defines a
“transition” equation: ϕDt = ϕ̃Dt+1. Third, define the period objective function,
H
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Fourth, using the equivalence results shown in Marcet and Marimon (2011), re-express

















s.t. ϕ̃Dt+1 = ϕ
D
t














t = dt + c
T

















Finally, rewrite the infinite-horizon saddle-point problem (C.8) in recursive form:
WOP
(

























































where time subscripts for variables dated in period t have been dropped, and a prime
is used to indicate variables dated in period t+ 1.
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